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China’s distinctive social media platforms have gained 
notable popularity among the nation’s vast number of 
internet users, but has China’s countryside been ‘left 
behind’ in this communication revolution?
Tom Mcdonald spent 15 months living in a small rural 
Chinese community researching how the residents use 
social media in their daily lives. His ethnographic findings 
suggest that, far from being left behind, many rural 
Chinese people have already integrated social media into 
their everyday experience.
Throughout his ground-breaking study, Mcdonald 
argues that social media allows rural people to extend 
and transform their social relationships by deepening 
already existing connections with friends known through 
their school, work or village, while also experimenting 
with completely new forms of relationships through 
online interactions with strangers. By juxtaposing these 
seemingly opposed relations, rural social media users are 
able to use these technologies to understand, capitalise 
on and challenge the notions of morality that underlie 
rural life.
ToM MCdonald  is Assistant Professor in the 
department of sociology, The University of Hong Kong. He 
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vIntroduction to the series Why We Post
This book is one of a series of 11 titles. Nine are monographs devoted to 
specific field sites (including this one) in Brazil, Chile, China, England, 
India, Italy, Trinidad and Turkey  – they will be published in 2016– 17. 
The series also includes a comparative book about all of our findings, 
published to accompany this title, and a book which contrasts the visu-
als that people post on Facebook in this same English field site with those 
on our Trinidadian field site.
When we tell people that we have written nine monographs about 
social media around the world, and that they all have the same chap-
ter headings (apart from Chapter 5), they are concerned about potential 
repetition. However, if you decide to read several of these books (which 
we very much hope you do), you will see that this device has been help-
ful in showing the precise opposite. Each book is as individual and dis-
tinct as if it were on an entirely different topic.
This is perhaps our single most important finding. Most studies 
of the internet and social media are based on research methods that 
assume we can generalise across different groups. We look at tweets in 
one place and write about ‘Twitter’. We conduct tests about social media 
and friendship in one population, and then write on this topic as if 
friendship means the same thing for all populations. By presenting nine 
books with the same chapter headings, you can judge for yourselves 
what kinds of generalisations are, or are not, possible.
Our intention is not to evaluate social media either positively or 
negatively. The purpose is educational, providing detailed evidence of 
what social media has become in each place, and the local consequences, 
including local evaluations.
Each book is based on 15 months of research during which time 
most of the anthropologists lived, worked and interacted with people, 
always in the local language. Yet they differ from the dominant tradition 
of writing social science books. Firstly they do not engage with the aca-
demic literatures on social media. It would be highly repetitive to have 
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the same discussions in all nine books. Instead discussions of these liter-
atures are to be found in our comparative book, How the World Changed 
Social Media. Secondly these monographs are not comparative, which 
again is the primary function of this other volume. Thirdly, given the 
immense interest in social media from the general public, we have tried 
to write in an accessible and open style. This means we have adopted 
a mode more common in historical writing of keeping all citations and 
the discussion of all wider academic issues to endnotes. If you prefer to 
read above the line, each text offers a simple narrative about our find-
ings. If you want to read a more conventional academic book that relates 
the material to its academic context, this can be done through engaging 
with the footnotes.
We hope you enjoy the results, and we hope you will also read our 
comparative book  – and perhaps some of the other monographs  – in 
addition to this one.
INTRODUC T ION TO THE SER I E S WHY WE POST
vii
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Note on the text
Transliteration
Names and certain words and quotations have been written in 
Mandarin, and Romanised according to the standard Pinyin system. 
A glossary of selected Pinyin terms with their accompanying Chinese 
characters and English equivalents is provided at the back of the 
volume.
Names
All personal and place (below provincial level) names have been 
altered to preserve the anonymity of participants in this study. A full 
discussion on anonymity appears in Chapter  1. Chinese personal 
names are written according to the normal ordering in Chinese 
(family name, followed by given name), with the exception of those 
authors of Chinese descent who have chosen to use alternative order-
ings or versions of their names in publications (i.e. Xinyuan Wang, 
Mayfair Yang).
Currency
RMB denotes renminbi, the official currency of mainland China. On the 
first day of conducting field work in China for this project (1 April 2013), 
US$1 was equal to 6.2 RMB.
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Introduction and field site:  
Down to the countryside
I had been living in rural Anshan Town for a couple of months when Li 
Kang, a local married man in his mid- twenties, invited me to accompany 
him on a short trip to a neighbouring town to run some errands. As we 
sat in his car I asked him to add me as a friend on WeChat (a popular 
Chinese social media platform). He explained that he could not do so, 
having deleted his own account a few days earlier. In the privacy of his 
car, he candidly recounted how a few days ago his wife, having (cor-
rectly) suspected that he had been using WeChat to meet and flirt with 
a woman from the nearby city, demanded to see her husband’s phone. 
Li Kang, wishing to destroy any evidence of this, deleted the entire 
account from his phone and claimed he no longer used the service.
Li Kang’s admission was striking as it contradicted other parts of 
his online profiles that I had seen. We were already friends on Qzone 
(another social media platform particularly popular among Anshan 
Town residents), where his profile page was full of family pictures, state-
ments made during trips away saying that he could not wait to return 
home to his family and memes regarding love and marriage. As I got to 
know Li Kang better, I realised his social media use oscillated between 
these two drastically different forms of social encounter:  on the one 
hand, private one- to- one messaging, not only with friends and family, 
but also strangers; on the other, the family- oriented postings he openly 
shared with friends and relatives on his social media profile. That peo-
ple have secrets, and present themselves differently to different people, 
is no particular revelation. However, social media places these sharply 
contrasting types of sociality adjacent to one another. This opposition 
seems even more extreme when it occurs in rural China, where these 
new modes of interaction are emerging against particularly prescriptive 
and constraining local moral norms.
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Cases such as Li Kang’s thus bring into sharp focus social media’s 
effect on the experience of everyday moral decision making in con-
temporary rural China. It is in the context of these judgements sur-
rounding the appropriateness of such technologies that this volume 
describes how, despite social media being a global phenomenon, its 
use always becomes articulated in specific, local ways. A key area for 
this book is the ongoing tension between two seemingly opposed types 
of relationships:  ‘friends’ and ‘strangers’. The first involves closed 
‘circles’ of personal friends from familiar, established and enduring 
offline social spheres (i.e. family, village, school and work), while the 
second allows users to find and interact with complete strangers for 
a variety of reasons, from romance to platonic friendship and some-
times just for relief from the intense familiarity of rural social life. 
As such, social media can be seen as a medium through which indi-
viduals extend and deepen a range of contrasting social relations, in 
addition to – on occasion – experimenting with ways to rework and 
redefine the boundaries of such relations.
While this opposition between relationships of ‘circles and strang-
ers’ constitutes a major focus of this volume, its broader objective is to 
provide a detailed ethnographic account of the use and consequences 
of social media in contemporary rural China. The majority of existing 
studies on internet and social media use in China have primarily focused 
on urban settings. This study aims to redress this imbalance, exploring 
not only the differences and commonalities of social media use between 
rural and urban China, but also how these platforms increasingly chal-
lenge such distinctions in the first place. The evidence for the analysis 
was collected during 15 months of ethnographic field work while I lived 
in Anshan Town and participated in its residents’ lives. This allowed me 
to witness – and be part of – everyday rural Chinese life for myself.
 As part of the field work, I befriended my research participants and 
sought to understand their online activities in the context of their offline 
lives, including their social relationships, work, how they spent their 
free time and their broader views and beliefs. This sustained engage-
ment often gave participants the confidence to share intimate details of 
how their lives were being reshaped through their use of social media 
(as seen in the above case of Li Kang), with many transformations being 
directly related to the town’s changing social landscape. This approach 
differs from many other studies of social media and the internet which 
attempt to understand the impact of such technologies purely through 
what happens online. Instead, I  have tried to ‘treat internet media as 
continuous with and embedded in other social spaces’.1
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This volume describes the role social media plays in contributing 
to, reflecting and allowing rural Chinese individuals to think through 
some of the major transformations occurring in their everyday lives.
Chapter outline: from circles to strangers
The book consists of seven chapters. As the volume progresses, the focus 
gradually shifts from profiling interactions with family and ‘circles’ of 
friends on social media to describing the growing frequency of encoun-
ters with strangers on the same platforms. Following this outline of the 
book, the current chapter sets the scene by reviewing existing schol-
arly approaches to the internet and social media in China, explaining 
the methodology of this study and introducing Anshan Town and its 
inhabitants.
The second chapter then moves on to examine how people in 
Anshan Town access the internet and the social media platforms they 
use. Two key discoveries are presented. Firstly, it is shown that the most 
frequent users of social media among townsfolk are students, young peo-
ple and younger adults. Secondly, it is shown how periods of migration 
to urban areas result in users adopting a more diverse range of social 
media platforms. This chapter thus emphasises the breadth and variety 
of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the town, and 
shows how social media use (and preferences toward using specific plat-
forms or features) often corresponds to particular social groups. A key 
factor determining the appeal of different social media platforms is the 
level of visibility they offer, something which is conducive to online soci-
ality among both circles of known friends and with strangers.
Chapter 3 considers what people in Anshan Town actually post on 
their social media profiles. It demonstrates that the most popular kinds 
of visual postings relate to the topics of raising children or the roman-
tic ideal of love and marriage. These postings therefore work to repro-
duce and reinforce idealised family relationships, which is especially 
significant given that the audience of these posts primarily consist of 
closed circles of familiar friends. This is an indication that the towns-
folk attempt to use social media in ways they feel are in keeping with 
their existing moral frameworks and which communicate common sets 
of ethical values within one’s own circle of friends.
Chapter 4 describes the dominance of non- kin relations based on 
principles of familiarity within these circles, highlighting the classmate 
group as a defining feature of such associations. This chapter also notes 
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how, in contrast to these familiar social groupings, young people in par-
ticular are increasingly using social media to interact with strangers, 
including as a means of forming romantic relationships. The growing 
popularity and ease with which these stranger finding services can be 
accessed is shown to result in some married couples also interpreting the 
stranger as a threat, fearing that social media use will lead to adultery, 
and ultimately resulting in couples generally avoiding such platforms 
as communication channels. The evidence indicates that social media 
challenges accepted understandings of the principle of familiarity as 
central to social relationships in rural China. In so doing, Chapter 4 also 
demonstrates how individuals use social media to conceptualise and 
respond to broader social change.
Chapter  5 examines the various systems that award points and 
levels to users, which are prevalent on many Chinese social media 
platforms. Young students in the town’s schools find these systems 
particularly appealing, as they offer opportunities for distinction and 
progression. Level accumulation means users often have to draw on 
the help of others from their own circle of online friends, despite this 
being at odds with the distinction such systems create within circles. 
Here the popularity of accumulating levels takes on a moral dimen-
sion, and is explained in relation to a broader Chinese cultural orien-
tation associated with entrepreneurialism. In this context, in addition 
to level accumulation being seen as an outward- facing status accumu-
lating activity, users also describe the practice as having an important 
inward- facing aspect of self- improvement. The diligence, perseverance 
and even manipulation demanded of users to successfully accumulate 
levels therefore becomes an ethical activity. The chapter also notes 
the important role of physical money in these systems, which offers an 
accelerated route to higher status. This demonstrates how townsfolk see 
social media reflecting and embodying the broader changes in material 
consumption that have taken place in Chinese society in recent years.
Chapter  6 focuses on how the town’s social media users view 
and interact with broader sets of relations through these platforms, 
most notably local, regional and national levels of government. 
Censorship and propaganda are discussed from the perspective of how 
they are experienced by participants, who seek to understand them 
in relation to their own moral frameworks. This control over social 
media is then contrasted against the growing desire of some users to 
exploit its economic potential – again drawing on the virtuous nature 
of entrepreneurialism, albeit this time oriented towards exchange 
with strangers. Finally the chapter asks whether moral concerns 
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regarding the consequences of social media use in the town may be par-
tially addressed by reconfiguring the monetised nature of social media 
platforms.
The final chapter of this volume will discuss the broader signifi-
cance of the study in three areas: circles and strangers, the morality of 
media and ‘the Chinese internet’. It will be argued that highlighting this 
study’s focus on sociality and the social relations occurring with circles 
of friends and of strangers online points towards the growth of indi-
vidualistic ideals in the management of social relations in rural China. 
Secondly, it is asserted that a consideration of morality in relation to 
communication technology use can provide a particularly fruitful way 
to understand the ethical dilemmas facing ordinary Chinese citizens. 
Finally, the implications of the case of rural China on our understand-
ing of the impact of the internet and social media more broadly are dis-
cussed, arguing that this specific case provokes us to challenge accepted 
ways of framing studies into technology use.
Ways of understanding social media in rural China
The chief aim of this volume is to provide a rounded account of how 
social media affects the lives of Anshan Town people. The separate 
comparative volume in the series discusses many of the theoretical 
debates that surround social media in general, including a detailed 
discussion of the specific approaches to carrying out ethnographies 
of social media.2 For that reason, the focus of this literature review is 
confined to an overview of three key themes central to understanding 
social media use in China to date: the concept of ‘the Chinese internet’, 
studies of specific online services and platforms, and internet use in 
rural China.
The problem of ‘the Chinese internet’
The dramatic growth in the number of Chinese internet users – reach-
ing 649  million people in 20143 (more than any other country in the 
world)4 – has inspired an increased interest in documenting and under-
standing this expansion, resulting in the publication of thousands of 
academic publications on internet and ICT use in China.5 This literature 
review does not attempt to survey the entire range of these publications, 
as other scholars have already conducted extensive analysis of these 
bodies of literature.6 These ‘meta- reviews’ have highlighted several key 
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trends of research about the internet in China, including preferences 
towards specific themes of study, approaches and a focus on particular 
social groups and organisations.
Many studies have discussed China’s online environment in 
national terms, often referring to ‘the Chinese internet’. As early as 
2004, one review article noted how scholars generally concentrate on 
‘the demographic, operational and evaluative dimensions of internet 
developments at macro levels, attempting to reach conclusions about 
the Chinese nation or even entire human society as a whole’.7 The dan-
ger of generalising about China’s internet use is indicated by statisti-
cal data which emphasises disparities in penetration rates between 
users in different provinces (Beijing has the highest penetration 
rate at 75.3 per cent, while Jiangxi province in China’s interior has 
only 34.1 per cent) and between urban and rural settings (72.5 and 
27.5 per cent respectively). Differences also exist between users of dif-
ferent genders (56.4 per cent male users, 43.6 per cent female users) 
and ages (78.1 per cent of users are aged between 10 and 39 years).8 
Although these figures indicate differing levels of uptake between pop-
ulations, they remain of limited use for describing why this may be the 
case, or how users in these different groups actually use the internet. 
Such information would make challenging generalised accounts more 
straightforward.
The tendency for research into internet use in China to jump to 
the macro level means that historical, regulatory, infrastructural factors 
and online discourses are frequently ignored,9 with the analysis tending 
to view the Chinese internet ‘in isolation from its social, political, and 
cultural contents and contexts’.10 A focus on the macro level means that, 
with certain exceptions, local and regional issues surrounding the adop-
tion and impact of the internet in China have received comparatively 
less attention. This book attempts to address such issues by focusing 
on a single rural town and the population’s everyday practices of social 
media, including the ramifications it has for households, families, social 
relationships and existing linkages people have with surrounding urban 
areas and networks.
In addition to the disproportionate emphasis given to national or 
global  level analysis, a further imbalance exists in the chosen themes 
of research into internet use in China. International scholarship has 
typically prioritised issues such as telecommunications infrastructure, 
censorship and social control.11 A strong correlation has also been noted 
between the themes covered in popular media reportage surrounding 
the Chinese internet and those researched by academics.12
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A final theme in these review articles regards who constitutes 
the ‘subject’ of China internet research. One review article notes that 
most international publications focus on the Chinese Communist Party 
(CPC) and other state authorities as the ‘owners’ or decision makers of 
the internet, with commercial businesses and generic ‘internet users’ 
(assumed to be young, male and urban) being another strong focus.13 
The same article notes that relatively few studies have researched how 
students and young people (5.3 per cent in total), farmers (1.4 per cent), 
migrants and ‘left- behind’ groups (1.3 per cent) use the internet. These 
groups constitute a major proportion of internet users in Anshan Town.
It is also worth comparing how international scholarship on the 
Chinese internet compares with domestic scholarship conducted by 
Chinese researchers within China. Qiu and Bu have noted that domes-
tic scholarship predominantly adopts technocentric frameworks, often 
neglecting to discuss the role of people and instead focusing ‘on larger 
contexts, the technologies per se, organizational structures, or online 
content’.14 In common with international scholarship, the ‘left- behind’ 
user groups are similarly overlooked by many studies, while domestic 
Chinese scholars are more likely to focus on actors such as the media, 
websites and journalists than their international counterparts.15 By 
examining the appropriation of the internet into everyday life in rural 
settings, my own study aims to contribute to an area that has been 
largely under- researched by both groups. A focus on social media adds 
further definition to the scope of the study.
Social media on ‘the Chinese internet’
A second effect of the generalising discourse surrounding ‘the Chinese 
internet’ has been that it has resulted in surprisingly few studies dedi-
cated to discussing the specific platforms, their features and the prac-
tices of use they engender. This is particularly concerning given the 
variety of unique social media services found on the internet in China.
One notable exception to this general avoidance of discussing 
specific platforms comes from a cluster of publications that emerged 
between 2007 and 2011, which examined the use of blogs in China16 and 
reflected the popularity of blogging services among Chinese users at that 
time. This set of studies included arguments that blogging created new 
fora for the discussion of competing viewpoints and so might expand 
a sort of ‘unofficial democracy’ 17 among citizens, increasing political 
discussion and personal expression.18 Others claimed blogging in China 
constituted a form of playful subversion of authoritarian discourse,19 
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for example highlighting how rhetoric, code  words and humour were 
employed to challenge power.20 A counter  argument claimed that rather 
than being activist in nature, blogging practices in China had become 
increasingly mundane and trivial.21 Taken as a whole, these discussions 
about blogs can be seen as reproducing many of the arguments that had 
already featured in the generalised discussions regarding ‘the Chinese 
internet’.
Beyond blogs, the arrival of social media platforms have brought 
further change to the internet in China and several scholars have 
attempted to address this change, albeit within a similarly constrained 
set of themes and methodologies. One paper attempts to describe the 
evolution of social networking sites in China; however, here too analysis 
centres on general discussions of whether social media as a whole has 
negative or positive consequences, supported by a number of isolated 
national and regional events.22 Longstanding debates on censorship, 
social control or free speech have been transplanted on to the novel form 
of social media.23 Other papers analyse factors shaping the adoption24 
and continued use of 25 social networking sites; these have tended to rely 
on online surveys with limited contextual information from which to 
draw their conclusions.26
Microblogs (weibo) – specifically the platform Sina Weibo – have 
attracted the greatest level of scholarly attention of all social media plat-
forms in China. Here, too, there has been a strong tendency for academic 
researchers ‘to oscillate between seeing information and communica-
tions technologies (ICTs) as “liberation technologies” and emphasising 
the Chinese state’s authoritarian resilience and adaptive use of ICTs’.27 
Scholars, particularly those working outside China, have frequently 
sought to understand how censorship operates on these microblogs 
through automated collection and analysis of the types of posts deleted 
and searches blocked,28 and commentary on users’ strategies in response 
to these constraints.29 Other methods have tried to analyse the postings 
that appear on these platforms on the assumption that they are indica-
tive of public sentiment.30 While these discussions have been valuable 
in helping to understand how microblogs have reformulated both public 
expression and authoritarian control on the internet in China, they have 
provided little insight into how these platforms fit into individual lives 
beyond the domain of public political participation. Furthermore, the 
focus on microblogs has meant that many other popular platforms have 
received comparatively less attention.
In summary, although the internet in China has undergone sub-
stantial change in the last decade in terms of platforms, access and use, 
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scholarshp has tended to apply established theoretical frameworks and 
modes of analysis to these new communication technologies. This study 
advocates an alternative approach:  to actually engage with users of 
these technologies in order to understand why the platforms appeal to 
them. Such an approach will allow analysis of the way internet users 
frequently move between a range of platforms, devices and online and 
offline environments in the course of their daily lives, consuming, pro-
ducing and sharing content in the process.
Internet use in rural China
Rural internet users have frequently occupied a marginal space in many 
studies of Chinese internet use31 on the assumption in press, public and 
even some academic accounts that ICT use in the countryside is either 
non- existent or is substandard when compared to urban areas.32 This is 
despite the fact, as previously mentioned, that 27.5 per cent of the coun-
try’s internet users – some 178 million people – are rural residents.33
One of the most exemplary areas of existing scholarship that par-
tially covers the issue of rural citizens is the study of China’s migrant 
populations. Since the majority of China’s internal migrants originate 
from the countryside, this group arguably represents an ‘uprooted’ rural 
population whose ICT use is characterised by very particular needs 
and behaviours. One comprehensive account notes how migrant popu-
lations rely on a new generation of affordable communication technolo-
gies, a phenomenon which has helped to sustain and shape the migration 
process,34 while noting that other complex economic and non- economic 
factors are also at play.35 Another detailed study emphasises the unique 
experience of mobility for Chinese rural migrants who, despite hav-
ing undergone rural- to- urban migration, find that the nature of their 
employment often restricts their physical mobility, requiring them to 
stay in the same place for long hours.36 As such, ICTs – especially smart-
phones – become incredibly important by allowing migrants to expand 
their social networks. These accounts manage to situate users’ online 
practices within the specific offline world they experience as migrant 
labourers, and in so doing provide an illuminating description of the 
relationships between the two worlds. While the above examples pro-
vide valuable insight into the unique aspirations and priorities of rural 
individuals resettling in cities, they cannot be assumed necessarily to 
apply to rural populations who remain in their place of origin.
Aside from this literature on rural migrants, other approaches 
to understanding ICT use include technical literature on the systems 
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designed for use in rural areas and the limited quantitative and (partic-
ularly) qualitative work on actual use of ICTs in rural areas. An import-
ant step forward came in a recent special issue of the Chinese Journal 
of Communication which highlighted the general lack of attention 
afforded to rural internet use,37 and showcased the range of qualitative 
and quantitative methods that could be applied to understanding spe-
cific rural contexts of use.38 While this helpfully acknowledges the need 
for Chinese internet studies to address rural perspectives, what is still 
missing are those accounts that emerge from long- term sustained eth-
nographic engagement of the type in this study.
A further issue identified as clouding discussions of the impact of 
the internet in the Chinese countryside comes from a continuing ten-
dency to treat the rural as a domain that is the opposite of the urban, 
and completely separate from it. Wallis challenged the term ‘Chinese 
countryside’ pointing out that places considered to be rural in China 
can differ drastically, ranging from areas ‘almost indistinguishable from 
the city in terms of transportation and communication infrastructure’ 
to especially remote settings ‘where nobody had computers or Internet 
connections’.39 Indeed, part of the reason why many urban Chinese 
may believe that the rural environment has no internet comes from a 
romanticised understanding of the Chinese countryside.40 However, 
rather than being frozen in a timeless past, numerous anthropological 
accounts have emphasised changes in the material culture of the coun-
tryside,41 and a new form of the ‘modern everyday’ 42 has been proposed 
as a way of describing the experience of life in contemporary rural 
Chinese. In a Chinese village one may now reasonably expect to meet ‘a 
variety of consumer goods and means of communication, including TVs, 
mobile phones, and internet’ in addition to rampant house construction, 
increasing integration with regional and national market economies, 
growing levels of literacy, and an awareness of and participation in 
modernist discourses.43
The concept of the modern everyday is especially useful when 
framing a study of social media use in a rural setting. It allows for the 
internet and social media to be viewed as a modernising influence 
bringing with it social change and possible types of translocal connec-
tions, while also acknowledging that these technologies find themselves 
embedded into everyday practices and contexts.
This review has described the pervasiveness of a narrow set of 
themes and methodologies that has defined research into Chinese 
internet use, a general lack of focus on the specificities of different 
social media platforms and their use, and a need to see social media 
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as embedded in the everyday lives of rural Chinese citizens. It is these 
areas of social media use in Anshan Town that this study attempts to 
address.
Locating Anshan Town
This book describes the use and impact of social media in a single rural 
township called Anshan Town. Although the townsfolk clearly identify 
themselves as being rural – as does the government, which assigns rural 
category household registration permits (hukou) to its residents  – the 
character of the town, its residents and its deepening links with sur-
rounding urban areas conform to the experience of the ‘modern every-
day’ as described in the previous section. Anshan Town is located in east 
China’s coastal province of Shandong. The province’s wealth is largely 
concentrated in the manufacturing- heavy coastal regions; however, as 
one moves further west inland towards the provincial capital of Jinan 
and nearby Anshan Town (Fig. 1.1), the amount of industry decreases 
and the landscape becomes comparatively more rural.
Beijing
Shandong province
Jinan municipality
Shanghai
Hong Kong
Adapted from Wikimedia Commons
Anshan Town
Fig. 1.1 Location of Anshan Town in China
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Jinan city is divided into four districts and the surrounding subur-
ban and rural area (which still falls under the city’s administrative remit) 
is divided into six ‘county- level’ areas, comprising a mixture of districts, 
counties and one further city. Anshan Town is located in Bai County, 
which is administered from a large, central county town – Bai Town – 
with a population of around 100,000. Nestled within Bai County’s hilly 
landscape is the valley township of Anshan Town.
The township has a total area of around 90 square km, in the cen-
tre of which lies Anshan Town. The administrative town consists of 
just a few government offices, although in practice when people refer 
to Anshan Town they mean four relatively contiguous villages (Baige, 
Heige, Huangtian and Xintian) that have grown to form an almost 
unbroken built- up area of around 1.5 square km. Official figures place 
the combined population of this central town area at 6,000 persons. The 
remainder of the township contains a further 37 scattered villages, with 
populations in each village ranging from around 125 to 2,500 persons. 
The total population of the entire township stands at around 31,000 
persons.
The main town is laid out along three main streets running north 
to  south and another three east  to  west. The southernmost east– west 
street is referred to by locals as ‘commercial street’, as it contains the 
majority of the town’s shops and supermarkets, as well as the police sta-
tion and a small number of residential buildings. Running parallel to 
this is a street containing the town’s government offices, taxation office, 
family planning office, middle school and a sizeable factory for heating 
systems, which is the town’s largest employer.
While townsfolk continue to identify Anshan Town (and them-
selves) as rural, the urban is encroaching on the edge of the township. 
A  luxury golf course has been built just outside the township, and a 
cluster of universities relocated from Jinan have established a new 
‘University City’ development between Anshan Town and Bai Town. 
Within the town itself, many roads are newly surfaced and four  lanes 
wide, which, when combined with the scarcity of vehicles on them, acts 
as testament to the government’s ambitious plans to build capacity for 
future use. Large engineering projects, such as the construction of wind 
turbines in the mountains surrounding the town, make modernisation 
a concrete reality for townsfolk, and are reflected on a smaller scale by 
their own house building projects. As this book will show, social media 
appears as one among these and numerous other manifestations of 
modernity in the town. Townsfolk experience modernisation as a source 
of problematic change, while simultaneously seeing it as increasingly 
INTRODUC T ION AND f I ELD S I T E :  DOWN TO THE COUNTRYS IDE 13
integrated in, and essential to, many aspects of their everyday lives. In 
this way, social media technologies become a significant point around 
which multiple moral issues arise and are reflected upon.
Moral frameworks in Anshan Town
A number of scholars have provided accounts of the changing moral and 
ethical values present in rural China during the reform era.44 Many of 
these accounts have emphasised that the transition towards a market 
economy, along with a growing sense of consumerism, has combined 
with the retreat of the state from many areas of public life, and resulted 
in increasing concern among rural people of a perceived breakdown of 
moral principles in society. Scholars have emphasised growing individ-
ualism45 or the absence of a clearly defined moral economy46 in society 
as the source of such decline. Steinmüller provides a convincing critique 
of accounts of the ‘loss of morality’, noting that individuals still retain 
some form of moral code on which they are willing to base ‘strong’ moral 
judgements, but it is just that these moral codes differ from those held 
in the past.47
Drawing on the work of Charles Taylor,48 Steinmüller argues for an 
understanding of how ‘moral frameworks emerge in action’, rather than 
presupposing there exists a specific ‘Chinese self’ or a universal norma-
tive ethics.49 Instead he proposes a need to understand the emergence of 
these moral frameworks not through unusual moments of moral crisis, 
in which ethics become a ‘second level reflection of morality’, but rather 
by paying attention to the ‘everyday ethics’ of rural life, acknowledging 
that the modern is now present in daily life in the Chinese countryside, 
and demonstrating how rural people respond to the moral challenges of 
this transformed life.50 I have found this concept particularly useful as 
I sought to understand how the people of Anshan Town handled social 
media in their everyday lives.
Although I share Steinmüller’s aversion to assuming there is a spe-
cific ‘Chinese self’, the specific geo- cultural location of Anshan Town, 
and this region of the Shandong province more generally, adds a unique 
aspect to this case, as both its residents and outsiders view the area as 
making a special contribution to China’s cultural heritage. Chinese peo-
ple from outside Shandong province generally characterise its inhabi-
tants as being especially ‘friendly’, ‘good hosts’ (haoke) and ‘sincere 
and honest’ (pusu). These stereotypical traits are often attributed more 
broadly to the region’s cultural and historical heritage,51 which is seen 
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to have influenced the entire country’s civilisation. Shandong’s cul-
tural history was also a source of pride for people from Anshan Town. 
Townsfolk often proudly explained to me that they were influenced by 
Confucius, the Chinese philosopher who was born close by in 551 bc52 
and whose teachings emphasised the nurturing characteristics of filial 
piety, duty, sincerity, wisdom, honesty and courage.53
An additional contribution to this cultural milieu is spiritual. The 
hills around Anshan Town are home to a significant number of Daoist 
and Buddhist temples (Fig. 1.2), and slightly further afield are religious 
sites of national importance. Townsfolk relate to these religious tradi-
tions pragmatically. While many families visit the Daoist temple during 
the bi- annual temple festivals,54 few formally study The Analects, Dao de 
jing or other religious texts. When townsfolk were asked to identify their 
religion in a questionnaire, around 85 per cent left the answer blank; 
9 per cent responded with none; a single person each identified them-
selves as being either Buddhist, Christian or Islamic; and one individual 
(in jest) listed their personal religion as ‘the Communist Party’.55 These 
figures are roughly similar to larger national level surveys.56 However, 
even though they do not identify with a particular religion, a significant 
proportion of townsfolk regularly cited the influence of these traditions 
to account for the good- natured character of local people.
Fig. 1.2 A Daoist temple in Anshan Town
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The town and its people: an outsider’s view
The moral qualities attributed to Anshan town people can be perceived 
through the opinions of outsiders living in the town. Peng Lei was a 
25- year- old male engineer from China’s Hebei province who was tem-
porarily living in Anshan Town, working on a utilities construction 
project for a large national company. Peng Lei and four colleagues lived 
in a rented house on the edge of Huangtian village, and typically spent 
much of each working day in the town’s outlying villages overseeing 
onsite work.
Ping Lei considered Anshan Town to be a backwater. Having grown 
up in rural China himself, he had hoped his career would have brought 
him to more exciting places than this. In the evenings Peng Lei lay on his 
bed with his laptop or phone, browsing the social media profiles of for-
mer university classmates, envious of their ‘exciting’ lives in large cities. 
Peng Lei complained of Anshan Town’s blandness and lack of amenities:
The people in our company all think this place is too poor. Only 
the roads are wide, but really its spending power is just not yet 
present . . . There are no real shops . . . the town ought to have a big 
supermarket.
Peng Lei and his colleagues would drive to Bai Town at least once a week 
to shop in the large supermarket there, or to eat at one of its many res-
taurants. By contrast, while in Anshan Town, Peng Lei spent his free 
time mainly using his Lenovo laptop or one of his two smartphones to 
keep in touch with his former classmates and his girlfriend (who was 
in another city in China) or to watch films. Despite Peng Lei finding life 
in Anshan Town to be tedious, he was able to acknowledge some merits 
regarding how townsfolk organised their lives:
As far as China goes, Anshan Town isn’t that bad. Let’s say you com-
pare it with other [places]. There aren’t many people, spending 
power is low, but they do have their own factories which increases 
people’s salary, and helps to resolve China’s [family] ‘harmony prob-
lem’ (hexie wenti). Nowadays, so many people leave their hometown 
to find work, spending long periods of time living apart from each 
other. The divorce rate is high, and it is impossible to look after the 
children. This creates many problems for society, for example chil-
dren who lack their parents’ love, and only get to see them once a 
year. I’ll try my hardest to avoid getting into this kind of situation.
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Peng Lei’s description notes how, unlike many parts of rural China 
where people abandon their villages to search for work in cities, Anshan 
Town’s local industry creates local economic conditions that are favour-
able enough to persuade some residents to stay. Local government fig-
ures indicate that around 60 per cent of people living in the township’s 
villages chose to remain in their home villages rather than migrating 
to either Anshan Town centre or nearby urban districts. In this climate, 
local development is made apparent to townsfolk through the increasing 
adoption of a range of new technologies, consumer goods and infrastruc-
tures appearing in the town, including social media, which allow people 
to participate in modernity while remaining in their place of origin.
One of the questions that emerges from the relative rootedness of 
Anshan Town people is how their social media use interacts with the moral 
frameworks, as outlined above, that they confront on a daily basis. The 
impacts of technology on tradition in China are often framed by scholars in 
terms of whether new ‘foreign’ technologies such as the internet are com-
patible with Confucian values, or whether they will have a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
effect on China’s development.57 This approach not only ignores the fact 
that far from being an alien technology, internet use in China now occurs 
on local platforms using domestic brand smartphones and other techno-
logies, but it also assumes that a given technology will cause people to act 
in a certain way (this way of thinking is known as techno- determinism). 
For this study, rather than assuming that traditions are fixed, constant and 
rooted in the past and thus challenged by the presence of new technolo-
gies, I have instead used the term ‘moral framework’ to emphasise the way 
that moral norms are in fact distributed throughout any society, and are 
constantly being constructed and challenged by its members.
Thus, rather than treating society and technology as separate from 
each other, this study takes the approach that social media use needs to 
be understood within the context of broader shifts in these moral frame-
works (which were already occurring in the town prior to the arrival of 
social media). This book will consider not only how these frameworks 
may be challenged by the advent of such media, but also how the social 
media platforms provide new spaces where moral positions can be 
reproduced and reinterpreted.
Households and families
The moral frameworks referred to here often related to concerns regard-
ing family, so it is worth noting the enduring importance of living in 
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multi- generation families in a single household. Our initial survey ques-
tionnaire, carried out at the beginning of the field work, helped to pro-
vide a general feel for household composition, and also highlighted how 
townsfolk generally avoid living on their own (Table 1.1).58
Furthermore, 86 per cent of those surveyed were nuclear families, 
with only 6 per cent living in a stem household (i.e. a family in which 
three generations, including one or more grandparents on one side 
live together under one roof); 3 per cent lived in extended or other 
family arrangements. These figures align with other research on rural 
China that documented a transformation in rural family structure in 
reform- era China as growing numbers of newly- married couples choose 
to live separately from their parents, or elderly parents were housed sep-
arately.59 For the vast majority of persons in the town, family still consti-
tutes a major presence.
Family structure was also shaped by the family planning policies 
of the area. While in Jinan or Bai Town, where couples with a household 
registration category of ‘urban’ have been restricted to having only one 
child,60 in rural areas such as Anshan Town, in an effort to accommodate 
the preference for male offspring, if the first- born child was a girl cou-
ples were allowed to give birth to a second child. Few townsfolk contra-
vened these restrictions: 61 of 312 middle school students surveyed, only 
2.7 per cent reported having an older brother (see Table 1.2).62 However, 
if the first- born child63 were a girl, she would almost inevitably have a 
younger sibling.
The issue of educating their offspring constituted a major concern 
for families, reflecting its perceived importance for family prosperity 
and moral cultivation.64  Anshan Town has both a large elementary and 
a middle school. A further eight elementary schools operate in key vil-
lages. Government policies to consolidate the delivery of education in 
larger ‘standardised schools’ has resulted in the closure of many small 
Table 1.1 Household size distribution among survey respondents
Household size (persons) Frequency Per cent
1 7 6.3
2 25 22.5
3 42 37.9
4 30 27.0
5+ 7 6.3
Total 111 100.0
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elementary and middle schools in the township. Recent years have seen 
a proliferation of expensive (and illegal) private tuition classes that 
operate during the summer holidays, the popularity of which reflect 
the willingness of parents to invest in their offspring’s education. The 
town’s only high school also closed in 1994, forcing many young people 
to migrate to urban areas on graduation from middle school in order to 
continue their formal education.
Employment
Anshan Town people overall are very hardworking, with individuals 
often balancing several different jobs. For instance, Tang Xiaoguang, a 
teacher of ‘ethics and morals’ (sixiang pinde) in the local middle school, 
supplemented his income by running two lottery ticket stalls in the 
town, in addition to selling photo printing services. Despite such moon-
lighting being commonplace, there are nonetheless several main types 
of employment, many of which are highly gendered in nature. These 
occupations play a major role in determining individuals’ social and 
physical mobility, which in turn affects their social media use. Some of 
the main occupation types are described in the following subsections.
Manual workers: from farms to factories
Manual workers are largely males between 20 and 40  years old, who 
either work on their family’s own farm, as temporary unskilled labour-
ers in construction or (increasingly) are employed by several factories 
that manufacture pressurised heating systems for apartment and office 
complexes. These few factories are major contributors to the town’s 
economy, employing around a thousand predominantly local labourers, 
Table 1.2 Survey results showing reported types of sibling relations among 
middle school students
Sibling of which respondent 
indicates having at least one
Number Per cent
Older brother 8 2.7
Younger brother 49 16.4
Older sister 71 23.8
Younger sister 35 11.7
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including welders, electricians and machine operators. The average fac-
tory labourer earns around 3,500 RMB ($564) per month which exceeds 
the town’s average monthly salary of 2,820 RMB ($454). This compares 
favourably with families who depend solely on farming (often from out-
lying villages), and who earn only around 1,500 RMB ($242) a month.
Factory work is gendered by industry. A  small number of adult 
females work on the factory floor of the largest heating factories; how-
ever factory management typically considered them unsuitable for 
especially ‘heavy work’ (tili huo). The town also has two small garment 
factories that produce clothes for the domestic market, both of which 
employ only female labourers.
Official local government figures from 2006 suggest that indus-
try and agriculture contributed to the town’s GDP in roughly equal 
measure. Since then, more and larger factories have opened, although 
agricultural labour still remains significant. As men have increasingly 
taken on profitable factory work, women have been left to perform an 
ever- greater share of agricultural work. Men still participate in farming 
when required, most notably around the autumn harvest (qiushou) and 
spring planting periods. The factories accommodate this by ramping 
down production at this time, allowing their workforce to return home 
during busy agricultural periods. These local factories – employing local 
labourers – thus reflect an aspect of industrial China that differs from 
the established portrayal of migrant labourers in factories far from their 
place of origin.65
The main crops of the area are wheat, corn, peanuts, sweet pota-
toes and increasingly fruits such as cherries and peaches. Most farmers 
continue to grow produce largely by hand. Families who depend solely 
on farming earn noticeably less than those who diversify. For young peo-
ple, and particularly for males with few qualifications, factory work thus 
represents a route to a fairly stable salary, despite its physical demands.
I’m at home studying, but I don’t know what to study. I would like 
to learn the skills necessary for the kind of job that involves lying 
in bed at home, but in which you can still earn money. Does any-
body have this kind of job? It doesn’t matter if the money isn’t very 
much. Whoever has it, let me know. Thanks everyone.
Status update on Zhao Xun’s Qzone page
Zhao Xun, a 24- year- old, had never been good at studying, in fact he 
never successfully graduated from middle school. This limited his 
choices for further study and while there was the option of a factory 
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job in Beijing or Shanghai, everyone he knew was in Anshan Town, so 
he started working as a labourer in a local factory. Despite the salary 
being lower than in Jinan, living at home meant ultimately he could save 
more money.
Zhao Xun enjoys his job because his girlfriend, also from Anshan 
Town, works in the same factory workshop as he does. Her picture some-
times appears on his status updates, dressed in the factory uniform. 
Zhao Xun has been using social media since 2000, and currently uses 
it for about three hours each day, mostly during lunch breaks or in the 
evenings after work. Zhao Xun’s other love is football. He plays in the 
town’s informal football team, and helps to administer the team’s social 
media chat group.
Service jobs: small- private traders, government and enterprise
Service jobs in the town can be divided into two main types: small pri-
vate traders and ‘desk jobs’ in government, state- owned and private 
enterprise employees. The town’s service sector is predominantly made 
up of female workers.
The first category, ‘small private traders’ (getihu), are mainly con-
centrated on the town’s commercial street and provide a range of basic 
necessities, including a solicitor, stationers, beautician, make- up store, 
alcohol wholesaler, two petrol stations, furniture stores, glaziers, baker-
ies, steamed bun makers, photocopy shops, butchers, food staple stores 
and home appliance stores, three hairdressers, small supermarkets, and 
pharmacies, and several clothing shops and small corner shops. There 
are ten restaurants in Anshan Town itself, with several others in the 
countryside around the township.
Many small traders operate as family- run businesses, with a mar-
ried couple typically working together. In such cases, the husband tends 
to be more mobile, doing deliveries or picking up goods, while the wife 
spends a greater amount of time watching over the store. Some stores, 
such as clothing, make- up supplies and small supermarkets, are almost 
entirely staffed by women.
‘Desk jobs’ in official work  units comprise a second type of service 
employment.66 They are found in the government offices and state- 
owned and private enterprises operating in the town. In these organ-
isations, males often occupy higher status positions. For example, the 
post office and two banks mainly employ female bank clerks, although 
the bank managers are invariably male. In the town government women 
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tend to spend more time in the office performing administrative tasks 
and dealing with public enquiries, while their male counterparts, nor-
mally leaders who occupy higher positions, spend more time outside the 
office meeting people. The majority of employees in these organisations 
live in Bai Town rather than Anshan Town and commute each day on a 
free coach provided by their work-unit.
In comparison to factory positions, small- trader and public service 
jobs frequently involve long periods of time sat in shops or offices wait-
ing for customers or visitors. People who occupy these jobs often have 
ready access to computers or smartphones with internet connections 
in their place of work. As such, they are comparatively heavy users of 
social media.
Dong Lihua, at 23 years of age, is the intelligent and astute daugh-
ter of successful local factory owner Dong Guoqiang. Dong Lihua had 
chosen to study accounting when she went to university in a nearby 
city. She wanted to continue with a postgraduate degree, but failed the 
graduate entry examination and decided to come back to Anshan Town, 
spending several months at home.
Finding herself back in Anshan Town was less than ideal for Dong 
Lihua, who would rather have been in an exciting city. Dong Lihua’s 
father used his connections to find her a job as a teller in one of Anshan 
Town’s banks. Although Dong Lihua remained frustrated at being stuck 
in Anshan Town, the branch was part of a larger provincial bank, and 
she hoped that on completing her training she might be reassigned to a 
city branch. The office’s air conditioning made the job relatively comfort-
able. Plus, during the quiet periods at lunchtime and in the afternoon, 
Dong Lihua could message her friends discreetly by using her phone out 
of sight of the bank’s security cameras.
This group of service employees, working in a large variety of 
professions, are thus defined by the fact that they have relatively easy 
access to internet connections and social media (for those who desire to 
use them).
Travelling educated workers: from the town and from elsewhere
The town has a small group of travelling workers who are typically 
young males in their twenties or early thirties, often holding some 
higher education qualifications (i.e. vocational qualifications or uni-
versity degrees). The town’s factories employ most of these workers. 
However, rather than manual labour, their work involves a significant 
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amount of travelling throughout China pursuing potential sales, over-
seeing installations and providing after- sales support for the heating 
systems. Earnings are commission- based and top salesmen may earn 
tens of thousands of RMB in a single month. In addition to spending long 
periods away from their families in Anshan Town, these highly mobile 
young men have their own cars and multiple smartphones with expen-
sive contracts that allow for inter- province roaming, national calls and 
increased data usage. This group make extensive use of social media in 
both their personal and professional lives.
In addition to educated workers from Anshan Town travelling out-
side, there is also a small group of people who come to Anshan Town 
from other areas in China – for example, personnel managing highway 
and utilities engineering projects (such as Peng Lei, described above) 
and a number of steel merchants who visited the town to sell raw mate-
rials to the factories. This group forms a tiny part of the township’s pop-
ulation (informal sources within the local government placed the town’s 
floating population at 1 per cent). However they too are typically heavy 
users of social media.
Elite: leaders and businesspeople
Anshan Town’s small local elite of government officials, business and 
factory directors command most of the recognised power and wealth. 
Many prefer to live with their families in apartments in Bai Town, com-
muting to Anshan Town for work, although a few business directors 
have also built new houses in their villages.
Dong Lihua’s father, 50- year- old Dong Guoqiang, ran a small but 
profitable factory in Huangtian village, where his family had lived for 
generations. When Dong Guoqiang was a child, Huangtian was one of 
the poorest villages in the township. The construction of a new road and 
subsequent building of several factories close to the village meant that it 
is now one of the best- connected and wealthiest settlements in the town-
ship, and Dong Guoqiang is one of its most successful residents. Dong 
Guoqiang makes his accomplishments manifest through constructing 
ambitious factory buildings and is often seen driving around town in his 
distinctive Audi car.
Dong Guoqiang’s mobile phone was another indication of conspic-
uous consumption. He used a domestic- brand BBK (bubugao) smart-
phone, which commanded a price tag of several thousand RMB and 
featured ostentatious gold  and  black casing. Despite its high cost, the 
BBK phone was poorly suited to social media use. The phone used a 
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custom Chinese- made operating system, and although apps for Chinese 
social media platforms were installed as standard, the system remained 
clunky and lacked many capabilities compared to modern smartphones.
The limited functionality of Dong Guoqiang’s phone mattered lit-
tle to him. He felt no desire to use social media, and had no an accounts 
on any platform. His mobile phone was instead primarily used for voice 
calls – around 20 per day – through which he managed all aspects of his 
business. Like many other people of a similar age and background, he 
found it easier and quicker to resolve issues directly through phone calls 
than by messaging. He would use an SMS message only if it was impos-
sible to make a call, sending around three messages each day. His apathy 
towards social media was compounded by the fact that writing Chinese 
characters on his phone was difficult for him. He had never learnt 
pinyin, the Romanised system for writing Chinese, so instead had to 
draw the characters manually into the phone. The BBK had a stylus and 
large display for this purpose, and despite its other flaws, the phone was 
quite good at recognising characters.
In July 2013 Dong Guoqiang replaced his BBK with a white iPhone 
4S, and took great pleasure in showing it to his friends and business 
partners. However, he soon complained that it was difficult to use as the 
area for drawing Chinese characters was tiny compared to his previous 
handset, and using his finger instead of a stylus to draw Chinese char-
acters was cumbersome. Within a couple of weeks, he had reverted to 
his BBK, and given the iPhone to his daughter. Dong Guoqiang’s case 
was similar to many of the other elite in the town who showed limited 
enthusiasm towards social media.
Homes, wealth and possessions
The vast majority of the housing in the township has been constructed 
by villagers themselves. As is common throughout China, houses are 
concentrated within continuous villages, which are surrounded by 
farmland that is divided into plots. This results in spatially intimate 
villages where people live together as close neighbours, forming a par-
ticularly intense social environment both supported and challenged by 
social media.
The four villages surrounding Anshan Town all have ‘old’ and 
‘new’ parts. The old villages contain courtyard homes constructed with 
dark, concrete- faced walls and separated by small alleyways (Fig. 1.3). 
In contrast the new villages feature uniform houses with tiled exteriors 
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and ample space for cars to pass and park (Fig. 1.4). Wealthier house-
holds were the first to build new houses, and wealthier villages tended 
to have more new homes.
The poorer outlying rural villages in the rest of the township con-
sist of a mix of concrete and claybuilt homes (Fig. 1.5), again reflecting 
Fig. 1.3 Houses in the ‘old’ part of a village
Fig. 1.4 Houses in the ‘new’ part of a village
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the varying affluence of different households in each village. Although 
here, too, there were occasional new homes being built.
There are only three apartment buildings in Anshan Town. Two 
have been built by the elementary and middle schools providing around 
20 modest apartments for teachers and their families. One factory also 
has a single block of flats, built to accommodate a number of employees 
and their families; however, the majority of the factory employees pre-
ferred to live in their own villages.
A look at the contents of homes also demonstrates the varying pros-
perity of households within the town. Television remained a de rigueur 
home appliance, with all but one of the 111 persons surveyed indicating 
that they have at least one television in their home (see Fig. 1.6).67 Most 
televisions are located within the main ‘guest hall’ area of the home.68  
Desktop computers are also common, with 76 per cent of respondents 
having one or more desktop PCs in their home. Laptop computers are 
less common, with 39 per cent of persons claiming to have at least one 
machine at home. As the majority of respondents surveyed came from 
the four wealthier villages surrounding Anshan Town, these figures do 
not represent the entire township. Visits to homes in the outlying vil-
lages suggested that ownership of computers in particular is far lower 
there. This data indicates that, in contrast to the ubiquitous television, 
Fig. 1.5 Mixed housing in an outlying village
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computers remain an emerging technology within households, a fact 
that obviously impacts upon social media use.
Urban connections: mobility and gender
Anshan Town is by no means an autonomous entity, cut  off from the 
rest of the world. The town’s connections to nearby urban centres and 
other regional and national infrastructure have an important impact 
upon the concepts residents are exposed to, and the educational, work, 
leisure and consumer opportunities available to them. However, ease 
of access to urban areas remains largely dictated by the availability of 
transport. One of the most significant aspects of transport connections 
is their gendered use; many adult males experience high levels of con-
venience and mobility, while for females mobility is comparatively less 
practical. This differential is noticeably reflected in differing attitudes 
towards and use of social media between genders, as will be explored 
later in this book.
Despite being physically near Bai Town and Jinan, public trans-
port to both these places was limited. Coaches and minibuses carried 
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passengers to Bai Town and Jinan for 6 RMB ($0.96) and 10 RMB ($1.61) 
respectively. Although affordable, the buses were limited to roughly one 
per hour for a few hours per day. Furthermore, the lack of a published 
timetable meant that waiting on the roadside for considerable periods 
was not uncommon. There were no licensed taxi services in the town, 
leaving residents relying on a number of small minivans that congre-
gated at each end of the commercial street waiting for passengers. These 
were comparitively costly, with journeys into Bai Town and Jinan priced 
at 50 RMB ($8) and 100 RMB ($16) respectively.
The inconvenience of public transport was one factor that made 
ownership of private vehicles attractive. Table 1.3 provides the results 
of a simple count, conducted at two different times on a typical weekday 
in May 2013, which showed the different vehicle types that drove along 
the town’s commercial street.
While this count shows that around three- quarters of vehicles 
were two wheeled, over the field work period it also became obvious 
that there existed a clear gender segregation in the use of different forms 
of transport: while women generally rode electric bikes, men normally 
drove cars or motorcycles. The popularity of electric bikes owed much 
to their low cost, with the best selling models priced around 2,850 RMB 
($459). They were also convenient:  their batteries could be charged 
using a domestic electricity connection, and they achieved a respectable 
speed of around 20 km per hour. Unlike cars and motorcycles, which 
required expensive driving licences and insurance, anybody (includ-
ing children) could drive an electric bike on the road.69 This was ideal 
because many women in their thirties and above had never had the 
opportunity to obtain a driving licence.70
Table 1.3 Popularity of vehicle types in Anshan Town
Vehicle type 8:30 am 4:00 pm
Minivan 7 0
Sports utility vehicle 2 1
Car/ light vehicle 11 7
Three- wheeled agricultural vehicle 14 6
Electric bike 42 54
Bicycle 5 4
Motorcycle 25 24
Light goods vehicle 3 4
Total 109 100
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However, even a well- maintained electric bike struggled to cover 
the distance between Anshan Town and Bai Town on a single charge, and 
would require double the time of the same journey in a car. Recharging 
the vehicle’s batteries took several hours, making electric bikes imprac-
tical for journeys to anywhere other than within the township, and 
making it difficult for the women who relied on such vehicles to travel 
outside the area without assistance.
The majority of car and motorcycle drivers were men. Falling costs 
and increasing reliability were making ownership of these vehicles a 
reality for ever- greater numbers of townsfolk. Half of those surveyed 71 
said their home had at least one car. By contrast, all except one of the 
111 persons surveyed said they had access to at least one electric bike or 
motorcycle in their household (Fig. 1.7).72  Cars were more practical for 
transporting groups of people. Cars also afforded men with easy access 
to urban areas such as Bai Town, Jinan and elsewhere.
This gendered differentiation of preferred transport methods 
results in men and women having significantly different geographies of 
accessibility and reflect deeper gendered inequalities in society. While 
women often lack easy access to towns and cities (without receiving lifts 
from car- driving males), for men such trips tend to be run- of- the- mill, 
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with plenty of opportunities to travel (often accompanied by their male 
peers). These are reinforced by a cultural expectation (shared by both 
men and women) that trips away from home ought to feature in the life 
of successful men. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how, when social media 
use is combined with the differing mobility of men and women, new con-
cerns arise regarding fidelity and the potential impact of social media on 
the institution of marriage.
Doing field work
I first arrived in Anshan Town in April 2013, having spent several weeks 
searching for a suitable field site with the help of Professor Zhang Ying 
at the Minzu University of China in Beijing.73 Professor Zhang had kindly 
arranged for me to be a visiting scholar at Minzu University of China for 
the duration of the field work. Being attached to a well- regarded domes-
tic institution was useful in establishing my credentials to local people 
as a legitimate researcher.
Initially I had been interested in the possibility of selecting a remote 
inland province for this study, similar to the place where I  had previ-
ously conducted research for my PhD project in 2009– 2011.74 However, 
Professor Zhang was concerned about my safety in what she perceived 
as the dangerous inland provinces. For my part, I  also knew that the 
comparative project of which this book is part demanded a more struc-
tured field work period in comparison to that of my doctoral studies. 
Professor Zhang steered me towards her home province of Shandong, 
citing the honesty of its people and their willingness to help strangers as 
the reason why it would be easy to conduct field work there. After visit-
ing several towns through Professor Zhang’s network of contacts in the 
province, I was taken to Anshan Town. The town immediately appealed 
to me, and it seemed to offer a relatively discrete and well defined field 
site in which I could understand how people experience their lives. On 
my first visit, I  was introduced to the town’s mayor and secretary (its 
highest level officials), to whom I explained my project. My integration 
into Anshan Town was, in retrospect, greatly assisted by these introduc-
tions from trusted individuals.
That did not mean that the authorities in Anshan Town greeted 
me with open arms. Although the town’s mayor and secretary were wel-
coming and cordial the first time we met, they remained distant and 
non- committal during my research. This was likely driven by a desire 
to limit exposure to a potentially disruptive foreign researcher and 
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concerns that I  might publish negative reports about the area, which 
could involve severe repercussions for their own careers. This conscious 
distancing was perhaps exacerbated by the aggressive anti- corruption 
drive in progress at all levels of government during the period of my 
field work, instilling a palpable paranoia among many officials of being 
accused (rightly or wrongly) of any wrongdoing. Early on, I attempted to 
ingratiate myself to the local government by accepting their request to 
appear in local media coverage of the town’s inaugural cherry-picking 
festival; however, I was not subsequently asked to participate in similar 
events.
Despite their coolness, the authorities allowed me to conduct my 
daily life and field work unsupervised throughout the duration of my 
study. I  moved freely around the entire township, and nothing pre-
vented me from speaking to anyone I  chose. It was only in the final 
weeks of the field work that I became fully aware of the level of anxi-
ety felt by the town’s officials concerning my presence. One of my best 
friends in the town explained to me that he had been interviewed by 
the local police on several occasions regarding the precise nature of my 
activities in the town, with officers from the county level supervising 
the investigation. My friend informed me that a Chinese- language arti-
cle I had published in a Shanghai magazine regarding my research in 
the town had helped to convince the police of the authenticity of my 
intentions.75
The caution of the officials contrasted with the attitude of the 
majority of townsfolk, who  – true to Professor Zhang’s word  – were 
incredibly welcoming, confirming the reputation of Shandong people 
as excellent hosts and eager to help wherever possible. People showed 
intense interest in my activities. They were generally keen to share their 
views regarding social media (and all manner of other topics) with me, 
to complete questionnaires and to participate in recorded interviews. 
Townsfolk often found it difficult to understand the point of my ethno-
graphic research, and would frequently ask why I would choose to live 
in their town (especially given that urban people tended to be heavier 
users of these platforms) and what the utility of my study was. This can 
be partly attributed to a lack of understanding regarding anthropology 
and its ethnographic research method. Furthermore, local researchers 
in anthropology or other social science disciplines generally undertake 
far shorter periods of field work, or those undertaking more extended 
stays do so in what are considered more distinctive places, such as eth-
nic minority regions. Many townsfolk thought my decision to spend 
15 months in Anshan Town made little sense.
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When I  started to conduct questionnaire surveys it helped allay 
these anxieties, as their contents confirmed to participants my legit-
imacy as a ‘proper’ researcher, and my genuine focus on their social 
media use. Undertaking questionnaires was perhaps more useful as 
an exercise in meeting people, gaining trust and engaging in conversa-
tion about social media than in generating rigorous and reliable data. 
Participants were recruited for the initial questionnaire largely through 
visiting local businesses and workplaces, as well as in the homes of peo-
ple I already knew in the town. Many participants, eager to assist me in 
my research, subsequently introduced me to other people who helped 
to complete the questionnaire, some of whom I would end up visiting 
regularly to discuss their internet use.
I was also fortunate to have worked with Li Yinxue and Liu Zhixian, 
two outstanding Masters students in anthropology at Minzu University 
of China, who came to Anshan Town to assist me in my field work for the 
months between June and August 2013. Both were incredibly helpful, 
assisting in establishing relationships with many participants. Although 
my Mandarin Chinese was proficient, Li and Liu were able to explain to 
the townspeople my goals and needs with a greater degree of eloquence 
than I could myself, which helped enormously in putting the townsfolk 
at ease. These two students were also of particular help when it came 
to administering questionnaires. Additionally, their status as outsiders 
(both were from another province, and had spent many years studying 
in Beijing) meant that life in the town also seemed somewhat alien to 
them. I learnt much about organising field work in rural China through 
working with them, in addition to gaining valuable insights every eve-
ning when we returned to our accommodation and discussed the inter-
actions with townsfolk we had shared together that day.
At the end of the summer of 2013, Li and Liu returned to Beijing 
to continue their studies, leaving me to conduct research on my own for 
the remaining 12  months of field work. During this time, I  continued 
to carry out some recorded interviews and questionnaires, albeit at a 
slower place. My research methods now shifted towards participant 
observation. I  spent longer amounts of time sitting and talking with 
people, engaging in their lives, assisting them wherever I could (hoping 
they would reciprocate by participating in questionnaires and surveys). 
My research topic also meant that people viewed me (incorrectly) as a 
computer expert, and often called upon me for help in this regard, tack-
ling problems such as uploading photos from a digital camera to a hard 
drive, using online shopping platforms or changing a profile picture. 
I learned much about their own ICT needs in this way.
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During my field work I lived in a house in Huangtian village rented 
from Dong Guoqiang, the factory director mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, who had previously constructed and lived in this family home 
in the 1990s before moving into a new building nearby. Townsfolk were 
concerned about me living on my own, and constantly dropped by my 
house to find out what I was doing.
I soon understood that the best times for meeting people were 
during the late morning and afternoon period, so I would make sure to 
leave the house during these times to meet people in their house, shop 
or place of work. For meals, my neighbours kindly allowed me to join 
their table whenever I did not have an invitation to eat elsewhere. I soon 
established particularly close bonds with some people, and I spent lon-
ger amounts of time with these families. I participated in the town’s foot-
ball team (despite my abysmal soccer skills), making a number of good 
friends this way. I became involved with the local middle school, helping 
its teachers to practise their English and giving talks to the students. All 
of these ways of getting involved helped to create friendships with partic-
ipants, allowing me to join in and learn about other aspects of their lives.
This participant observation method was combined with more 
formal research methods such as semi- structured interviews and ques-
tionnaires. In total I conducted 108 recorded interviews, gathering over 
84 hours of recorded audio material. In addition, I  conducted three 
questionnaire surveys over the course of the field work, all of which are 
detailed in the appendix. Perhaps most importantly for a study of social 
media, these methods were combined with extensive online research. 
I  asked participants to friend me on social media, and followed their 
account activity so that I  could understand what they were posting 
against the context of their everyday lives. I  also dedicated an entire 
month of field work to a systematic visual analysis of their social media 
postings (Chapter 3).
Attempting to implement this diverse combination of methods in 
the testing conditions of rural China was far from simple. Since leav-
ing the field, I have spent many months working through the data, and 
remaining in contact with my participants via social media has helped 
in this process. Nonetheless, the core of this study is the 15 months of 
ethnographic engagement in Anshan Town, and the direct observations 
and encounters that emerged during that period. As such, I hope that 
this volume will offer some original insight into the conditions there, 
and the changing live of its townsfolk.
A final note on anonymity. In order to protect research participants’ 
identities, and in line with the conventions of ethnographic writing,76 
INTRODUC T ION AND f I ELD S I T E :  DOWN TO THE COUNTRYS IDE 33
all names have been altered – personal, business and place (below the 
provincial level). Occasionally, it has also been necessary to change cer-
tain particulars regarding individuals’ circumstances, although wher-
ever this occurs care has been taken to avoid omitting details that would 
impact upon the argument of the book. However, this project sought 
to go beyond purely textual descriptions of social media and its use by 
allowing audiences actually to see the field site, its inhabitants and the 
kind of social media postings they make for themselves through the use 
of photography, film and actual social media postings. This visual mate-
rial can be seen in the subsequent chapters of this book, as well as on 
the project website.77 The use of such visual media can, however, be a 
delicate issue and somewhat at odds with efforts to conceal participants’ 
identities. In each instance, permission to use the images was negotiated 
with the owner or subject of the image.
The majority of individuals I asked for permission were extremely 
happy to contribute their imagery so that their way of life could be seen 
by a wider audience. However, making them fully aware of the impli-
cations of sharing their images (and postings, many of which were pre-
viously only shared among their friends) posed a particular challenge, 
especially given people’s limited understanding of the tenants and aims 
of anthropological research. Therefore, I  feel it is important to recog-
nise that participants’ generosity and trust in agreeing to allow visual 
insights into their lives to be reproduced creates a responsibility, both 
on myself as author, but also on readers of this book, to avoid narrow 
concerns regarding the reputations of specific individuals. I would ask 
readers to focus instead on the educational aim of this material  – the 
intention is to facilitate an understanding of social media’s impact upon 
people’s social relationships and their experience of being human – and 
accordingly to respect the role anonymity plays in creating the space to 
allow this to happen.
Conclusion: the ideal life of Anshan Town
This chapter has shown what makes Anshan Town unique. It is a small 
rural town where agriculture remains an important part of life, while 
a small but healthy manufacturing industry means it avoids desper-
ate poverty. The town’s reasonable proximity to Bai Town and Jinan 
enables its residents to take advantage of connections with urban areas, 
without having to entirely surrender their rural lifestyle. In this way, 
Anshan Town is defined by its sustainability. The townsfolk do not have 
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to migrate to other cities to find work in factories – the factories have 
migrated to them. This is in direct contrast to the other book in this 
series regarding social media in Industrial China, which describes life in 
a large factory town in the south of China that caters almost exclusively 
to migrant labourers.78
Anshan Town’s distinctive characteristics also impacted upon its 
inhabitants’ values. The town’s enduring rurality and positioning in 
the centre of the rich cultural and religious environment of Shandong 
appears to have instilled many of the classic ideals – even stereotypes – 
of Chinese society upon its inhabitants. They work hard, value educa-
tion, respect laws, care about family and desire to be acknowledged as 
good, respectable citizens. This adds further import to the rest of this 
study, allowing us to examine how social media impacts on this particu-
larly archetypal form of Chinese- ness.
35
2
The social media landscape:  
Visibility and economy
Having introduced Anshan Town and its residents in the previous chap-
ter, this book now moves on to describe how these people generally com-
municate with each other, and to illustrate the different social media 
platforms they use. One of the most important aims of this chapter is 
to catalogue the variety of different social media platforms available 
for people to choose from. The chapter will show that, when faced with 
this choice, the type of visibility that each platform offers becomes a key 
factor in determining its popularity, with Anshan Town users generally 
only opting for platforms that, under ordinary circumstances, limit their 
visibility to their small group of friends.
Broader factors that shape and constrain these decisions are also 
considered, for example the availability and affordability of communi-
cation technologies in the town and the infrastructure in place for con-
necting to the internet. Understanding this relationship between choice 
and constraint, and how it dictates social media use, forms the basis of 
our examination of online relationships with circles of friends and with 
strangers that appears in subsequent chapters.
Changing communications and rural  
informatisation in Anshan Town
The introduction of social media in Anshan Town is the latest stage in 
a series of transformations in the town’s communication technologies 
that has occurred over recent decades. Prior to telecommunications, the 
town largely relied on postal letters for non- urgent communication with 
other regions. Zhang Lin, a store holder in the town, could recall the 
later cultural importance of the telegram when he was a child in the late 
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1980s. At that time telegrams were very expensive. Charges were cal-
culated on the number of Chinese characters in the message. Incoming 
messages would be hand delivered to the recipient by the town’s Post 
Office. Their cost and rarity meant telegram deliveries would arouse an 
entire village’s interest. Zhang Lin commented that the prohibitive cost 
of sending these messages meant that their use was restricted to import-
ant events such as births or deaths:  ‘If it wasn’t very bad news, it was 
incredibly good news,’ he explained.
Around 1977 the town’s first telephone, a black wind- up machine, 
was installed in the town’s government building. At that time it cost 
2,000 RMB ($322), meaning that the town’s government was the only 
institution that could afford one. The Post Office was next in line, install-
ing a phone for public use not long after; however, townsfolk found the 
charges to be prohibitively expensive. Eventually calling costs dropped 
and payphones began to be installed more widely in shops. It was not 
until the early 1990s that fixed- line telephones began to become com-
mon in people’s own homes.
Since the mid- 2000s, rural China has seen increasing rural ‘infor-
matisation’, with the state actively supporting the expansion of new 
ICTs into rural areas with the intention of driving economic and social 
change.1 Improving mobile telecommunications was a major part of 
these efforts, although distribution throughout China’s countryside 
was anything but uniform.2 In many ways Anshan Town was already 
ahead of these policies, reflecting its proximity to urban areas. The town 
first received mobile phone coverage in 1996, although mobile phone 
ownership did not start to become common until the following decade. 
Equally, authors have noted that the dispersion of ICT infrastructures 
does not always occur through ‘top- down’ state interventions, and that 
provision and adoption also needs to be understood within the context 
of personal relationships in the countryside.3 Relatives and friends fre-
quently provide vital parts of the communications infrastructure from 
the ‘bottom- up’, for example researchers have noted that adult children 
returning from urban areas will often give used mobile phones to their 
older parents.4 Similar practices of gifting or borrowing mobile phones 
from relatives were also commonplace in Anshan Town.
When ADSL connections first came to Anshan Town in the year 
2000 (according to the China Unicom store manager), the town’s govern-
ment was once again the first premises to have it installed. This reflected 
a general trend for the town’s government to be at the forefront of adopt-
ing expensive new communication technologies (however, Chapter  6 
will describe their reluctance to appear on the social media platforms 
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themselves). Once again, there was a considerable delay between ini-
tial adoption and these technologies becoming commonplace in people’s 
homes. China Unicom introduced internet access through 3G mobile 
phone connections to Anshan Town in 2003. In terms of internet access, 
such as mobile phones, Anshan Town was a relatively early adopter of 
the technology (on an official level, at least) in comparison to other areas 
of rural China where policies of informatisation have had only minimal 
impact.5
In summary, while new media arrived early to Anshan Town, wider 
uptake only really occurred from 2005 onwards owing to the conver-
gence of three trends: the increased availability of affordable handsets 
and computing technology; reductions in telecommunications costs; 
and the increasing affluence of Anshan Town’s population. Although 
this has been a positive move in many ways, it has not been without sig-
nificant concerns that the quality of communications may be declining.
Anshan Town’s social media platforms:  
affording visibility
In  much the same way as social media in other parts of the world, 
China’s social media is made up of an ever- growing number of differ-
ent websites, applications and apps. The vast majority of these services 
are owned and operated by Chinese companies. While some platforms 
appear to share particular characteristics with other non- Chinese plat-
forms (which leads some commentators to accuse the former of being 
copies of the latter), significant differences in features and use almost 
always exist. Close examination and comparison of different social 
media platforms help to reveal their specificity in comparison to non- 
Chinese platforms, and also to each other.
The key factor shaping a preference for particular social media 
platforms among Anshan townsfolk is the level of visibility afforded by 
each platform. This section aims to introduce the range and specificity 
of social media platforms to the reader, but limitations of space make 
it impossible to describe every feature in detail. Instead the focus will 
remain on the type of visibility desired from these platforms, which in 
turn substantiates the argument that social media use in Anshan Town 
is dominated by relatively closed groups of familiar friends.
The most popular social media platform in Anshan Town during 
the field work was QQ. An early survey6 of participants’ general com-
munication practices was conducted in which people were asked to 
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self- report their usage of different platforms.7 QQ ranked highest in terms 
of account ownership, history of use and daily usage (see Table  2.1). 
This corresponds with other research that has highlighted the contin-
ued dominance of QQ in rural China and among users from lower class 
backgrounds.8 Aside from these figures, everyday interactions within 
the town also confirmed that use of both QQ and WeChat dominated 
people’s everyday interactions and communication habits. The rank-
ing of platforms by account ownership also roughly corresponds to the 
ranking of each platform’s monthly active users (see Table 2.2).9
The strong preference among Anshan Town people for using 
QQ and WeChat informed the focus of subsequent field work, it mak-
ing sense to concentrate on the platforms that local people were using 
most. As such, a considerable portion of this volume is devoted to these 
platforms in particular. However, less popular social media platforms 
are also considered, as understanding how they differ from the two 
Table 2.1 Popularity of social media platforms in Anshan Town
Social media 
platform
Respondents  
with at least one  
account (persons)
Average  
length of use 
(years)
Average time 
spent online  
per day (hours)
QQ (incl. Qzone) 93 5.32 5.93
WeChat 49 1.31 5.11
Renren 22 3.56 1.32
Sina Weibo 15 1.98 2.25
Tencent Weibo 18 2.00 1.93
Momo 3 0.83 2.05
Table 2.2 Popularity of Chinese social media platforms worldwide
Social media platform Worldwide monthly active users (millions)a
QQ (incl. Qzone) 625
WeChat 355
Renren 45
Sina Weibo 129
Tencent Weibo 220b
Momo 40
a We Are Social. 2014. Social, Digital & Mobile in China 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2015, from 
http:// www.slideshare.net/ wearesocialsg/ social- digital- mobile- in- china- 2014.
b Simon, K.  2014. Tencent:  The Growing Giant. Retrieved 15 December 2014, from http:// 
wearesocial.net/ blog/ 2014/ 05/ tencent- growing- giant/ .
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dominant platforms (particularly in terms of the visibility they offer) 
helps to account for their limited popularity.
QQ
QQ, the most popular platform in Anshan Town, is notable in offering 
its users almost every service imaginable: instant messaging, social net-
working, email, video sharing, online search, anti- virus software, televi-
sion and film streaming, cloud storage, news, weather, online shopping,10 
gaming and numerous lifestyle portals covering a plethora of themes 
such as old age, health, women’s issues, education, study abroad.
However, QQ Instant Messenger (QQ IM) is arguably central to 
many users’ experiences of the platform, in addition to being the tool 
through which they most frequently became visible to other users. 
When QQ launched its initial service in 1999, then named OICQ, it 
consisted solely of this instant messaging service, closely modelled on 
internet chat platform ICQ.11 Today, QQ IM still exists as a Windows 
application, now complemented by Mac, Android and iPhone versions. 
QQ IM is also used to add or delete ‘QQ contacts’ (one’s friends on the 
network),12 and to access and receive notifications relating to other QQ 
services.
Many Anshan Town users configure their home PC to automatically 
open the QQ IM application and log in to the network on start- up, and 
will then leave their account logged in whenever the computer is run-
ning. In this way, the application becomes a relied upon fixture in many 
user’s software ecosystems, and field work participants were observed 
using this application not only to locate and communicate with contacts, 
but also to access the numerous features offered by QQ (Fig.  2.1). As 
such, for many users QQ IM constitutes the main point through which 
users’ contacts are made visible to them, and they become visible to 
these contacts.
Users became visible to other users on QQ IM through a number 
of avenues, each of which offered a slightly different kind of visibility. 
Messaging itself was the dominant form, and was mostly conducted on 
a one- to- one basis. This messaging was largely text- based, albeit com-
plemented by a handsome repertoire of both approved and user- created 
emojis. QQ IM also offered the possibility for users to set up and com-
municate within ‘QQ groups’, either as a managed conversational group 
or in an announcement list. Finally, users also became visible through a 
feature that allowed users to search for and add other users. Although 
most users were visible to the rest of the network through this feature, 
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many concealed their identity and thus limited their visibility through 
the use of avatars and aliases.
Qzone (QQ kongjian, literally ‘QQ space’) is a popular predomi-
nantly web- based13 social networking site where users are made visible 
to other users by adding information on their own profile pages, which 
are generally viewable by all a user’s QQ friends.14 Interactions between 
users also occurred on user’s profile pages, again generally only visible 
to friends of the page owner.
Within Qzone, several features allow users to make different types 
of information visible (to a greater or lesser degree) to other users. 
A  Facebook- like ‘timeline’ called ‘happenings’ (ta de dongtai, literally 
‘his/ her15 happenings’) displays an aggregated news feed of several 
elements of a user’s profile.16 Qzone’s ‘Speak speak’ (shuoshuo) function 
is similar to Facebook’s shelved ‘Wall’ feature, giving users a space to 
share their thoughts or images (although on Qzone a user can create 
new posts on their own wall only, with friends only able to comment on 
the account owner’s posts). Qzone also features a ‘diary’ (riji) for more 
extended entries and a ‘gallery’ (xiangce) function for sharing images. 
Other features include a ‘message board’ (liuyan ban) where visitors to 
one’s Qzone are permitted to make postings, which, although visible to 
a user’s friends, do not appear on the prominent ‘happenings’ section. 
Qzone also allows its users to give gifts (both free and paid for) to their 
QQ level (see Chapter 5)
online status (see Chapter 5)
user’s most recent status
user’s net alias
link to user’s Qzone
user’s avatar
link to QQ email
link to QQ.com
link to buy virtual currency
chat history
friend list
QQ group list
Qzone
contact groupings
friend’s avatar friend’s net alias
friend’s label (assigned by user)
JD.com shopping
Tencent finance
Tencent video
QQ web browser
QQ music
Tencent lottery 
friend’s most recent status
Tencent antivirus software
QQ pet game
Tencent app store
Fig. 2.1 QQ Instant Messenger main window 
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friends on the network. While these Qzone features vary slightly in 
terms of prominence on the platform, they are all generally visible to all 
of a user’s friends.
The way that users are able to make themselves visible to others on 
Qzone is also far more visual that on QQIM. Users are able to customise 
their Qzone profile to a large degree, including colours, typefaces, posi-
tioning of navigation menus, background images and music. It is even 
possible to set an animated introduction sequence to greet visitors to 
one’s own Qzone. A large selection of templates allows users to achieve 
customisation with minimal effort, although these often need to be acti-
vated through spending money or points accumulated by extended peri-
ods of Qzone use (to be discussed in Chapter 5).
QQ’s extensive gaming network is also extremely popular, and 
offers users a form of visibility that entails a very specific mode of com-
munication and experience. QQ has a number of flash- based games 
found inside Qzone, and a large number of downloadable games. 
These include international games such as World of Warcraft, League 
of Legends and Guild Wars, as well as locally developed games such as 
‘Dream of Three Kingdoms’ (meng sanguo) and ‘Crossfire’ (chuanyue 
huoxian). Many games are online multiplayer, allowing users to play 
with their friends.
These games are strongly linked with QQ’s social media platforms. 
QQ IM is frequently used for organising multiplayer gaming sessions 
among classmates, and screenshots of users’ achievements within such 
games are frequently posted on Qzone profiles. Playing online games 
together is an important way for friends to socialise and bond in Anshan 
Town, especially among elementary and middle schoolchildren. As 
such, rather than gaming being an isolating experience, it tends to be 
highly group- oriented.17 Therefore, these games can also be understood 
in terms of visibility: they make players visible to other users’ in a form 
quite distinct from typical online communication, and one that also 
privileges specific types of skills and abilities.
The four elements of QQ described above  – QQ IM, Qzone, 
Tencent Weibo and its gaming  – are those most frequently used by 
people in the town, with each providing subtly different ways of mak-
ing users visible to other users. However, this constitutes only a part 
of the extensive total offering of services provided within the QQ 
network.
Schoolchildren in Anshan Town (especially elementary and mid-
dle schoolchildren) were particularly enthusiastic users of QQ. In a 
survey of 312 students from the town’s middle school, 85 per cent of 
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respondents indicated they had a QQ account, the most popular of all 
platforms.18 They particularly valued the ability to converse with class-
mates in QQ groups, being able to customise their own profiles and 
the gaming features offered by the platforms. QQ could be accessed 
through almost all internet- connected desktop PCs or phones. The 
popularity and heavy use among school students led to parental con-
cerns over the impacts of social media on education. Some young 
adults and university students did not appreciate the particular aes-
thetics of visibility offered by the platform, commenting that the net-
work was ‘childish’ (youzhi) or ‘troublesome’ ( fan), provoking them 
to move to other networks such as WeChat. However, even for these 
users QQ often remained indispensable for activities such as transfer-
ring files and storing photographs.
WeChat
The second most popular (in terms of reported users with one account) 
social media platform in the town was WeChat. WeChat is a newcomer 
in comparison to QQ, having only been launched in 2011. Although 
WeChat is owned and operated by Tencent, the same company that runs 
QQ, there was initially only very limited crossover between the two 
(i.e. it was possible to use one’s QQ account number to register for the 
account). During the course of the field work, connections between the 
two networks were gradually increased, as it became possible to receive 
and reply to QQ messages within WeChat, but to all intents and pur-
poses they remained largely autonomous spheres.
WeChat distinguished itself from QQ in requiring users to have a 
smartphone to login to the network. The app made use of the phone’s 
contact list to allow people to find friends. This meant that those 
who lacked a smartphone (typically school students and adults in 
their forties and above) were effectively barred from using the plat-
form. Because exchanging phone numbers was a sign of relative trust 
between individuals, the network was perceived by many to be more 
intimate than QQ.
WeChat was primarily used by persons in the town as an instant 
messaging chat client, and in this sense the visibility afforded by the 
platform was similar in some respects to QQ IM. One- to- one messag-
ing dominated everyday use, although it was also commonplace to 
have group chats featuring several people. Unlike ‘QQ Groups’ which 
included limits on the number of groups that could be created by a user 
and required authentication and a designated administrator, WeChat 
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groups were often smaller in size and could be created more sponta-
neously and informally, allowing one to add individuals drawn from 
one’s friend list.
The ‘Moments’ (pengyou quan, literally ‘friend circle’) feature in 
WeChat is arguably the most ‘social’ element of the platform, and as such 
is the area where users were typically most visible to others. Moments 
allows users to post photographs or video accompanied on one’s own 
Moments page (Fig. 2.2), which by default can be viewed by all of one’s 
WeChat friends. Users can also make text-only postings to their own 
moments page; however, this is achieved through a hidden feature in 
the app marked as being ‘an internal function for testing’, and which 
not all users know about. As such, Moments is designed to encourage 
WeChat users to adopt a particular form of visibility, by posting origi-
nal, primarily visual content. In the same vein, this function also serves 
to discourage the sharing of memes by users. For example, it is not 
possible to ‘share’ another user’s posts on one’s own timeline without 
cumbersome copy- and- pasting (unlike QQ, where a ‘share’ (zhuanfa) 
button makes this possible). Like QQ, users also experience restrictions 
on where they can become visible. WeChat users cannot post directly 
on to another user’s Moments timeline, and can only post comments in 
response to a user’s own posts.
Friend’s avatar
Friend’s net alias/
label assigned by user 
 
Friend’s signature
(e.g. ‘Life is torture’)
Single status update
Status update text
(e.g. ‘Good night’)
Status update date
(e.g. 30 March)
Status update photograph(s)
Fig. 2.2 An individual user’s WeChat Moments profile 
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A further significant feature of WeChat is ‘Subscriptions’ (dingyue), 
which allows users to follow WeChat announcements from various life-
style channels, celebrities, brands, businesses and government bodies 
that have registered for an enhanced ‘official’ WeChat account. These 
official accounts allow the entities that utilise them to be hyper- visible 
to users via the network, while restricting the visibility of the users that 
subscribed to the channels. For instance, 21- year- old Li Yan is studying 
for an undergraduate degree in art at a university in Shanghai; however, 
she returns home to her family in Anshan Town during the university 
holidays. She subscribes to 25 channels within her WeChat account, 
including the ‘Chinese University Student Fellowship’, ‘Chinese Film 
Competition Network’, ‘A piece of art every day’, ‘Global fashion’ and the 
official account of her university’s Students’ Union. These subscriptions 
reflect many of the interests she has started to pursue more intently fol-
lowing her migration to Shanghai.
WeChat also contains three features that are specially designed to 
allow users to make themselves visible to, connect with and chat with 
strangers. Firstly, ‘People Nearby’ ( fujin de ren) uses the phone’s GPS 
function to display a list of users who are close by at that time; this can 
also be filtered by gender (Fig. 2.3). Secondly, ‘Drift Bottle’ (piaoliuping) 
Nearby person avatar Nearby person gender
Nearby person net alias
Distance from user
Nearby person signature
Fig. 2.3 Neighbouring users listed on WeChat’s People Nearby  
feature 
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is a novel feature enabling users to write a message (or alternatively 
record an audio message) to be randomly sent to another Drift Bottle 
user, who can either reply directly to the original sender or cast the bot-
tle back into the ‘sea’ to be re- assigned to another user (Fig. 2.4). Thirdly, 
the ‘Shake’ (yaoyiyao) function allows users to vigorously shake their 
phone to reveal a list of other users on the network who are shaking at 
the same moment. All of these features gave WeChat an important dual 
nature, allowing users to complement their messaging and sharing with 
friends with a function that made them visible to strangers, who might 
be around the corner or on the other side of the world.
Social media’s potential to allow users to connect with strangers 
captivated many people’s attention, even among non- users, and it is for 
this reason that it forms a major focus of this study. For example, Song 
Bing, a university student from Anshan Town who was studying for a 
Master’s degree in engineering in a nearby city, explained how his male 
classmates made use of WeChat’s ‘Shake’ function:
In our dormitory they use WeChat, Shake, to make friends . . . in 
our school there are very few female students, and no chance to 
chat with girls. My classmates want to use this as if it were a wed-
ding matchmaker, in order to communicate with female students.
Fig. 2.4 WeChat Drift Bottle feature 
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In this case, Song Bing appears to value social media’s ability to make his 
classmates visible to university students of the opposite gender, in face 
of the lack of opportunities to meet female students on campus.
While QQ and WeChat both have ways to add strangers, there is 
a slight difference between the two. In QQ, it is typical to directly add 
strangers using the QQ IM’s search function in the same way one would 
add a normal friend. Because the feature generally makes users visible 
to other users, this sometimes results in unwelcome friend requests by 
strangers. By contrast, WeChat’s users know that People Nearby, Drift 
Bottle and Shake were specifically designed for meeting strangers, and 
as such there is an assumption that users found on these features are 
expecting to engage in dialogue to strangers. These features of WeChat 
appear to be designed with the intention of making users who appear to 
seek such actions visible to each other.
The arrival of WeChat as a viable alternative to QQ had presented 
smartphone- owning users with a choice of platforms to conduct specific 
social relationships. While many of the friends on WeChat were people 
from urban areas met during periods of migration, this was not always 
the case. One example was Xu Liqin, who runs a hair salon in the town 
with her husband Han Peng. Xu Liqin is an Anshan Town native, and has 
lived there her entire life. For Xu Liqin, WeChat represented a valuable 
new blank space that was completely separate from her cluttered QQ 
account, which had many friends from her schooldays and some people 
she did not know. On WeChat she only added close family members and 
a few best friends from within the town.
Renren
Renren was the third most popular platform (in terms of users with a sin-
gle account) among survey respondents. Renren is a predominantly web- 
based social networking site, although it did also have smartphone apps.
Renren was rarely mentioned by participants during field work, 
suggesting it was of minor importance to the town’s internet users. 
Current university or recently graduated university students used the 
network slightly more often. This was possibly because originally (just 
like the original Facebook) the network was limited to those who were 
students.
Peng Lei, the engineer from out of town who was living in Anshan 
Town on a work posting (introduced in Chapter 1), was one of the few 
people in Anshan Town who actually made use of the Renren platform. 
The majority of his Renren friends were former university classmates. 
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However, Peng Lei did not view Renren as useful for contacting them or 
sharing photos (QQ and WeChat were better suited to those activities). 
Instead, Renren was his preferred destination for viewing ‘funny vid-
eos’, which were often widely shared films of practical jokes or television 
blooper shows.
One of the most distinctive features of Renren was the fact that 
it made visible each user’s contact lists to their friends on the network, 
allowing all users to view who their friends’ online contacts were. While 
this is a common feature of non- Chinese social media platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter, its presence on Renren distinguished it from 
both QQ and WeChat. Zhang Jie, a middle school student in the town, 
was keen to point out this feature as something that made the platform 
unique.
On Renren it is possible to find your friend’s friends, and then you 
can add them! . . . But I  only use it to get in touch with my class-
mate’s friends. We’ve never met face- to- face.
Despite the convenience of being able to view friends’ contact lists, the 
thought of making one’s own social networks visible to others is likely 
to be a key limiting factor of Renren’s appeal. Firstly, by allowing users 
to keep their contact lists private, as in the case of QQ and WeChat, it 
becomes possible to friend strangers without such relationships being 
revealed to other online friends. Secondly, this concern with privacy 
extends beyond strangers:  even making one’s ‘circle’ of friends from 
offline life visible to others can be undesirable within the context of a 
competitive and close- knit society. While one may desire to make one-
self visible online, it was generally felt that one’s network of social rela-
tionships should remain concealed.
Microblogs (Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo)
Microblogs are social media platforms that allow users to share short 
messages online; these are typically made visible to the entire internet. 
These messages are predominantly text- based, and are restricted to 140 
characters in length. Users can include images, film and geolocation 
information in microblog posts, as well as mentioning other users of 
the network. The dominant microblog platforms in China are Tencent 
Weibo and Sina Weibo.
As mentioned in Chapter  1, microblogs dominate coverage and 
analysis of Chinese social media, a phenomenon that can largely be 
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attributed to two factors. First, the rapid growth of Chinese users with 
microblog accounts in the years prior to 2012 led many to believe that 
microblogs were becoming the dominant social media platform. For 
example, between December 2013 and June 2014 43.6 per cent of 
Chinese internet users were active users of these services (although this 
represents a decrease from a high of 56 per cent in 2012).19
The second reason rests in the open – and highly visible – nature 
of much microblog content. In contrast to both QQ and WeChat, where 
content is largely shared exclusively with one’s friends on the network, 
both Weibo platforms make posts visible to the entire internet by default. 
This is highly convenient for researchers who wish to conduct analysis 
of postings made by users, offering easy access to and extraction of data 
from multiple users. By contrast, QQ and WeChat accounts required 
the acceptance of friendship requests before postings became visible to 
others.
It was this visibility that made microblogs less appealing to social 
media users in Anshan Town, and made their use relatively rare in com-
parison to urban areas. This reflected the tendency for ‘most microblog 
users [to be] mainly young, urban, and middle class, and geographically 
concentrated in the coastal regions’.20 A separate study showed that only 
5 per cent of microblog users in China live in the countryside, despite the 
fact that 27.9 per cent of internet users are rural residents.21 Many regis-
tered their Tencent Weibo account just because they had a QQ account, 
and did not feel the need to use it.
For those in the town who did use Weibo, its main attraction lay in 
the ability to follow celebrities and organisations they liked, rather than 
being able to share their own thoughts to the internet. Here a compari-
son can be drawn with WeChat’s Subscriptions feature, described above, 
which served to provide ‘official’ sources with accounts. Zhang Lili, who 
was 31 years old and ran the town’s only beauty parlour, explained the 
appeal of the Weibo in these terms.
I’m always free with nothing to do. WeChat, Weibo, I’ve nothing 
else to do, so leave them logged in all day. But I don’t really go on 
[Weibo]; I  just leave it logged on 24 hours a day . . . I  don’t really 
post . . . I follow things about beauty treatments, but I only want to 
follow, that means I can see whatever they post.
Although Anshan Town’s users displayed little desire to make themselves 
visible on social media, even if they had, the utility of these platforms for 
achieving this is questionable. In a study exploring who possesses ‘voice’ 
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on China’s microblogs, it was shown that verified users – ‘Big Vs’, who 
tend to be influential celebrities, scholars, public intellectuals, journal-
ists and media organisations – attract users to the platforms, but they 
can also help to shape user opinion on the same platforms, and most 
notably act as transmitters of voices of the weak.22
Other users in Anshan Town stressed concerns that messages 
posted online might not necessarily be visible to friends, rather than the 
same messages being visible to the entire internet, as a detracting fea-
ture of microblogs. For example, Zhang Guobao, who ran a pharmacy in 
the town explained:
If you post to your Qzone then everyone [you know] will see it, but 
on Weibo only some will know. Like Tencent Weibo, only if you 
follow will it give you new message, but if you don’t follow any-
one, then you will not get anything. [If this is the case,] it is very 
possible that only if you look at it [that person’s page] at the right 
moment, then you’ll know.
Momo
Only three questionnaire respondents reported having a Momo account, 
and it was perhaps one of the social media platforms where issues sur-
rounding the appropriateness of being visible on the platform were most 
highly charged. Interviews with high school and university students, 
and adults in their twenties in particular, revealed the peculiar repu-
tation that Momo was afforded. The app was associated with ‘one night 
stands’ (yi ye qing) and its mention often provoked a wry smile from 
participants.
Momo was a smartphone- only app possessing similarities to 
WeChat’s ‘People Nearby’ feature mentioned above. Momo used the 
phone’s GPS to display a contact list of people sorted by distance from 
the user, which could also be filtered by gender. One person explained 
the main difference between Momo and People Nearby was that Momo 
gave a more accurate indicator of proximity showing distances to the 
nearest metre, while WeChat claimed only to offer results to 100 metre 
accuracy.23
Experimenting with Momo during the early stages of field work in 
Anshan Town revealed clear differences in terms of the visibility between 
different genders. When the app was set to display nearby females only, 
the closest individuals displayed were over 5 km away from the loca-
tion of use in the town centre, suggesting female users were outside the 
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township. By contrast, when the app was operated from the same loca-
tion but set to display males only, then it was possible to see that many 
males within the immediate vicinity were using the app.
Of the three survey respondents who reported using Momo, two 
were young men from Anshan Town, aged 17 and 19. The third was a 
young, unmarried woman in her late 20s from Bai Town who worked 
in a state- owned enterprise in Anshan Town. This woman explained 
that she only ever used the app in Bai Town, and would never open it in 
Anshan Town as she did not wish to be visible to people in the town. This 
situation underwent some change as field work progressed. Most nota-
bly, during the summer holidays when significant numbers of students 
returned to Anshan Town from their universities in urban areas, many 
more people (of both genders) appeared on the app within distances 
indicating they were inside the township. Nonetheless, some doubted 
the authenticity of the people it was possible meet on the platform, as 
one male explained:
What you see on Momo is so fake. Everyone on it is really a guy. 
When a man shaves his head, then you know whether he’s really 
handsome or not. When a woman removes her makeup, then you 
know whether she is really beautiful. I  haven’t added a single 
friend on Momo.
While participants had clear opinions regarding the authenticity of 
Momo users and the reputation of the platform, this may simply rep-
resent a widespread conservative discourse among Chinese internet 
users. An anthropological study of the use of Momo in mainland China 
has highlighted the importance of the platform’s group functions, 
which challenges the assumption that the app is used predominantly 
for arranging one night stands.24 In Anshan Town, however, those who 
did use Momo spoke little of the group function. Instead the stigma sur-
rounding Momo resulted in a high degree of anxiety around being visi-
ble on, or implicated in using the platform. This is perhaps felt especially 
acutely by women.
Non- Chinese social media
While the Chinese social media platforms compared so far have afforded 
their users’ varying degrees and forms of visibility, non- Chinese social 
media platforms (such as Facebook and Twitter) are also significant as 
state controls have rendered the majority of these platforms entirely 
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invisible to the town’s internet users. Typically, attempting to access 
these platforms will result in server timeout or page not found errors. 
As such, there was almost no use of non- Chinese social media within 
Anshan Town.
Furthermore, knowledge of non- Chinese social media platforms 
was limited, and few had any idea of what the platforms did. While a 
small number of people could name some of these platforms (having 
become aware of them through media reports or from elsewhere), many 
had little reason to use these services because none of their friends used 
them, nor did they know how to circumvent the controls on the inter-
net that prevented access to these networks. Nonetheless people were 
intrigued to know what services were used outside China.
By describing the different social media platforms used in (and 
absent from) Anshan Town, one starts to get a grasp of the complexity of 
the townsfolks’ patterns of use, including the use of multiple platforms 
by some individuals. Furthermore, it is apparent that the distribution of 
people on these platforms is not a matter of happenstance, but rather is 
strongly linked to the modes of visibility that are afforded by each plat-
form. While QQ has a broad base of users of all ages, its most avid con-
sumers in the town are elementary schoolchildren. Teenage males may 
be more enthusiastic about playing online games, whereas girls typically 
have preferences for maintaining Qzone. University students enjoyed 
using WeChat and Momo because it gave them the opportunity to talk 
to strangers, while these same features made some married couples con-
sider these platforms to be unsuitable (to be discussed in Chapter 4).
However, the preferences for particular platforms were not solely 
determined by membership of any specific social group. Rather, towns-
folk had developed different attachments to particular social media plat-
forms and features within these platforms. For many (both at school, and 
those who had graduated) QQ had strong associations with the school 
group, and the shared solidarity and pleasure of that group. WeChat may 
be more strongly associated with urbanity, modernisation and migration. 
By contrast, WeChat’s People Nearby feature and Momo had garnered a 
certain notoriety with regards to using these platforms for romantic rela-
tionships, a fact that served to attract some to the platform while repel-
ling others. This highlights the importance of choosing the appropriate 
platform for specific activities, and shows how social media platforms 
themselves become morally inscribed.
The theory of polymedia is useful in understanding why Anshan 
Town people relate to different platforms in different ways. This the-
ory proposes that rather than simply assuming that the affordances of 
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a particular platform are destined to shape communication in a spe-
cific way, we should instead acknowledge that the relationships that 
individuals have with different communication technologies is also 
a key factor in determining use.25 The model argues that it is impossi-
ble to understand the significance of individual platforms in isolation, 
because the meaning and use of each platform is only ever understood 
in relation to all others. In the instance of Anshan Town, different social 
media platforms (and features within these platforms) come to be seen 
as representing different levels of cosmopolitanism, openness, maturity 
and different modes of sociality. These values are not uniform among 
all persons, but rather form a point of identification, contestation and 
challenge.
A key condition under which polymedia is said to occur is that 
access and cost no longer dictate individual communication acts.26 
However, examining the way in which people access social media in the 
town shows that participants often also face significant constraints in 
terms of both technology and means of access to social media, which 
suggests that states of polymedia can also flourish in less favourable con-
ditions and also shape users’ behaviour on these platforms.
Economies of access
Contrary to the beliefs of many urban Chinese from large cities, who 
often thought that nobody in the countryside used social media, ICTs and 
the internet have permeated the lives of many Anshan Town residents. 
Increasingly low- cost smartphones and connections have made access a 
possibility for ever- increasing numbers of persons in China. While this 
is certainly the case in the town, and while most social media accounts 
themselves are also free, participant observation revealed a high degree 
of variability regarding how easy it is for individuals in Anshan Town to 
gain access to both the devices and connections required to use social 
media platforms. As such, the economies surrounding access impose 
a real constraint on people’s use of social media (both as a whole, but 
sometimes in relation to different platforms), and the modes of online 
visibility available to them.
Smartphones and mobile broadband
Smartphones are the most popular means of connecting to the internet 
and social media platforms for adults within the town (and indeed the 
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whole of China).27 Only one person from the initial survey of adults said 
they did not own a mobile phone of any kind.28 Around a quarter of the 
initial survey group said that they owned only a (2G) feature phone.29 
The majority – around three- quarters – indicated owning at least one 
brand of smartphone including Apple, Nokia, Blackberry, Motorola and 
a range of Chinese brands including Lenovo, Huawei, Xiaomi, BBK, 
Jinli, Xiapu and Benmai. The high proportion of Chinese brand mobile 
phones is indicative of the importance of these cheap, domestically pro-
duced phones. Around 5 per cent of people surveyed indicated that they 
regularly used more than one mobile phone, although observations of 
people moving between different mobile phones during the course of 
interactions suggest the true figure might have been even greater than 
this. Often, rather than being an extra cost, multiple devices are used 
with the aim of saving money (for example, by using one phone for voice 
calls, and a second with a different SIM card for data).
Phone ownership is also an important issue for schoolchildren in 
Anshan Town, creating an important means for students to gain easy 
access to the internet. Despite an almost universal desire for phone owner-
ship among schoolchildren, in a separate survey carried out among 312 
students from Anshan Town’s middle school, just over half, 56 per cent, 
of students actually indicated having a mobile phone.30 Of these phone- 
owning students, 77 per cent specified that their handset was a smart-
phone, as opposed to 23 per cent who indicated they owned a normal 
feature phone. These figures suggest that while smartphone ownership 
is becoming more common for the town’s youth, the majority still lack 
handsets that allowed them to access the internet and social media.
This transition to smartphone ownership among students seems 
to conform to broader trends within China, albeit with uptake in rural 
places such as Anshan Town being somewhat delayed. Two commercial 
surveys on mobile phone usage among Chinese youth (defined as between 
15 and 24 years of age) indicate the radical transition from standard fea-
ture phone to smartphone has occurred over only three years (Fig. 2.5).31 
Despite both surveys being largely limited to urban areas of China, com-
parison suggests that Anshan Town lags only a short distance behind the 
2013 figures. While the countryside’s youth are ‘going mobile’ this is at 
a delayed pace and acts as a further barrier to their use of social media.
While ownership of smartphones and other access devices consti-
tuted one form of economic burden related to connecting to the internet, 
a second came in the form of paying for the connection itself. Additional 
fees and subscriptions were required to make calls, send SMS messages 
and use the internet through the mobile networks. Once again, whether 
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or not these costs represented a burden depended on the individual’s 
own economic situation.
Anshan Town residents can choose from any of China’s three mobile 
phone networks  – China Mobile (zhongguo yidong), China Unicom 
(zhongguo liantong) and China Telecom (zhongguo dianxin) – all of which 
have signal coverage within the town. Although all the networks are 
similarly priced, China Mobile clearly dominates the market for mobile 
phone subscriptions. Data from the initial questionnaire of 111 adults 
(including non- social media users) showed that around three- quarters 
of those surveyed hold their only mobile subscription with China Mobile, 
while one in 10 choose China Unicom.32 Only one respondent uses China 
Telecom, and this person also happened to be the owner of the town’s 
struggling China Telecom retail store, which ceased trading toward the 
end of field work.
A minority of people in the town are also willing to switch between 
networks, often with the aim of reducing costs. Around one in 10 of 
those surveyed reported that they had subscriptions with both China 
Mobile and China Unicom. This is despite the fact that only 5 per cent 
of people surveyed have two mobile phones, suggesting that some of 
these customers were either using special dual- SIM phones for switch-
ing between networks or manually swapping between SIM cards. A sig-
nificant number of survey respondents who subscribed to both networks 
used a special China Unicom plan, which offered 300 MB of 3G data 
for the very low rate of 7 RMB ($1.12) a month, but had very high call 
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Fig. 2.5 Smartphone/ feature phone ownership rates for Chinese youth 
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costs and text message costs. Common reasons for having more than 
one subscription included the perceived superior quality of voice calls 
on China Mobile and faster internet speeds on China Unicom. However, 
for many, having two SIM cards was a response to the expense of mobile 
bandwidth.
Chinese phone companies tend to offer paltry subscription pack-
ages in comparison to network operators in many other countries. The 
call plans available in Anshan Town offered a generous allocation of 
either free minutes or bandwidth, but rarely both. Sending text messages 
almost always incurred a separate charge (see Table 2.3). The cheapest 
3G phone packages on sale in Anshan Town, offering a monthly band-
width quota in excess of 1 GB, cost 288 RMB ($46) per month. This rep-
resented a significant amount, given that a factory labourer was earning 
around 3,500 RMB ($564) per month and many families earned signifi-
cantly less.33
People adopted several strategies to reduce mobile bandwidth 
usage, such as asking for Wi- Fi passwords at their friend’s homes or in 
restaurants. Despite this, many reported regularly exceeding the free 
quotas on their plans and incurring extra charges. The high cost of 
mobile access often had noticeable impacts upon social media use for the 
least wealthy people in town. Some of the users modified the way that 
they used social media in order to reduce bandwidth usage; for example, 
by only using QQ on their phone to send text- based messages to friends 
and avoiding sending images or browsing Qzone, which would use up 
their data allowance.
The pricing plans meant that, for certain groups of people in 
Anshan Town, particularly children and middle-aged and elderly peo-
ple, phone subscriptions with 3G data bundles were unaffordable. 
Table 2.3 Lowest price- point 3G plans available from China Mobile store in 
Anshan Town during May 2013
Package 
name
Monthly fee Free calling 
time 
(minutes)
Free bandwidth 
for use in- 
province 
(Megabytes)
Free 
nationwide 
text 
messages
‘Online plan’ 48 RMB ($7) 60 
(nationwide)
250 MB 0
‘Chat freely 
plan’
48 RMB ($7) 150 
(nationwide)
40 MB 0
‘Local plan’ 48 RMB ($7) 260 (local) 40 MB 0
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Other factors were also at play, such as perceived utility, although cost 
remained a major consideration. The idea of spending more than a few 
RMB on phone charges in a month constituted extravagant excess. 
Phone companies catered to this sizeable customer base through a num-
ber of ultra low- cost plans. One such plan, China Mobile’s ‘0.09 RMB 
Card’ (9 fen ka), offered calls within the Bai Town district only for 1.9 
RMB ($0.31) in the first minute, and 0.09 RMB ($0.15) for each minute 
thereafter. In exchange for ultra low- calling costs, customers endured 
restrictions on calling distance, roaming capabilities and lack of data 
allowances. Older customers in particular felt that these plans were suf-
ficient for their needs, as they had little requirement for data for internet 
and social media use.
The market for these low- cost calling plans was evidenced when, 
in October 2013, the town’s China Telecom store held an outdoors pro-
motional event. The promoters had shrewdly chosen to organise the 
event on one of the town’s market days, knowing that crowds would be 
congregating on the town for their regular shop. The event drew over 
200 spectators, many of whom were elderly people. A male in his thir-
ties, smartly dressed in a suit jacket with open- collared white shirt, 
compèred the event using a headset microphone and booming PA sys-
tem. Over the course of two hours, he wooed the audience with jokes 
about how virtuous Shandong people were, what good value for money 
China Telecom offered and how the store in the town was ready and 
waiting to sign up new subscribers. However, the main attraction for 
the audience was not the prospect of a new mobile phone, but rather the 
chance of winning a free plastic washbasin (Fig. 2.6).
Giving away these washbasins was the precursor to two further 
events of similar duration that occurred over the course of the next two 
days, in which the organisers introduced a convoluted ticketing system 
where people could exchange money for temporary tickets (with the 
promise that these funds would be returned at the end of the event). 
This would give them the right to claim prizes of ascending value in 
future promotions, culminating in a 2G handset. As the audience began 
to doubt the sincerity of the organisers’ intentions, and fears grew that 
they would not get their money back, the number of attendees dwin-
dled. Some alleged that, rather than allowing customers to buy an 
affordable smartphone, the promotion was designed to trap consumers 
into purchasing an overpriced handset that they had no need for. By the 
final event the following day, only a few dozen elderly people remained. 
This example demonstrates that, although certain groups of townsfolk 
(young to middle- aged manual and service workers, the town’s elite 
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and university students), may have had access to smartphones and 
data packages, elderly townsfolk, by contrast, prioritised more limited 
mobile telecommunication functionality such as voice calls and text 
messaging – indeed many saw no need to have a mobile phone at all, and 
were more motivated by ownership of a new washbasin – and accord-
ingly dedicated far less money towards mobile telecommunications. It 
is therefore worth bearing in mind that mobile phone use in the town 
encompasses an especially broad spectrum of different needs, expecta-
tions and budgets.
Home broadband connections
One of the defining features of home broadband connections is that, 
in contrast to the expensive and limited mobile internet plans avail-
able in Anshan Town, they do not restrict the amount of bandwidth 
users could consume. There are two varieties of broadband connection 
available within the town. The first is China Mobile’s WLAN option. 
This involved powerful Wi- Fi base stations installed on existing tele-
graph poles throughout the township. Customers are then able to use 
the Wi- Fi function on their device to connect to broadband internet. 
Fig. 2.6 A China Telecom promotion distributing plastic bowls  
among townsfolk 
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Although WLAN has no bandwidth limit, users could nonetheless only 
access the network for a limited amount of time every month by logging 
in through a dedicated control panel. Connection time to the WLAN 
network either came bundled with the most expensive mobile phone 
subscriptions (for example, the packages listed in Table 2.3 came with 
10 hours of WLAN access per month) or could alternatively be pur-
chased as a standalone package. In 2013, WLAN traffic accounted for 
73.8 per cent of China’s wireless internet traffic growth, which prob-
ably reflects the low cost of this connection method in comparison to 
using 3G bandwidth.34
The second, more common option for connecting to broadband 
was a fixed line ADSL connection from China Unicom. While these con-
nections cost only slightly more than that of WLAN, they offer faster 
connections and unlimited bandwidth. This service is now available in 
most villages in the township, and posters advertising the service often 
appear on the exterior of rural homes (Fig. 2.7). The steady rise in home 
broadband connections nationwide has been the result of on- going 
efforts by ISPs and the Chinese government to promote access at home.35
The perceived benefits and affordability of ADSL over WLAN made 
it the preferred mode of home broadband access. Among 111 adults 
Fig. 2.7 Advert for broadband and other telecoms services on village 
home exterior 
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surveyed (including non- users) regarding which methods they use to 
connect to the internet from their homes, around seven out of 10 con-
nected via ADSL broadband, with the remainder split roughly evenly 
between WLAN connections, mobile phones used at home (via 3G) and 
those who claimed never to connect to the internet at home.36 This sig-
nificant preference for ADSL broadband was corroborated by a later sur-
vey conducted among middle school students, in which 45 per cent of 
students surveyed indicated that their home had a computer from which 
it was possible to access the internet.37
However, the growing availability of home broadband connec-
tions did not mean it was affordable or desired by all the families in 
the town. According to an informal conversation with the town’s China 
Unicom store manager, around one-third of the township’s 8,300 
households have installed broadband. However, homes with broad-
band connections were mainly found in Anshan Town proper and the 
four villages immediately surrounding it, with fewer households from 
outlying villages installing broadband. According to the manager, the 
purchase of a separate computer, along with the installation and main-
tenance of the broadband – which in May 2013 was 610 RMB ($98) per 
year  – constituted an unnecessary expense for many families in the 
town. One result of the scattered dispersion of home ADSL connections 
was that young people whose families lacked these connections often 
visited the homes of relatives or friends in order to use a home broad-
band connection.
One group of people for whom home broadband connections are 
of particular importance are the small- private traders (i.e. shopkeep-
ers, restaurant owners) introduced in Chapter  1. A  large proportion 
of this group operate their businesses from ground-floor shop fronts 
that faced on to commercial street, which often double as their homes. 
Living on the premises reduces a family’s expenses and enables them 
to stay open longer (often up to 12 hours per day), increasing oppor-
tunities for sales. Because many of these small private traders were 
effectively stuck at home with little to do, many installed broadband 
connections and placed computers within the main area of their shop, 
allowing them to use the internet while keeping an eye on the store 
(Fig. 2.8). These shopkeepers constituted some of the heaviest users 
of social media in the town. They were also noteworthy in another 
sense:  many of them were in their late thirties and forties, and so 
they stood apart from many same- aged peers who spent far less time 
online. This constitutes an affordable form of entertainment for these 
persons.
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Work  unit broadband
Many administrative employees in the town’s work  units (various gov-
ernment offices, state- owned enterprises or private factories) enjoy sim-
ilar broadband connections in their workplaces. Their circumstances 
are similar to small private traders in that they are confined to their 
desks for large periods of each day and computers have become both 
an important work tool and a diversion from their work. Not all organ-
isations make use of email, so it is relatively common for employees to 
use QQ IM for both personal and work tasks. However, their personal 
backgrounds often differ considerably from local small traders. Many 
of these administrative workers are urban female employees from Bai 
Town. These low- level administrative employees in state- owned enter-
prises enjoy relatively relaxed jobs, affording them with not only a reg-
ular fixed salary, but also plenty of opportunity throughout the working 
day to access social media.
Internet café
Anshan Town has a single internet café which offers metered internet 
access for between 1– 3 RMB per hour ($0.16– 0.48). This café is in a state 
Fig. 2.8 Computer placed in a hair salon 
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of slow decline, marking a radical transition from several years ear-
lier, when the town was able to support three separate internet cafés. 
There has been a general dwindling of internet cafés around China, 
owing to the falling price and increasing availability of home broad-
band connections and smartphones diminishing their appeal. The hus-
band and wife owners of the surviving internet café in Anshan Town are 
attempting to avoid a similar fate by diversifying its business offerings. 
The front of the café is emblazoned with numerous hoardings listing a 
myriad of services – ‘Photocopying. Printing. Business cards. Banners. 
Flags. Photographs. Closed Circuit Television Installation. Computer 
Equipment.’ – which aim to supplement the ever- shrinking income gen-
erated from café users. The main area of the café contained 28 computer 
terminals organised into four rows. No more than half of these terminals 
were ever occupied. Only 2 per cent of surveyed middle school students 
identified the internet café as the place where they most often accessed 
the internet.38 Despite the declining numbers of people using the internet 
cafés, they are an important ‘commons’ 39 for a small number of people 
in the town, particularly for the ‘information have- less’ youth, many of 
whom were middle school students from outlying villages where poorer 
families could not afford (or did not want) home internet connections.
School
The town’s middle school also constitutes an important point of access 
for its students. This is particularly surprising, given the school’s disap-
proval of student internet and social media use. At specific instances, 
social media use is tacitly allowed within the school. One example 
of this is during weekly 45- minute- long computer classes (weiji ke). 
Students explained that the computing curriculum closely follows a 
dated textbook focusing on teaching the use of software packages such 
as Microsoft Word, Paint, Excel and Access, despite students’ knowledge 
of this software often surpassing that of their teacher. One progressive 
ICT teacher responded to this situation by closely following the content 
of the textbook for the first 25 minutes of class, then allowing students 
to use the internet freely for the remainder of the lesson. Students had 
installed QQ IM on the school’s computers so they could chat online 
during the lessons. One student even reported having installed Counter 
Strike, a first- person shooter video game on some machines, for use in 
class. This constitutes a good example of how even the formal education 
system was responding to students’ desires to access social media and 
the barriers that some of them faced in doing so.
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For a significant minority (16 per cent) of middle school stu-
dents surveyed,40 computer classes represented the main way that they 
accessed the internet (Table 2.4). This indicates the importance of pro-
viding internet and social media access, especially among students of 
poorer backgrounds from the outlying villages who struggled to access 
the internet and social media in their own home, internet cafés or 
through relatives and friends.
Conclusion: Choice and constraint
This chapter has demonstrated the impressive dispersal of ICTs in Anshan 
Town. Rather than internet and social media being scarce, and its popu-
lation tentative about using it – a view of ICT that frequently emerges in 
representations of rural China41 – having social media accounts and at 
least some way to access the internet (albeit sometimes temporary and 
requiring social effort and co- ordination) is an established and largely 
taken for granted reality for significant groups within the town.
The issue of the mere presence of social media, however, has 
turned out to be the foundation for a much more complex scenario that 
involves many different varieties of social media and their relationship 
to the diverse populations found in a small place such as Anshan Town. 
This chapter has shown how differing levels of visibility account for the 
appeal of different social media platforms. However, it has also shown 
that not everyone in the town has an entirely free choice over which 
platforms to use.
Visibility emerged as a key determinant in the selection of social 
media platform. Different platforms offered different forms of visibility, 
with the most popular platforms, such as QQ and WeChat being compar-
atively closed, while open microblogging platforms such as Sina Weibo 
Table 2.4 Middle school students’ responses to survey question ‘Where do 
you access the internet most?’
Access method Number of respondents Percentage share
Home 177 59
Relatives’ home 47 15
School 47 16
Friend’s home 22 7
Internet café 5 2
Other 4 1
 
THE SOC IAL MED IA L ANDSC APE :  V IS Ib I L I T Y AND ECONOMY 63
and Tencent Weibo were less popular. However, I argue that this visibil-
ity should not be understood solely in terms of the affordances offered 
by the platform.42 This discussion has also shown how visibility could be 
created or erased through users’ own practices (for example, the use of 
avatars and aliases). Qualities of visibility are also heavily dependent on 
context. For example, features on social media platforms designed for 
connecting with strangers help to satisfy some people’s desires to be vis-
ible to others online; however, some of these users did not always want 
fellow townsfolk to know they were using these services. In contrast to 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, on QQ and WeChat each user’s 
contact list remained concealed from other users. Therefore, although 
the specific type of visibility afforded by the platform was especially 
important, this was also dependent on the specific context of the user 
and their social situation. Rather than being an inherent quality of 
platforms, the nature of visibility only becomes apparent through inter-
action with and use of a platform.
The concealment of one’s own network of social relations as offered 
by these platforms is especially useful when one is adding and convers-
ing with strangers, mutually shielding the stranger’s and the contact’s 
existing friends from each other.43 It also speaks to broader concerns 
about concealing various branches of one’s own traditional network of 
friends from each other. For example, the owner of a small store in the 
town had various different wholesalers from the nearby county town as 
friends on his QQ account. He felt more comfortable with the fact that 
the existence of the other retailers was concealed as it enabled him to 
maintain good relations with each of them and prevent any jealousy. 
This accords with anthropological accounts that have emphasised how 
networks of connections (guanxi) need to be ‘subtly managed’,44 and 
sometimes concealed to avoid envy or accusations of impropriety (real 
or otherwise).45
While the use of particular social media platforms is strongly 
influenced by these notions of visibility, this chapter has also shown that 
the cost of access meant that not all people could exercise a free choice 
over which platforms to use, and when they could use them. For all 
but the wealthiest families, connecting to the internet still constitutes 
a significant expense. As such, for some in Anshan Town social media 
access should be seen as a scarce resource, and the degree of usage 
seems to indicate how quickly it imposes itself as a priority expenditure. 
Affordable ICT’s are filling the gap between the information ‘haves’ and 
‘have- nots’, to create growing numbers of rural ‘information have- less’.46 
While this chapter has offered evidence for this, the explanation will be 
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found in the following chapters when it becomes clear what people actu-
ally get out of using these platforms and the pressures upon them to be 
part of the community of users. However, one reason was immediately 
evident, which is that social media lies within a much wider framework. 
There are clear correspondences between these different populations in 
terms of age, employment, gender and education and their likely con-
nection with particular elements of social media usage.
The dominant variable is age. Young people were among the high-
est users of social media, especially middle school, high school and 
university students. Young adults were also frequent users, although 
sometimes the degree to which they were able to access platforms in 
the course of a typical day was determined by profession and working 
environment. Middle-aged and older groups of people were typically 
less likely to use social media, although once again this was often linked 
to people’s daily circumstances. A middle-aged shopkeeper in the town 
might be far more likely to use social media than someone of the same 
age whose main activity was agriculture.
While QQ is the most popular platform in Anshan Town, its use 
may be as much about a relationship to the news, gaming and entertain-
ment as it is about social networking. As such, QQ seems to represent a 
more holistic engagement with communication, which becomes clearer 
if we consider polymedia in relation to the whole range of platforms 
available, since the majority of internet users in the town are likely to be 
using more than one social media (e.g. QQ along with WeChat, Weibo, 
Renren, etc.). However, this sense of engagement seems even stronger 
when we see that social media do not just spread across into other func-
tions of QQ, they also become associated with other smartphone func-
tions. Therefore, the discussion of the context of a rise in smartphone 
ownership was as central to this chapter as the discussion of the range 
of QQ functions. Overall, this chapter tries to give sense of the sheer size 
and scale of what it is that people are becoming part of when they use 
social media. Almost inevitably that implicated QQ and, increasingly, 
smartphones.
So the essence of this chapter is, on the one hand, to portray the 
breadth and depth of this new engagement with digital communication 
technologies, while also starting to introduce the issues that will be fur-
ther explored in later chapters. The same scale of functions allows, as 
do polymedia, an increasing differentiation of populations, each delin-
eated either by their association with a particular platform or app or 
by their creation of specific groups and associations within the field of 
possibilities.
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The general trend for social media use to be concentrated among 
specific groups also encourages further communication and the devel-
opment of intimacy within these groups, providing the foundation on 
which ‘circles’ of familiar friends are constructed. However, maintaining 
such circles requires not only ongoing exchanges, but also acceptance, 
and adherence to a shared set of ideals. The next chapter investigates 
the actual messages shared on the social media profiles of Anshan Town 
people.
66
3
Visual postings: Idealising family – 
love, marriage and ‘little treasures’
Having introduced Anshan Town, its people and the social media plat-
forms used there, we now turn to consider what content townsfolk 
actually post on their social media profiles. Close examination of these 
postings – many of which relate to family themes – appears to confirm 
the type of online visibility preferred by the town’s social media users, 
as outlined in the previous chapter, which generally privileges sharing 
posts with closed circles of friends.
Rather than attempting comprehensive coverage of all the post-
ing genres, this chapter focuses on some of the most common types of 
post: photos of offspring, memes related to love and marriage and posts 
professing gratitude towards one’s own parents. The choice of these 
three themes is simply an acknowledgement that they are some of the 
dominant genres of posting, which demand proper contextualisation 
and explanation in relation to the various moral frameworks present in 
the town. These popular postings are of particular interest, given that 
their content appears to differ so markedly from the overtly political 
postings which, as was discussed in Chapter 1, have largely dominated 
academic coverage of social media and internet use in China to date.
This chapter argues that because the content of these posts is 
centred on family themes and the platforms they are shared on allow 
only limited visibility, the postings function as a way of sharing with 
friends moral discourses around what idealised ‘traditional’ family rela-
tions should be. This argument will be challenged later in Chapters 4 
and 5, which will show how people also use social media to explore and 
rationalise the moral implications of various transformations in society.
The task of examining participants’ social media postings in a sys-
tematic way required its own dedicated method. October 2013 was spent 
recording and analysing the social media postings made by participants 
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on their own Qzone pages.1 I asked all 111 participants who completed 
the initial survey questionnaire2 to friend me on QQ so that I could view 
and analyse their Qzone posts. A  total of 55 people from this group 
both friended me and had active Qzone profiles that could be accessed. 
Collecting data involved taking a screenshot of each individual post on a 
user profile and saving it into a database, in which each image could be 
‘tagged’ with multiple themes. In total, from these 55 profile pages, 1,214 
separate photos, diary and ‘speak speak’ entries were examined. Of all 
the posts analysed, themes relating to offspring – e.g. ‘child’ and ‘baby’ – 
and posts relating to romantic affection – e.g. ‘love’ or ‘romance’ – were 
the most significant genres. Both of these themes occupied 151 tags.
As the categorisation was carried out by myself, it was necessar-
ily somewhat subjective. Therefore, the statistics used to determine the 
popularity of postings are by no means comprehensive or statistically 
rigorous. Instead they are included to provide a feel for the kinds of posts 
on the Qzone profiles of Anshan Town people, and they do correspond to 
the general trends of postings that I observed throughout the field work.
One distinctive advantage of this method was that this analysis of 
postings was a small part of a long- term period of ethnographic field 
work, thus allowing me to cross- reference what I  saw people post on 
their social media profiles with everything else I knew about these indi-
viduals through my interactions with both them and others in the town.
‘Treasure one  hundred- day photographs’:  
a wealth of variety
My little treasure has been born. 3.7kg. Born at 4:48.
— Young mother’s posting on her Qzone page, 
a few hours after she gave birth.
The birth of a child is always celebrated in Anshan Town. These celebra-
tions do not only mark the arrival of a new life, but they also express the 
new parents’ pride in fulfilling a duty to their own parents by ensuring 
a new generation.3 Young parents are often keen to share images of a 
new baby, often called a ‘treasure’ (baobao or baobei), with their friends 
on social media. This is particularly the case for young mothers, most 
of whom still observe a traditional month of confinement in which they 
remain inside their home with the newborn child for a period of a month 
following the birth.4 However, the mere event of birth does not mean a 
child is automatically considered to be part of the family. Instead, the 
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successful incorporation of a child into the family occurs in the period 
following birth, and its success becomes clearest in the practice of 
‘Treasure one  hundred- day photographs’ (baobei baitian zhao).
The practice of producing and sharing a child’s photos on social 
media needs to be understood as developing out of older traditions. For 
example, research carried out in rural north China during the early 
1990s identified families marking a child’s one hundredth day as a major 
event  – one among a number of celebrations of a child’s survival that 
take place during its first year.5 Banquets were frequently held where 
friends and family gifted red envelopes filled with money. Such cele-
brations were said to symbolise long life and mark a point at which an 
infant truly becomes part of a family, owing to the increased likelihood 
of a child’s survival.6 Similar festivities still occur in Anshan Town today, 
although now in tandem with the production and online sharing of these 
commemorative photographs.
Advances in affordable technology, the increasing affluence of 
townsfolk and national trends within China have led to photographs of 
the child being commissioned, and this too has become an integral part 
of the ritual. The town’s first photo studio opened in the early 1980s and 
the practice of producing a single black  and  white baby photo of newborns 
became commonplace (Fig. 3.1). Towards the end of the 1980s colour 
Fig. 3.1 Black  and  white baby photo taken during the 1970s 
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photography arrived. In the mid- 1990s photo studios started overlaying 
clear transparent sheets featuring adornments and decorations on to the 
developed colour photos (Fig. 3.2). From 2010 high- quality, profession-
ally produced photo albums for ‘Treasure one  hundred- day photographs’ 
started to become widespread in the town, following trends in nearby 
urban areas. Anshan Town has four photography studios offering one 
hundred- day photo services (in addition to wedding photos, their main 
income source). Today a typical photo album produced by these studios 
consists of eight double- page spreads featuring approximately 20 differ-
ent images of the baby (Fig. 3.3) and costs around 200 RMB ($32). The 
edited photo albums and mounted pictures produced by photo studios 
were kept in the home of the new parents (see Fig.  3.4); however, in 
recent years Qzone has also become an important secondary destination 
for these one  hundred- day baby photographs.
The desire for a ‘wealthy’ variety of baby photos
Close examination of the one  hundred- day baby photos appearing in 
printed photo albums and on Qzone demonstrates a broadening of 
the meaning of these images, from celebrating survival to attempting 
to demonstrate parents’ ability to bestow wealth on their offspring. 
Parents define a successful photo collection as one that captures their 
‘little treasure’ in as wide a variety of poses, clothing and settings as 
Fig. 3.2 Colour one  hundred- day baby photo taken during the 1990s 
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possible, thereby exhibiting wealth. Because sharing photos on Qzone 
allowed parents a greater range of poses and costumes, this was felt an 
even better way to showcase this abundance experienced by the baby.
The timing of these photo sessions reflects concerns around good 
fortune. Contrary to its name, it is considered inauspicious to hold photo 
sessions on the exact hundredth day of the child’s life, owing to the 
Chinese for ‘one hundred’ (bai) being a homonym of the word ‘white’ 
(bai). Major life events are typically divided into ‘red events’ (hongshi), 
such as births and marriages, and ‘white events’ (baishi) such as funer-
als.7 Since one- hundred- day photos are meant to be celebratory, a day 
or two either side of exactly one hundred days is seen to be more auspi-
cious. Some parents cited a more practical reason for taking pictures at 
the one  hundred- day mark: at this age the baby is able to sit up, recognise 
people and smile, which contributes to producing the maximum diver-
sity of facial expressions and positions. The material forms of abundance 
combined with auspicious concerns around selecting the right day for an 
event are considered instrumental to creating good fortune.
Recent advances in affordable digital photography technology 
have resulted in greater numbers of photos being produced, and have 
meant these photos undergo extensive post- production, retouching 
and adding multiple layers, effects, fantastical backgrounds, colours 
Fig. 3.3 Spread from a printed photo album, produced in 2013 
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and patterns (Fig. 3.3). The editing and printing of these albums was 
not done in Anshan Town, but was outsourced to specialists in the pro-
vincial capital of Jinan. QQ IM was essential in this process. It allowed 
Anshan Town’s photo studios to send original images to album produc-
ers, and for album producers to share digital proofs with the studios 
and parents. Poorer families who lacked internet access could visit the 
studio in Anshan Town to view digital versions of the proofs. The fin-
ished printed albums were transported back to the photo studios in 
Anshan Town on passenger buses for collection by customers.
Photo studios also make extensive use of multiple costumes as 
another way of diversifying these image collections. For example, Wang 
Liyao, a 25- year- old mother who worked in one of the town’s hotels and 
had previously arranged these photos for her own child, explained:
There is a feeling, if there are lots of different costumes then you 
get different styles, if there is just one costume then all your photos 
will be the same. If the costumes are changed then the photos will 
all feel different.
Fig. 3.4 Living room of a young married couple. Above the television 
is a mounted wedding photograph, while underneath the television are 
three mounted ‘one  hundred- day photographs’ of their son. The shelf 
underneath holds a closed wedding photo album. 
SOC IAL MED IA IN RUR AL CH INA72
Photographing the baby displaying as many different facial expres-
sions as possible was also stressed as being important. More expen-
sive photo studios in urban areas such as Jinan and Bai Town employ 
staff who are said to be ‘experts’ in making babies laugh. By contrast, 
in Anshan Town, the child’s mother and grandmother typically attend 
sessions and are given the task of evoking facial expressions from the 
baby. A  further trope is the use of backdrops, basic pieces of minia-
ture furniture and building elements (such as fences or windowsills), 
which were also changed between different images within a single 
session.
from print albums to Qzone sharing of baby photos
One  hundred- day baby photographs are increasingly being shared on 
Qzone, with many parents wanting to upload the images to their Qzone 
profiles immediately after the photo shoot, often using the photo stu-
dio’s own computers to log on to their account. While photo studios 
in Anshan Town generally offer the raw images to customers free of 
charge, those in Bai Town and Jinan charge customers for these uned-
ited image files. For example, Bai Qing, a 25- year- old mother from 
Anshan Town, thought the costumes in local photo studios were of low 
quality, so she paid 298 RMB ($48) for a photo shoot in Bai Town, and 
was willing to pay an extra 300 RMB ($48) for a CD containing the 
unedited images.
A further consequence of Qzone being a destination for one 
hundred- day photos is that it has also provided a new outlet for those 
photographs that fail to appear in the printed photo albums. During 
photo shoots, photographers will take double the amount of photos 
needed to ensure enough suitable images are available for the finished 
album, and participants valued the fact that these extra images could 
be shared online. The advent of digital photography also allowed them 
a comparatively greater level of control in curating their own Qzone 
album in comparison to the printed album. On Qzone mothers were able 
to select their favourite images and juxtapose them with other photos, 
as Bai Qing recalled:
The album photos are all in [my] Qzone, and there are some of 
the original photos. I  think some of them are not very good, so 
I didn’t upload them, they’re in my computer. A few of the photos 
are really ugly, but I also uploaded them too, because they’re really 
good fun!
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Mothers gave other practical reasons for posting the photos on their 
Qzone profiles. Some said they found it helped to share these photos 
with their friends (often also mothers of a similar age), and receive sup-
portive comments from them; many also spoke of Qzone as a storage 
device,8 explaining that Qzone provided a backup should original image 
files go missing. Wang Liyao explained:
I think there are two thoughts [when posting child’s photos online]. 
One is that by putting the photos online, I can let my colleagues 
look at the photos; and, if I put them online, if my mobile can’t turn 
on or the photos get deleted, and then if they’re online it’s safer. 
And another reason is that I only want my friends to see my baby 
photos. I’ve set up restrictions for other people, set up privacy. I am 
afraid other people would copy the photos, and some kind of situ-
ation would occur.
While some mothers uploaded photos as they would appear in the fin-
ished printed photo album (Fig. 3.5), it was more common for parents to 
share the raw, unedited photographs. Fig. 3.6 shows some of an original 
series of images that were used to create the finished photo album image 
seen in Fig. 3.5. Even without the vivid effects typically reserved for the 
printed photo album, these unedited Qzone infant pictures still retain 
their imaginative and multifarious qualities.
Fig. 3.5 An infant girl in a one  hundred- day photograph (after studio 
editing). The red- lettered text caption in the image says (using a com-
bination of traditional and simplified Chinese characters) ‘Treasure 
garden’. 
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Fig. 3.6 Unedited photo studio images posted on Qzone 
The drive for as many different styles as possible in baby pho-
tos accords with research showing how Chinese parents hope to give 
their children ‘first world’ conditions to grow up in – often thought of 
in terms of material plenty.9 In the case of Anshan Town, one  hundred- 
day photos relate to a major concern around obtaining and providing 
a respectable level of wealth and prosperity for oneself and one’s fam-
ily  which is present within Chinese culture. Deploying the quality of 
variety within these images becomes a key ingredient for attaining this. 
As a female designer of photo albums from Jinan explained, ‘What we 
are looking for with a single spread is that things should be harmonious 
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and not monotonous (dandiao).’ This position was confirmed by the 
owner of an Anshan Town photo studio who described what constitutes 
a successful album:
It’s like, for example, there are two photos, when you design it 
you have to care about the complementary nature of colours, 
and if, for example, if she just put these two [unedited] photos 
here it would be very flat and plain. These things [the props in 
the photos] they are decorations, like these frames [indicating 
to frames hanging in the shop], they are just like the furnishings 
in the room. If you just put only these two photos [in the album] 
it would be very, very monotonous, because this background is a 
white background, so once the blue is added, it evokes a dream-
like effect. It is just like some sort of decorations have been 
added, it is not as if there are any particular thing that is defi-
nitely required.
In addition to using abundance to attempt to show how well cared for 
a child is in the present, these images also function as a site for imag-
ining the wealth the child may enjoy in the future. Some parents spoke 
of creating these photographs with the intention that their child would 
view them at an older age. One young mother had gone so far as to set 
up a QQ account for her baby, populating its Qzone profile with their 
own baby photos for them to view when they grow up. This adds a fur-
ther dimension to the meaning of these images. Not only are they ways 
of imagining the prosperity their children may gain, but they will also 
allow the children to look back in the future at the earliest parts of their 
own childhood to see the nurture and care they received from their 
parents.10
Love and devotion
Life is precious, but love is more valuable
— Chinese saying
Dramatic statements of love and affection, often combined with images 
of anonymous young couples hugging and kissing (Fig. 3.7), dominate 
the Qzone profiles of Anshan Town residents just as frequently as baby 
photos. While these postings differ from baby images in a number of 
ways  –  a different theme, shared memes rather than original images, 
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and originating mainly from the town’s teenagers rather than parents – 
they nonetheless serve a similar function of representing the impor-
tance of family- oriented values into moral frameworks. These postings 
show how Qzone becomes a space where one can fantasise upon and 
share with one’s friends everything that points to the infinite happiness 
that may be gained through unbridled affection and commitment – often 
implying marriage – between partners. Qzone thereby constitutes one 
of the most important places for Anshan Town society to idealise love 
and life- long devotion.
Romantic memes: How teenagers talk about love online
The fact that much of the content posted regarding love and devotion is 
in the form of forwarded memes rather than original content is signifi-
cant, as it implies that, on this topic, many prefer to communicate online 
in words other than their own. This suggests that people find it easier to 
Fig. 3.7 Meme of couple kissing shared on Qzone. Caption reads: 
‘I already have you in my heart. Even if there was someone better, 
I wouldn’t want them.’
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recycle another’s words regarding love rather than write about it at great 
length themselves. This may reflect issues of possession. While babies 
(as already demonstrated) are persons that parents are keen to display 
online as a mark of their own achievement, being in love is something 
young people often aspire to but may not have achieved, so cannot illus-
trate it themselves.
Even in cases where young people do have romantic partners, 
issues of preserving an appearance of decency may be at play. Sharing 
memes merely implies identifying with something, whereas writing 
original romantic content suggests one has direct experience. Young 
people, even into their twenties, were often keen to hide relationships 
from their parents and other friends. Chapter  4 will discuss in more 
detail how parents and schools believe that students will be distracted 
from their studies if they become involved in romantic relationships. Set 
against this culture of non- permissiveness, romantic memes stood out 
as being strongly declarative in nature, proudly showing young couples 
embracing, holding hands or kissing (Figs 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10).
However, while these memes are in one sense transgressive (par-
ticularly in terms of imagery), the text that accompanies them empha-
sises a conformist ideal of monogamous devotion and commitment. All 
of the memes in Figs 3.7– 3.10 feature this common trope of dramatic 
declarations of love, and images of unspecified couples embracing or 
Fig. 3.8 Meme of couple kissing shared on Qzone. Caption 
reads: ‘When can I finally proudly tell other people, I have a partner 
that I love so much?’ 
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Fig. 3.9 Meme of couple holding hands in front of marriage registra-
tion office. Caption reads: ‘In five years’ time, will you accompany me 
to this place, and spend 9 RMB?’ [9 RMB ($1.45) is the cost of a legal 
marriage registration] 
Fig. 3.10 Meme of couple embracing on basketball court. Caption 
reads: ‘One’s own wife. Who you can have a hilarious time with, get so 
close to and won’t lose face. This is called love.’ 
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holding hands. In contrast to literature which has suggested that ‘tra-
ditional’ Chinese society is undergoing an ‘opening up’ towards novel 
Western forms of relationships and sexuality,11 online memes shared by 
Anshan Town youth generally remain focused on promoting conven-
tional views of relationships. Very occasionally these same declarations 
of love may tiptoe on the border of respectability, such as in Fig. 3.11, 
which combines saccharine statements of devotion with altogether more 
tactile imagery (see hand placement).
All of these posts appear to have tens of thousands of likes. The 
large numbers of likes and shares that such posts attract may be due to 
the romantic content, but may also be because the postings specifically 
request that users like and share them (qiuzan and qiuzhuan respec-
tively). Although the photos look self- made, rather than professionally 
taken, it is often unclear whether these are ‘real’ couples, or whether 
such imagery is created to capitalise on the appetite for this genre of 
Fig. 3.11 Meme of couple embracing. Caption reads: ‘The greatest 
expression of love. Requesting likes and requesting blessings [of this 
post]. In the days ahead, whether they are good or bad, we can struggle 
together, we can create our future. You say you can give me a blessed 
and joyous future, do you know, as the people in love say, I really feel 
blessed. My future has you! This is definite, Wenguo, we want to be 
blessed, so blessed that it will make all the people of the world jealous. 
My future has you, Xu Ziqing.’ 
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postings and in a desire to achieve internet fame. Unusually, the text 
that accompanies the image in Fig. 3.12 names its two subjects, although 
again there is no reason to assume these are necessarily the people in 
question.
For younger unmarried persons in the town a further strong 
sub- theme of romantic Qzone postings emphasises the importance of 
waiting patiently in the cause of true devotion (Figs 3.12– 3.16). This is 
exemplified by the following status update shared by a 17- year- old high- 
school student.
There is a kind of love called ‘letting go’ . . . I am the one that loves 
you . . . I’ll wait for you.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, young, unmarried people were the main group 
who posted this type of meme. It appears to be a tacit way to advertise 
the romantic availability and moral integrity of the meme sharer while 
also justifying their singledom. Taken as a whole, this genre of posting 
romantic memes among young people draws strongly on rhetoric sur-
rounding monogamous devotion. Furthermore, the fact that many of 
these posts use shared memes suggests they correspond to more broadly 
held values.
Fig. 3.12 Romantic meme shared on Qzone. Caption reads ‘Single girls 
please remember, place quality over quantity, waiting for a long time is 
for a more beautiful chance encounter, it’s after going through the big-
gest test in life, that God (Shangdi) will give you the most precious gift. 
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Posting about one’s own love: legitimised experience  
of newly married couples
A small number of relatively newly married Qzone users in Anshan Town 
felt at greater liberty to create their own original postings highlighting 
their ongoing, committed (and legitimised through the act of marriage) 
relationship, which they shared on their social media profiles. These 
postings tended to portray the martial relationship in a particularly 
Fig. 3.13 Meme of series of flowers. Caption reads: ‘But the thing 
we are lacking is not the person who is good enough, right enough, or 
dependable enough, but in the end of the end, every one will change 
and end up needing this kind of person. If you give him a little more 
time, he will give you a little more time, it’s better. Come, let us fall in 
love without worrying about the time.’ 
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harmonious light. For example, the following post was made by Song 
Xuebai, a young married mother who worked in the town’s hotel (men-
tioned previously), who posted the following message on her Qzone pro-
file during her pregnancy:
To see my husband come home every day and gently pat and caress 
my stomach, it is really so sweet! [I’m] so blessed (xingfu)! Really 
I love him more and more each day!
At times individuals also attempt to pepper these displays of deep devo-
tion with elements of humour, perhaps indicating a degree of reflexivity 
about these postings. For example, Han Peng is a 26- year- old married 
Fig. 3.14 Meme of cartoon couple embracing. Closing sentence of 
accompanying text reads: ‘ . . . I know you will come, so I will wait.’ 
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male hairdresser who runs a hair salon in the town with his wife. They 
live and work together each day in the salon with their young son, and 
always present themselves to customers as a very close pair. Among Han 
Peng’s public postings was a message that was directed to his wife:
I don’t dare to love you, because there is no medical insurance for 
lovesickness
A final, and perhaps most impressive, example of this genre of post-
ing comes from Zhang Chaoyue, an unemployed 23- year- old married 
male who lives in his parents’ house in the town along with his wife. 
His father works as a salesman for one of the town’s factories. Although 
Zhang Chaoyue graduated from Anshan Town’s middle school, he never 
completed his high school education in Bai Town, as he was unable to 
bear sharing a dormitory with his classmates. One day he suddenly 
appeared at his parents’ home at Anshan Town refusing to return to 
high school. Zhang Chaoyue worked as a manual labourer for a spell 
in Bai Town, but disliked the work. During this time he met his wife, 
also from Anshan Town. In the end he reduced his working hours to 
just mornings. Eventually he decided to leave his job, and returned to 
Anshan Town to live with his parents. He worked in one of the town’s 
Fig. 3.15 Romantic meme shared on Qzone. Text above photo reads: 
‘Time will tell you who really loves you, and who is just playing.’ 
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factories for a short period. However, once again, he could not tolerate 
the manual labour, so he resigned his position and now spends much of 
his time on his computer at home, playing games, visiting websites and 
using social media.
For Zhang Chaoyue, Qzone has become an important way of declar-
ing his devotion to his wife. His profile picture features a wedding photo 
of him and his partner. Many of his status updates on social media take 
the form of messages of unending devotion to his partner.
I love you to death.
My wife, I will love you for all of my life.
Yes, yes, love for a lifetime.
These examples, all of which emerge from newly married individu-
als, are of particular note as they demonstrate the extent of the post-
er’s efforts to portray their relationships as the living embodiment of 
the types of family connections that the memes posted by unmarried 
Fig. 3.16 Romantic cartoon meme. Caption reads: ‘Wife, if we are 
to walk apart, reply to me, you will wait in the original place for me 
to come back. // Mmm. Husband, I will wait for you to come back. 
Definitely!’ 
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persons allude to. In this case relationships are typically portrayed in a 
way that emphasises intra- family harmony.
In summary, young unmarried individuals show a propensity to 
share memes about marriage, love and devotion. Newly married people 
may also make original status updates regarding their marriage. Older 
married couples in their thirties and above tend to share far less of these 
types of romantic postings and memes because, as will be explained 
in Chapter 4, patterns of social media use generally become more con-
strained within relationships between married couples in the town.
Expressions of thanks to parents (or friends?)
Posts that appear to be lovingly addressed expressions of gratitude to 
parents are another prevalent theme among participants, which also 
implies adherence to a particularly strong family ethic. These posts 
appeared less often than baby photos or posts regarding devotion and 
marriage. An unusual aspect of this practice was the fact that, in the 
majority of cases, the poster’s parents did not use social media12 and were 
therefore unable to view these messages. For example, Dong Qiang, a 
37- year- old male from Huangtian village who was married with chil-
dren and whose parents (in their sixties) neither used the internet nor 
had social media accounts, shared the following online:
Dearest father and mother, I am thankful to you both. Thank you 
for giving me life, allowing me to have one hundred years of my 
own in the vast universe, thank you for giving my home warmth, 
and the care of one’s own flesh and blood, for immersing me in the 
golden nest of love from my youth . . . 
Some younger people, such as 19- year- old Li Na, posted similar mes-
sages on her Qzone profile:
Dearest father, thank you that for this life you have treated me 
with limitless love, I am really very thankful to you.
Xu Jing, a 16- year- old high school student, also made a similar post. In 
this case her mother and father, both aged 48, did not use any social 
media even though they possessed mobile phones:
Mother’s chatter is the warmest language in the entire world
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A further example of a post ostensibly directed at parents came from 27- 
year- old Liu Yang, a mother from Huangtian village who worked as an 
administrator in the office of one the local factories, and whose parents 
did not use the internet.
Mother hosted me for several days, and fed the chickens, they said 
they would like to eat lettuce, and fry it for them to eat, I asked 
where the chicken was, my mother said I should buy it at the mar-
ket. Mother, I love you, I hope your health is good!
These status updates demonstrate a desire by those who post them to 
perform acts of filial devotion and piety. The example of being duti-
ful towards one’s elders is often viewed as being emblematic not only 
of China, but also of countries in Asia more generally. Anthropologists 
studying China have long understood these feelings as emerging from a 
system of patrilineal authority in which men are placed above women, 
and the old are placed above the young.13 The dominance of this way 
of understanding Chinese society among Euro- American scholars owes 
much to a series of influential theories, which argued that patrilineal 
descent should be understood as the overwhelming organising factor in 
Chinese kinship and society.14 These theories became a dominant model 
in the anthropology of China.15 However, in the case of Anshan Town, 
the performance of these acts of gratitude does not always appear to be 
for the benefit of the parents.
The fact that parents are typically unable to view their child’s mes-
sages of gratitude and love suggests that these messages are designed 
to establish one’s own cultural and moral value in the eyes of one’s 
peers. A parallel situation can be observed in the ritual activities that 
occur during the annual tomb sweeping festival (qingming jie). This 
traditional Chinese festival involves families visiting the tombs of their 
deceased ancestors where they will clean, bow and leave offerings of 
food. The festival was widely observed in Anshan Town. However, some 
cynics commented in private that the actions relating to this festival are 
not really about the deceased ancestors at all; and were actually ‘liv-
ing people performing for other living people’ (huoren zuo, gei huoren 
kan), alluding to the fact that these rituals help to display the upstanding 
morality of participants within the community.
If one were to approach the Qzone posts of filial piety in a similarly 
cynical fashion, it could be argued that these messages may perform 
a similar function. They are not seen by parents, but are yet another 
expression of the idealised version of parental devotion  – and family 
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values – placed on Qzone in order for individuals to appear virtuous to 
one’s friends. However, many of the individuals who posted these mes-
sages seemed to have perfectly good relationships with their parents, 
even if these were conducted entirely offline. It therefore seems unrea-
sonable to doubt the sincerity of the postings. Perhaps the sharing of 
such messages should be understood in terms of one individual’s asser-
tion that their social media profile was a place to ‘share happiness, not 
sadness’ (baoxi, bu baoyou). It ought to be possible to view this form of 
social media posting not as an act of self- aggrandisement, but rather as 
a desire to share the joy of an apparently harmonious parent– child rela-
tionship with one’s friends. This establishes another link between these 
postings and those of the baby photos and romantic memes, in that they 
can all be seen to be about sharing largely positive and idealised views 
of family relations.
‘Shared’ values
This chapter has examined what is arguably the most ‘social’ aspect of 
social media use in Anshan Town:  the posting of status updates and 
memes that are shared with closed circles of people, most of whom are 
the poster’s acquaintances and friends in offline life. As such, these post-
ings identify with, speak to and reinforce many of the accepted moral 
frameworks already existing in Anshan Town life. Although many people 
in the town say that they do not feel the need to share very much, when 
people do post on their Qzone or Moments pages, such postings tend to 
be extremely normative in nature, and with a strong focus on the family. 
The posts that appear most often in Qzone reflect these topics of love, 
devotion, childbirth, marriage and gratitude towards one’s parents.
Each of the three topics considered in this chapter are important 
in their own right but, when considered as a whole, they point to far 
more significant, over- arching ideals that are priorities for social media 
users in Anshan Town. All of these postings assert identification with, 
and adherence to, an imagined ‘traditional’ lifestyle and set of moral val-
ues. Chapter 1 showed the pride that Anshan Town people have in the 
inherent values of the township and its people, informed by a cultural 
heritage whose foundations are understood to have their roots in a rich 
historical milieu of Confucian, Daoist and socialist cultural influences, 
as well as a contemporary counterpoint to the values and practices of 
those in nearby urban centres. The popular kinds of mundane status 
update described above enable those posting them on social media to 
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assert a direct link with what they see as their own enduring moral 
framework.
Although these postings appeared to reference tradition, they 
were in fact selective adaptions of these cultural groupings. Key char-
acteristics  – notions of patriliny, clan, descent, obedience  – were all 
notably absent from the posts. These ‘traditional’ postings were not 
strict reproductions of original Confucian or Daoist values or ethics. 
Instead, the appearance of social media in Anshan Town had enabled 
townsfolk to reconfigure and reinterpret these ideals, making them both 
relevant and useful in their own lives. One  hundred- day photos shared 
on social media referenced notions of a child’s debt to its parents, but 
also allowed parents to express adoration and love for their child. Posts 
regarding love and marriage emphasised the importance of enduring 
affinal relationships as the foundation of family, while allowing for the 
possibility that these relationships could be based in romance and rela-
tive equality, all the while playing down patriliny. Posts aimed at por-
traying their creators as filially pious sons or daughters were cloaked 
in strong expressions of affection and gratitude towards parents rather 
than unquestioning obedience.
These findings would not have emerged without careful consid-
eration of what was posted online. This chapter has demonstrated the 
specific nature of the kinds of mundane posting that occur on the semi- 
public area of Qzone, which was widely used by the town’s social media 
users. Sharing such content on these platforms occurs mainly through 
small groups and one- to- one messages away from public view. In that 
sense, the content differs from that typically shared on Chinese micro-
blogs and other open networks. It is precisely because access to Qzone 
content usually requires one to ‘friend’ a page owner that description 
and analysis of these important yet quotidian postings have been rare 
until now.
The following chapter will move on to explore even more con-
cealed kinds of communication facilitated by social media. It will 
examine how social media operates in the most intimate of rela-
tions:  considering how classmates in schools and universities form 
their own ‘circles’ with peers on QQ and WeChat, and how social 
media actually operates within romantic relationships and between 
couples. Considering these kinds of relationships complicates the 
idealistic representations of family life shared online among circles 
of friends as detailed in this chapter by bringing into view another 
pivotal and influential  figure –  the stranger.
89
4
Relationships: Circles of friends, 
encounters with strangers
I won’t chat to strangers online. What’s more, I  will only talk to 
people who I know, and only chat with the people who I’m willing 
to talk to.
The above quote came from 24- year- old Fang Qiyao, an unmarried 
woman from one of Anshan Town’s outlying villages who worked as a 
clerk in the town’s Post Office. Many people in Anshan Town (and espe-
cially women) would make similar statements when I  first started to 
talk with them about their social media use. However, these statements 
belied another truth. After spending some time gaining the trust of indi-
viduals, they tended to casually let slip that interactions with strang-
ers also formed part of their social media use. This became even more 
commonplace when individuals were talking about how other people 
in the town used social media. This chapter examines this contradic-
tion, and tries to understand its implications for the conduct of rela-
tionships in Chinese society. While accounts of Chinese sociality have 
traditionally considered the stranger to be the antithesis of recognised 
and proper social relations, in Anshan Town we observe a turn towards 
(often intense and intimate) interactions with strangers. For this reason, 
they need to be considered as a central element to contemporary rural 
Chinese social life.
Anthropological accounts of social relations within Chinese soci-
ety have traditionally viewed kinship, connection and familiarity as the 
basis of relationships between persons, which has inevitably led to the 
exclusion of strangers from an understanding of social relations. For 
example, Fei Xiaotong described kinship (which he defined as any social 
relationship based on marriage or reproduction)1 as the most impor-
tant relationship in Chinese society, likening it to ‘the concentric circles 
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formed when a stone is thrown into the lake’.2 Although Fei’s descrip-
tion of this network of relationships was rooted in kinship, it had an 
expansive and all- encompassing nature which could potentially include 
‘countless numbers’ 3 of persons, and yet he also appeared to suggest 
clear limits to its application. With the family at its core, this network of 
relations both privileges and is bonded by familiarity. Fei describes this 
familiarity as an intimate feeling, resulting from sustained and recur-
rent interactions occurring over an extended period of time.4 While Fei 
asserts ‘the basic methods of human interaction in rural society rest on 
familiarity’,5 this leads him to maintain that ‘these methods cannot be 
used with a stranger’.6 Importantly he contrasts familiarity, which he 
describes as ‘a distinctive characteristic of being rural’,7 with modern 
society, which he views as being composed of strangers.
By contrast Mayfair Yang, in her account of guanxi, ‘connections’, 
in Chinese social life, argues that familiarity has largely usurped kin-
ship as the organising principle of urban Chinese relations. Yang notes 
that ‘guanxi ties based on the familiarity principle have come to sup-
plant the centrality of agnatic and affinal kinship ties described by so 
many ethnographers of rural Chinese life’.8 Yang understands familiar-
ity to be a prerequisite for cultivating guanxi with others. Yang’s theory 
points to a clear dichotomy between inside and outside, which she posits 
is informed by China’s ‘kinship- based sedentary agricultural society’.9 
Significantly, Yang allows for individuals to attempt to transform others:
A ‘familiar person,’ one with whom guanxi exchange can take 
place more easily, is also a ‘cooked person,’ whereas its opposite, 
the ‘stranger,’ is an ‘uncooked or raw person,’ according to the lit-
eral meanings of the words shouren and shengren . . . . Bridging the 
gap between the inside and outside in order to make the guanxi 
exchange possible is accomplished by a transformation of the 
‘uncooked’ into the ‘cooked,’ in a sense preparing the other to make 
him/ her palatable or ready for guanxi overtures.10
Although Yang’s description of this way to turn strangers into familiar 
people who can be incorporated into one’s guanxi network appears con-
vincing, one wonders to what extent these ‘strangers’ can accurately be 
classified as such. Yang notes that familiarity and shared qualities and 
identities are the basis for the transformative process, and that there-
fore many guanxi relations are drawn from among class, hometown 
or work acquaintances (tongxue, tongxiang and tongshi, respectively) 
who share a ‘principle of commonality’ (tong). Yang even describes 
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how in encounters between strangers both parties will initially search 
for any kind of shared acquaintance, so that ‘no matter how tenuous 
the social connection asserted, identities have been slightly realigned 
around a common link and the relationship now begins to assume a 
different light’.11
Despite Fei and Yang’s accounts displaying different understand-
ings of familiarity and kinship as the basis of social relations, they are 
alike in that they effectively place ‘true’ strangers (i.e. those completely 
unknown, and possessing no direct or indirect connection to the indi-
vidual) completely outside the realm of prescribed social relations. This 
chapter will demonstrate that social media use in Anshan Town clearly 
contradicts this understanding. The townsfolk concurrently experience 
ongoing exchanges with circles based in traditional relations of familiar 
ties, as well as serendipitous and highly experimental interactions with 
arbitrary strangers.
Defining circles
Villagers restrict the scope of their daily activities; they do not travel 
far; they seldom make contact with the outside world; they live soli-
tary lives; they maintain their own isolated social circle. All of these 
characteristics contribute to the parochialism of rural China.12
The Chinese countryside has undergone a remarkable transformation 
since 1948 when Fei Xiaotong put forward the above account of rural 
localism. As mentioned in Chapter 1, contemporary Anshan Town can 
no longer be described as an isolated township. New roads have short-
ened the journey to the provincial capital from the best part of a day 
to a manageable hour (providing one has a car); the town’s manufac-
turing industry embeds it in the regional and national economy; and 
migration to outside areas for study or work is also becoming increas-
ingly routine.
In light of these conditions of change, it is perhaps surprising 
that the majority of social media use by townsfolk still displays a sim-
ilar parochialism, being largely based on familiar social categories 
of family, work, school and village. The presence of these categories 
strongly conforms to Yang’s understanding of ‘friendship, kinship, 
classmates’ which ‘serve as bases or potential sites for guanxi prac-
tice’.13 The most significant presence within online circles in Anshan 
Town is that of classmates.
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A circle of schoolmates
The Chinese New Year’s Eve of 2013 presented a difficult balancing act 
for Little Zhang, a first- year high- school student who had returned home 
for the winter holidays. On one hand, he had to satisfy his parents and 
other relatives by participating in the preparations for the festival; on 
the other hand he was keen to maintain contact with the new friends he 
had made during his first term at high school in Bai Town. I was able to 
witness this friction first hand as Little Zhang’s family kindly invited me 
to spend the whole of the festival with them, following their prepara-
tions and sharing in their celebrations.
On New Year’s Eve, while his parents were busy preparing the 
‘reunion dinner’ (tuanyuan fan), they instructed their son to walk over 
to Baige Village, where his elderly maternal grandparents lived, to help 
them prepare their house for the festival. Little Zhang marched excit-
edly through the town, his hands full of firecrackers, door posters to 
hang and trouser pockets crammed with peanuts and sunflower seeds 
to snack on.
On arriving at his grandparents’ house, he was warmly greeted. 
While his grandmother prepared tea, Little Zhang got busy sweeping the 
courtyard, removing the existing paper characters for ‘wealth’ fixed to 
the doors and walls of the courtyard, before replacing them with a new 
set of bright red and gold paper characters. Finally, he set off a string of 
firecrackers in the yard. Once the 30 seconds of deafening banging had 
finished, the freshly swept yard was littered with hundreds of pieces of 
half- burnt red paper.
Sometime later Little Zhang returned to the store where his par-
ents lived, in time for the special reunion meal. Together they sat down 
in the small room at the back of the shop, which doubled as both a living 
room and bedroom, to watch the New Year’s Eve Gala broadcast on China 
Central Television. Little Zhang’s father set to work on a bottle of baijiu 
(a strong Chinese liqueur).
The New Year’s Eve Gala is an annual live televised variety show 
which in many ways exemplifies traditional mass media. The gala is the 
nation’s largest media event, and the 2014 edition attracted a record 
814 million viewers who watched the show together, many while eating 
the reunion meal.14 Therefore, unusually, its audience comprises every 
generation of Chinese families, both rural and urban. The programme 
producers have the seemingly impossible task of creating a show whose 
appeal spans this wide demographic, from elderly people who grew 
up in the Republic of China, or experienced the Cultural Revolution, 
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through to young children born in more prosperous times and accus-
tomed to a media diet of cartoons and entertainment. The result is an 
eclectic, wizardly mix of revolutionary songs, trapeze artists, dancers 
performing to trance music, child magicians, ‘hip’ young TV hosts, staid 
middle- aged light entertainment presenters and saccharine pop stars. 
Segments praising ‘model workers’ and musical performances by the 
People’s Liberation Army jostle for attention against teenage rappers 
and enthusiastic dancers.
That year in Anshan Town, while Little Zhang’s mother and father 
watched and chatted in front of the television, their son’s attention 
waned as the show progressed. Before long he left his parents, mov-
ing into the shop area where their computer was located. Turning on 
the computer, he started alternating between his web browser, which 
he used to view Qzone, and the QQ Instant Messaging client, while the 
television broadcast remained in earshot. He used the QQ IM client to 
send New Year’s greetings (zhufu) to each of his classmates while brows-
ing their Qzone pages. Many of his friends were sharing posts on Qzone 
providing an alternative commentary on what was happening on the 
television show.
Little Zhang and his friends used social media as a space to com-
ment on, and often sharply critique, the content of the state- backed 
variety show. For instance, at the start of the programme, the present-
ers introduced a young girl dressed in a flowing white dress, explain-
ing that she would continuously spin round on the spot throughout the 
four hours of the programme, to symbolise the changing seasons of the 
year. While this segment was presented earnestly on the television pro-
gramme, Little Zhang was amused by a satirical meme that was already 
circulating the internet in response to this feature, and had been shared 
by one of his classmates, The meme consisted of a photo accompanied 
by the text ‘Spinning girl, have you eaten Xuanmai chewing gum?’ 
parodying an advertising campaign for Xuanmai, a local chewing gum 
brand featuring a young singer who, after eating the aforementioned 
gum, achieved superhuman singing powers, capable of toppling other-
wise sturdy objects. The original advert featured the tagline ‘Xuanmai 
chewing gum, unable to stop’, a phrase that neatly fitted the constant 
spinning of the girl on the television programme.
The case of Little Zhang is an excellent example of what has been 
termed ‘produsage’,15 demonstrating how cultural objects and informa-
tion are increasingly being created and consumed across different media 
and devices by different actors. This challenges the established one- 
way flow of content from old media ‘producers’ to passive ‘consumers’. 
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Ethnographic examples such as this also demonstrate how these chang-
ing cycles of media production and consumption prioritise different 
forms of social relationships and are redefining the practices of even the 
most established and central cultural events, such as celebration of the 
Chinese New Year.
In this example, Little Zhang appeared to be eschewing the com-
pany of his parents, the state televised broadcast and the reunion meal 
itself by joining a separate New Year’s Eve party via QQ with his class-
mates from school. This orientation towards school friends supports the 
theory that classmate relationships create a significant and enduring 
base for guanxi relations.16 However, Little Zhang found himself caught 
between obligations to both his friends and family, and social media 
presented a means of (partly) addressing these conflicting interests. He 
had to strike a balance between obedience to his parents – assisting his 
grandparents in preparing their house for the New Year – and making 
sure he took part in the reunion meal organised by his parents, while 
also maintaining and strengthening his relationships with classmates 
from the Bai Town high school (who had all returned to their homes 
across the county district) by being seen to be active and taking part in 
the New Year online.
However, while Anshan Town’s parents are on the whole absent 
from the social media platforms frequented by young people such as 
Little Zhang and his classmates, this absence was the result of local cir-
cumstances and attitudes. There is an important point to be made here, 
which is that the circles of friends on social media platforms, based in 
familiarity, were not seen as intrinsically opposed to family relations. 
Instead, it was cultural differences between generations that generally 
hindered the formation of family relations online.
families online: absence of online parent– child relationships
The previous chapter noted how posts expressing gratitude to one’s par-
ents are a common feature on Qzone profiles, despite the fact that the 
parents to whom these messages are directed are not social media users 
and ultimately do not see the messages. However, close examination 
of the reasons behind the rarity of parent– child relationships on social 
media reveals a very different picture inside China to that of regions out-
side, and helps to explain why the circles of social media in Anshan Town 
are largely dominated by peers. The presence of parents on social media 
was largely due to their age. Chapter 1 demonstrated that while social 
media use was relatively common among teenagers and people in their 
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twenties and early thirties, users in their forties were relatively rare and 
users in their fifties or above were almost non- existent. This meant that 
parents in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties, whose children were aged 
10 or under, were generally all on social media. in contrast, parents in 
their mid-thirties to mid-forties, whose offspring were in middle or high- 
school, were comparatively less likely to use such platforms.
It should be noted that some of these older parents were internet 
users, without necessarily being active social media users. Over two- 
thirds – 68.5 per cent – of middle school students surveyed said that 
at least one of their parents used the internet (Table 4.1). When only 
one parent used the internet, this was far more likely to be the father, 
revealing the highly gendered nature of ICT use in rural China.17 
Examples of internet use by parents which may not have been clas-
sified as social media use included playing online games (sometimes 
using relatives’ QQ accounts) and watching streamed television pro-
grammes or films.
This narrow age range among social media adopters means that it 
is relatively uncommon for young people to be friends with their parents 
on social media. Importantly, this does not mean that Anshan Town’s 
young people are averse to their parents using the same social media as 
themselves. In fact, most middle school students expressed enthusiasm 
at the thought of their parents being friends with them on these net-
works. Instead, young people identify the problem as being that their 
parents either ‘do not know how to use the internet’ (buhui shang wang) 
or ‘do not have QQ’ (meiyou QQ). Some even responded to the question 
with amusement, because they felt it so unlikely that their parents would 
ever learn or feel the need to use social media. In addition, the fact that 
Anshan Town’s young people were happy to add siblings and cousins as 
friends on social media further demonstrates that for them social media 
and family relations are perfectly compatible.
Table 4.1 Middle school students’ response to survey question ‘Do your par-
ents use the internet?’
Frequency Per cent
Only father uses 98 32.0
Only mother uses 10 3.3
Both parents use 71 23.2
Neither parents use 127 41.5
Total 306 100.0
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Young people’s positive view of online parent– child relations stands 
in contrast with the nature of parent– child interaction on social media 
observed in a number of the other field sites in our study. For example, 
in the UK, Miller has noted how parents’ presence on Facebook deterred 
teenagers from being active on the same platform.18 Other studies in 
the United States have highlighted similar concerns over parental pres-
ence. By contrast, in rural China the uncontroversial nature of postings 
shared among friends (as illustrated in the previous chapter) and the 
restricted affordances of visibility on the platforms themselves, which 
limit an individual’s ability to post on other people’s pages, encouraged 
the more normative postings of the kind seen in Chapter 3, the content 
of which rarely offended parents’ sensibilities.
Although students express less concern (or in some cases even opti-
mism) towards the concept of their parents being present on the same 
social media platforms as they were, the antipathy of many older parents 
towards internet use inevitably resulted in furthering their wariness of 
social media and its effects. Almost all parents of school- age children 
in the town believed internet, mobile phone19 and social media use to 
be detrimental for their offspring’s educational advancement, and tried 
to discourage and control their child’s internet use. For instance, 70 per 
cent of middle school students surveyed 20 felt that their parents’ control 
over their internet use was either ‘very strict’ or ‘quite strict’ (Table 4.2).
Despite this, it is not unusual for parents in their forties and above 
to have their own smartphones, even if they make little use of the inter-
net or social media. One of the reasons these phones are preferred is 
because the ‘large screen’ (pingmu da) is felt to make it easier to see char-
acters. The phones are used for calling, texting and sometimes playing 
games. On occasion, to gain access to the internet their offspring seize 
the opportunity to consume the unused data allowances on their par-
ents’ phone plans.21 Zhang Meixiang used this approach with her father, 
even claiming that she was ‘helping’ him to expend the un- utilised band-
width. Zhang Meixiang’s case demonstrates how members of different 
Table 4.2 Middle school students’ response to survey question ‘Do your  
parents control your internet use?’
Response Frequency Per cent share
‘Very strict’ (hen yanzhong) 58 21
‘Quite strict’ (bijiao yanzhong) 135 49
‘Not too strict’ (bu tai yanzhong) 75 27
‘Do not care’ (bu guan) 8 3
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generations can approach the same smartphone with completely differ-
ent expectations of its main purpose. This is another reason why there is 
a scarcity of inter- generational relationships on social media in Anshan 
Town when compared to the abundance of non- kin relations, and espe-
cially those between classmates.22
Class groups and QQ groups
This general lack of the older generations online meant that young peo-
ple were left to inhabit social media. In addition, it became obvious that 
there was further selection in terms of age, and many people’s social 
media networks predominantly consisted of their own peers, very often 
drawn from their own age group, and more specifically their own class at 
school. The class group is a particularly important social unit in Chinese 
society. Students typically remain in the same class for entire academic 
years, and they stay in the same classroom for the majority of each day 
while the teachers rotate between classrooms.23 The formation of ‘col-
lective identities’ within class groups is further encouraged by inter- 
class competitions in a range of activities, curricular and otherwise.24 
During high school, college and university students tend to share dormi-
tories. This forms particularly intense friendships, which often persist 
throughout adult life and are drawn upon for favours and assistance.25
Social media has become an important means of conducting these 
class group relationships for young people in Anshan Town. While QQ 
dominates social media use in Anshan Town, it is particularly popu-
lar among school- age children (Table 4.3). The platform also provides 
students with the opportunity to reproduce the class group in another 
space. This is most noticeable in the case of ‘QQ groups’, which permit 
Table 4.3 Middle school students’ social media account ownership by 
platform
Social media 
platform
Number of students  
with one account
Percentage of total number 
of students surveyed
QQ 264 85
WeChat 86 28
Tencent Weibo 114 37
Sina Weibo 33 11
Renren 27 9
Momo 16 5
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users to create on- going instant messaging conversations with defined 
(and almost always closed) group of users.
School- age children in the town are particularly keen to establish 
QQ groups, often based around existing class groups and often named 
after the members’ class group number. Students typically instruct their 
classmates to join the group during classes or via direct instant message. 
A single class group in the middle school often has several QQ groups, 
each set up and managed by a different student, who acts as ‘group 
owner’ (qun zhuren) for the group in question. The group owner also 
appoints group administrators (qun guanliyuan), who are typically his 
or her best friends. These groups proliferate because being the owner or 
administrator of a large and active group affords those associated with 
managing it status in class and a chance to steer the group’s conversa-
tions. As such, these group owners compete to sign up class members, 
and are also active in ensuring that after school conversation takes place 
within their group.
Several students expressed the belief that the constant and com-
petitive messaging within these groups could be especially irritating 
(  fan). Equally, they do not wish to leave the group for fear their class-
mates take offence. For many the best solution is to ‘silence’ (pingbi) the 
group notification, thereby remaining a member but avoiding distract-
ing alerts when messages are exchanged.
Despite such irritations, students experience these QQ groups as 
having other practical uses. Several students explained that QQ groups 
helped to facilitate the completion of homework assignments, some of 
whom were observed accessing class- group- based QQ groups from their 
home to obtain homework answers from classmates. While this may 
raise concerns about whether such use of technology constitutes ‘deep 
learning’ or simply encourages plagiarism, it should be understood that 
many parents of middle schoolchildren in the town had received only 
limited education and found it difficult to help their children with their 
schoolwork. In this instance, class- based QQ groups also extended the 
support provided by classmates outside the classroom.
Perhaps most importantly, though, students used the class- based 
QQ groups to have fun together and strengthen their relationships 
and familiarity with one another. For example, the groups were often 
used to organise playing online multiplayer games together by helping 
to coordinate everybody being online and playing the correct game at 
the correct time. Students would post messages within the QQ group, 
entreating each other to join an online game that was about to start. 
Playing games seems to be an activity that runs largely along gender 
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boundaries, with multiplayer battle games such as League of Legends or 
Counterstrike predominantly played by males and virtual dancing games 
being played by females.26 Simple simulator games such as QQ Farm (to 
be discussed in Chapter  5) seemed to attract players of both genders. 
The intense pleasure of a shared gaming experience further deepens 
bonds between classmates, especially in the case of synchronised gam-
ing sessions among young males. This was made particularly clear in 
the town’s only internet café, where activities were dominated by group 
gaming, with groups of classmates forming particularly strong friend-
ships by gaming together, further intensified by the illicit nature of their 
internet café use (described in Chapter 2).27
These examples all confirm how for many of Anshan Town’s 
schoolchildren, especially those of middle and high school age, class-
mate groups became a locus of many different kinds of activities. Some 
did relate to practical schoolwork, but other activities served to cement 
relationships and gain status among peers, or simply allowed leisure 
activities to be shared. These groups of classmates were incredibly cen-
tral to the experience of being online.
Class- based QQ groups, and especially those existing among 
middle school students, provide an exemplary case for the argument 
that people in Anshan Town understand the majority of their con-
tacts on social media in terms of closed and defined groups of circles. 
Furthermore, they show how the groups were populated with individu-
als, many of them non- kin, who would form the basis of future networks 
of connections. As such, the shared activities of joking, sharing home-
work answers and playing games establish an essential familiarity on 
which to base future social relations.
Changing circles: high- school, university and work
While classmates were central to the experience of being online for many 
middle school students in the town, it is by no means an exclusive group-
ing. As people leave middle school and progress through different stages 
of life, the friends they have on their social media accounts begin to reflect 
this expanding network of social relations. These extra groups of friends 
can be understood as forming a series of concentric circles that the indi-
vidual has accumulated through various phases of life.28 When Anshan 
Town’s students graduate from middle school and start to attend high 
school or college in Bai Town, this is typically accompanied by a signifi-
cant growth of online contacts. For example, during Little Zhang’s (see 
above) first term at high school, his QQ contacts increased by one third.
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Different circles cannot always be discerned by examining an indi-
vidual’s social media profile because (as previously mentioned) few use 
their real name or photo online, and friends’ lists are not visible to users. 
However, the different groups were important to users and techniques 
did exist for distinguishing them. QQ IM forced users to assign contacts 
to specific lists. In addition, different circles of friends were sometimes 
distinguished by using different platforms. For example, when students 
from Anshan Town begin to attend university in urban cities WeChat 
becomes the preferred platform for communicating with their new class-
mates. Therefore these students saw WeChat as predominantly being for 
communicating with university friends, while QQ IM remained the easi-
est way to communicate with middle or high school friends.
There were QQ groups other than class- based groups in Anshan 
Town, especially among adults who use the network for work or lei-
sure. For example, the town’s informal football team uses QQ groups 
to organise their practice sessions; a number of fishing enthusiasts who 
cast their lines into the town’s reservoir have a group for communicat-
ing with each other. Similarly, QQ groups frequently act as the preferred 
way to maintain communications within a workplace or between busi-
nesses. Pharmacist Zhang Lin uses QQ groups to receive stock updates 
and offers from medical wholesalers in Bai Town and Jinan. Teachers 
from the town’s middle school have established a QQ group, which they 
use to distribute important internal messages. For many businesses in 
Anshan Town QQ IM has become the main internal communication 
method, its popularity far exceeding that of email.
Despite the variety of these QQ groups, the ones based on class-
mate relations remain especially important in that their use often con-
tinues after students graduate from school and the class group ceases 
to meet regularly. Some older individuals even used social media as a 
way to reinvigorate these relationships. A  particularly notable exam-
ple comes from Tang Xiaoguang, a teacher in his forties who organised 
a reunion of his former classmates during the summer of 2013. A few 
weeks prior to the reunion Tang Xiaoguang explained to me:
Too be honest, I don’t really chat with other people that much . . . If 
you instruct me to go to a classmate reunion, then I might go. I’m 
always passive, I almost never take the lead and go out to socialise 
with old classmates.
Despite claiming this passivity, Tang Xiaoguang found himself in the 
throes of organising a reunion for some of his former classmates with 
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whom he had attended the town’s middle school almost three decades 
earlier. Every couple of years one of them takes responsibility for organ-
ising a reunion and this year the task had fallen to him.
Initially Tang Xiaoguang examined the possibility of going to a 
tourist area in the countryside surrounding Jinan for an entire week-
end, or meeting up for a large meal in a restaurant in the city. However, 
both options were prohibitively expensive. He instead negotiated a 
discounted rate for himself and his classmates at the town’s hotel. The 
group would meet on Saturday lunchtime, spend the day together in the 
Daoist temple, have a meal together in the hotel that evening, sleep at 
the hotel (sharing rooms to further reduce the cost) and then return to 
their respective homes the following day. The entire outing was to cost 
less than 100 RMB ($16) for each person.
In addition to organising the bookings, the teacher used his com-
puter to produce a precise timetable of activities and events, organised 
to the hour, which he pre- circulated to the classmate group via QQ. 
Although the group spoke regularly on QQ, Tang Xiaoguang explained 
that these occasional reunions were especially important given how 
busy and dispersed everyone had now become, and that they repre-
sented a welcome change from the more sporadic occasional conver-
sation between members of the QQ group. While many people of Tang 
Xiaoguang’s age in the town did not use social media, as a teacher his 
employment gave him easy access to a computer, and also reason to 
use it. Indeed, many of the other members of his QQ classmate group 
had moved to urban cities, so their use differed from those who had 
remained in the town.
Furthermore, for groups such as this, the reunion was an important 
opportunity to renew close bonds of friendship and to recollect a shared 
past together. Despite Tang Xiaoguang’s reservations about participat-
ing in such events, he recognised that maintaining relationships with 
these classmates could be useful in the future, especially if one needed 
a favour. This example therefore further confirms the classmate group 
as a basis for enduring familiar relations. It also demonstrates how these 
groups become mapped on to social media, even in cases where the indi-
viduals did not have QQ when they were classmates.
Highlighting the importance of circles of known acquaintances 
for social media use in Anshan Town has identified the social relation-
ships and contexts that explain the highly normative postings shared 
online:  the intended audience is a closed network of known friends. 
Cultivating circles of known acquaintances online has been shown to 
have practical uses. The range of online activities may serve to establish 
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one’s status among these friends, and later to maintain and renew social 
relationships. Hence the circles stress shared values, familiarity and 
obligation, being largely based in traditional and mostly non- kin bases of 
guanxi such as school and workplace. It is against this backdrop that we 
now turn to examine the recurring presence of the figure of the stranger 
on social media, and attempt to make sense of why Chinese social media 
platforms juxtapose familiarity with alterity in this specific way.
Seeking out strangers
In contrast to participants’ strong claims that they only spoke online to 
people they knew personally, respondents were altogether coyer with 
regards to their interactions online with strangers. While it gradually 
became clear that when people wanted to interact with strangers online, 
townsfolk do not choose to make use of platforms that offer drastically 
wider visibility to engage in such practices (Sina Weibo, for example, 
allows postings to be shared with the entire internet), townsfolk instead 
prefer to use the social media platforms they use to communicate with 
their friends, in order to seek out and interact with strangers, predomi-
nantly on a one- to- one basis.
Aliases, avatars and anonymity: bridging friends and strangers
Interactions with strangers on social media can take place under condi-
tions of mutual anonymity. This anonymity is achieved because it is the 
custom for the majority of social media users in China to employ uniden-
tifiable net aliases and user avatars.29 This appears to be a nationwide 
trend on most major social media platforms. For example, I conducted a 
brief survey of research participants’ accounts and found that, approx-
imately, only one in five QQ accounts and one in four WeChat accounts 
featured photos of the actual user as their profile image. Most avatars 
were cartoon characters of photos taken from the internet. However, 
using an image of one’s own child was also a notable theme, with about 
10 per cent of all users employing this method of anonymising.
Other researchers have noted the use of social media in China for 
communication with strangers, for example highlighting the impor-
tance of QQ among migrant populations not only for keeping in touch 
with relatives, but also for chatting online with strangers and extend-
ing one’s social network.30 It has been argued that there are important 
cultural differences in Chinese concepts of anonymity compared to 
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Euro- American notions, which are based on concealing identities in 
order to avoid the repercussions of one’s behaviour.31 In a context where 
most people do not wish to use their real identity online, the Chinese 
government have been particularly concerned with being able to trace 
the connections between online and offline individuals.32 However, 
while anonymity may provide cover for both protest and illicit activities, 
it is also argued that in China it provides a venue for exploration of the 
self and creative endeavours.33
Other commentators have suggested that online anonymity has 
allowed for experimentation with the self and the formation of new 
identities, particularly among teenage users. The notion of an ‘elastic 
self’ has been proposed to describe this ‘trying on’ of different identities, 
arguing that the elastic self gives young people the ability to navigate 
through society and conduct a new form of civil society.34
However, the use of anonymity in Anshan Town differs from that 
proposed above in that these interactions occur alongside strong and 
clearly defined circles of known friends. While avatars and net aliases 
provide anonymity when interacting with people one does not know, 
Anshan Town users believed that if someone knew them well, they 
should be able to discern the person’s real identity from the net alias or 
avatar alone.35 The anonymity feature therefore acted as a form of test-
ing of personal relationships. Avatars and net names were seen not only 
as anonymising, but also as individualising and expressing personality.
Aided by this, people in Anshan Town seek out interactions with 
strangers for a wide variety of reasons:  to ease boredom, to appear 
more popular to others, to pursue romantic relations, for sex and to 
meet people who share the same interests. Common among all of these 
themes, however, is that seeking out interactions with strangers appears 
to transform the nature of these experiences themselves, allowing the 
individual to explore the freedom of relationships that fall outside the 
familiar social areas of family, classmates, workplace and village.
Messily adding: encountering disorder
One of the earliest forms of adding strangers is in the practice of ‘messily 
adding’ (luanjia), which refers to indiscriminately adding strangers on 
social media, often in large numbers. This practice is particularly pop-
ular among middle school students, although it is also commonplace 
among high school and university students. Messily adding was done for 
a number of reasons. For middle school students, the practice was often 
intended to increase the number of contacts they had on the platform; 
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however, others referred to the practice simply as a means of addressing 
some of the boredom related to social media use.
This form of adding strangers is considered to contravene accepted 
forms of social relationships. The character for ‘messily’ (luan) used to 
describe this method of adding friends can also mean ‘disorderly’, ‘in 
confusion’ and ‘chaotic’. As such, ‘messily adding’ indicates the poten-
tially transgressive nature of interactions with strangers that occur on 
social media. The practice of messily adding strangers contrasts power-
fully with more ‘orderly’ social relations of class, work, family and vil-
lage that Anshan Town people claim typifies their social media use.
Romance among students
Arguably the most dominant theme that emerged when speaking to 
young people about interactions with strangers centred on issues of 
romance and sex. Interacting with strangers holds a particular appeal 
for the town’s young people who often seek to engage in romantic rela-
tionships, but face barriers to doing so in their everyday lives. An obvi-
ous advantage of social media for young people is that it allows them 
to engage in one- to- one communication with somebody while reduc-
ing the risk of people, such as their parents, teachers and classmates, 
becoming aware of what they are doing.
Schools tend to forbid romantic relationships between classmates 
on the assumption that they will adversely affect students’ study, mak-
ing interaction on social media particularly appealing. For example, 
Little Zhang, the student mentioned at the start of the chapter, recalled 
an occasion when two of his classmates, one male and one female, were 
caught holding each other’s hands by their teacher. The teacher ordered 
them to stop and severely reprimanded the students. The school sub-
sequently contacted the students’ parents to alert them to the roman-
tic relationship. The students were subsequently paraded in front of 
the entire school during an outdoor assembly; their unsatisfactory 
behaviour was highlighted and they were admonished for engaging in 
‘abnormal relations’ (bu zhengchang jiaowang).
Li Biao, another high school student in Anshan Town, uses several 
different QQ accounts, keeping the password for some from his parents, 
in order to preserve a ‘private space’ where he can chat with girls online 
without his parents’ knowledge. While there is no evidence that hav-
ing romantic relationships really does have a detrimental impact upon 
young people’s academic success, it is clear that for students such as Li 
Biao social media offers a useful way to circumvent such restrictions.
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By shielding interactions from public view, social media was felt 
to allow the town’s young people to alleviate some of the shyness and 
awkwardness around discussing romantic matters. As one woman 
explained:  ‘Sometimes some more romantic things, they are hard to 
say [in person], but on QQ they are easier to speak about.’ For exam-
ple, when presented with a range of possible communication methods 
for ‘discussing “matters of the heart” or declaring ones love?’ 36 (the 
Chinese equivalent of declaring a crush), almost half of all middle 
school students surveyed chose QQ IM as the most suitable means 
(Table 4.4).37
When young people reach the age of 19 or 20 and start vocational 
college or university, parents generally become more relaxed with 
regards to their offspring engaging in romantic relationships, or, as it 
is affectionately referred to, ‘talking about falling in love’ (tan lian’ai). 
Universities and colleges, for their part, do not exercise severe bans on 
romantic relationships between students as is the case in middle and 
high schools.
Despite this greater level of permissiveness, university students 
also maintained that social media helps to overcome anxiety around 
talking to the opposite sex. Many university students38 from Anshan 
Town who returned home during the summer and winter holidays were 
keen to discuss with me how they and their classmates use social media 
in dating. Almost every returning student I  spoke to either had them-
selves, or knew someone at university who had, found partners on cam-
pus using these platforms. Male students in particular eagerly shared 
stories of how easy it was to find a girlfriend while at university thanks 
to the help of social media. For example, Wang Gaoshan, a final year 
university student from Anshan Town, explained the ease with which 
university students took to online dating.
Table 4.4 Middle school students’ response to survey question  
‘Which media is the most suitable to discuss “matters of the heart”  
or to declare one’s love?’
Communication method Frequency Per cent share
Phone call 21 7.9
QQ instant message 133 49.4
Face  to  face 82 30.5
SMS 7 2.6
Write letter 17 6.3
Other 9 3.3
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Dating online is very fashionable in China, you know? Falling in 
love online, it’s just chatting with strangers online. Chat, chat, 
chat. Then just say, ‘Let’s meet up’, you meet, and . . . success!
Online dating at the universities is helped by a fortuitous combination 
between the affordances of location- based stranger- finding functions on 
social media smartphone apps and the geographic location of university 
campuses. Many of these have relocated from city centres to large, self- 
contained campus clusters on the peripheries of urban areas (Fig. 4.1).
One such university cluster, called ‘University City’, lies between 
Anshan Town and Bai Town. University City is an enormous devel-
opment, featuring 10 newly built universities and colleges and over 
200,000 students (in comparison, the population of Anshan Town is 
only 31,000). Despite being only several kilometres distant from Anshan 
Town, the University City has relatively little impact upon the daily life 
of the town. Few students from University City visit the town unless they 
already have connections there.
These university encounters with strangers on social media par-
tially retain the traditional notion of classmates, while also often allow-
ing students to push beyond the confines of their college. Because of 
the concentration of students in University City, using WeChat’s People 
Nearby function or Momo from within the town was almost guaranteed 
to return results predominantly comprised of students. Wu Haoran, a 
Fig. 4.1 University City near Bai Town 
REL AT IONSH IPS:  C IRCLES Of fR I ENDS,  ENCOUNTERS WITH STR ANGERS 107
male university student from Anshan Town who attends a college in the 
University City, claimed he could ascertain whether prospective part-
ners were members of his own school or the neighbouring colleges sim-
ply by looking at the distance of the individual from himself. The overall 
impression given by Anshan Town’s returning university students is 
one of an abundance of romantic opportunity at university  – further 
enhanced through the presence of social media  – in contrast to the 
restrictions they had experienced during middle and high school. Social 
media made it easier to break out of traditional classmate relations, and 
to speak to students in the neighbouring dormitory, or even college.
That being said, encounters with strangers online also raised num-
ber of concerns regarding issues of authenticity. Wang Gaoshan, a final 
year university student, explained.
With falling in love online, it is really easy to be cheated. Female 
students can get cheated really easily . . . in fact, male students 
can get cheated really easily too. When you are taken to a partic-
ular place, then you’re blackmailed! For example, let’s say you’ve 
both had good conversation, she invites you to come to Anshan 
Town. After you arrive, the two of you hold hands lightly, sud-
denly out of nowhere comes a bunch of people, and one asks 
‘What are you doing with my girlfriend?!’ They take out a knife 
to scare you. How are you going to solve this problem? You give 
5000 RMB ($806), or 10,000 RMB ($1612), and the problem will 
go away. Otherwise nobody is leaving . . . So, on QQ female stu-
dents are cheated out of sex, and male students are cheated out 
of money.
Dong Jian, a 19- year- old hairdresser from the town, was similarly cyn-
ical about the authenticity of online romantic relationships among peo-
ple of his generation, commenting:
Post- 90’s generation39 love . . . it’s unbelievable. It is full of cheaters 
and the cheated. They are either using sex to make love, or they are 
using love to make sex.
Forming romantic relationships online with strangers outside of famil-
iar networks meant there was no way to get people to vouch for others. 
So while pursuing such relationships carried inherent worries regarding 
authenticity, this was also part of what made them exciting and out of 
the ordinary.
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It should also be noted that young unmarried women from Anshan 
Town respond to the opportunity to interact with strangers in different 
ways to their male counterparts. While some indicated their willingness 
to pursue interactions with strangers, they were generally more cautious 
about them, or had to form strategies for dealing with the demands of 
such online interactions. For example, Long Qing, an unmarried woman 
in her early twenties who worked in one of the town’s hotels, felt that 
instant messaging on social media did make it easier to communicate 
intimate matters with romantic partners rather than in face- to- face 
communication. However, she exercised caution when interacting with 
male strangers through the platform.
I only started using them [‘shake shake’ and ‘people nearby’ func-
tions] recently. . . . I  have [added some men I  don’t know]. But, if 
they are people I don’t know, and . . . if it displays online that they 
are quite old, then I will refuse their friend request.
Other young women in Anshan Town were less enthusiastic when it 
came to using social media to find romantic relationships. For instance, 
Gao Li, a nurse who worked in Anshan Town’s small hospital, tried to 
avoid receiving online messages from many other people in the town. 
Gao Li was in her mid-twenties, and was originally from Anshan Town. 
She lived on the town’s Commercial Street with her parents and her 
brother. Although Gao Li had studied dentistry in Jinan, on gradua-
tion she had been unable to find a job in Jinan, and so had returned to 
Anshan Town to a modestly paid nurse’s position while studying for fur-
ther qualifications.
Gao Li finds her current job boring. On most days patients arrive 
at 8 am to have their bloods taken, although by 10 am all the patients 
have been dealt with, leaving the remainder of the day largely vacant. 
Gao Li keeps herself occupied by studying from medical textbooks in the 
hope of gaining extra qualifications that could lead to a job in the city, 
or idling the time away using her Samsung smartphone to message her 
friends on social media.
Since starting college, Gao Li predominantly uses WeChat rather 
than QQ as most of her college classmates from the city also preferred 
the platform. However, she retains her QQ account, explaining that 
all of her friends on QQ are people that she knew in person, many of 
them former schoolmates from middle school in Anshan Town. Gao 
Li claims that whenever she is visible ‘online’ in QQ IM she always 
receives greater numbers of ‘annoying’ ( fan) messages. Because she 
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knew these people personally, she often felt an obligation to reply. For 
this reason, she always sets her own QQ IM status to invisible, as she 
does not want men she knows from the town to pursue her. Gao Li 
is equally dismissive about finding partners online, and told me that 
she would never use social media to talk to strangers. Not only does 
the thought of finding a date on QQ seem completely unattractive, the 
prospect of just chatting to a stranger online in a non- romantic con-
text does not appeal to her.
Similarly Wang Miao, a 30- year- old married female pharmacist 
who dispenses Chinese medicine in the same hospital, spoke of her wor-
ries regarding the dangers of befriending strangers.
I always refuse strangers’ [friend requests] . . . Let’s say I am online 
every day, then in one month I  will receive between 50 and 60 
friend requests. Most of them are all cheats, or people who are idle 
and have nothing to do. I am also quite worried, like if in the future 
my son wants to go to the internet café, I will be unable to look 
after him, he could turn into anything, I don’t know.
These accounts portray the concerns surrounding dating for women in 
Anshan Town, whether offline or online. While offline advances can be 
experienced as disconcerting, blunt and invasive, chatting to people 
online brings with it an acute sense of concern and anxiety regarding 
authenticity and safety. Nonetheless, despite the difficulty of ensuring 
authenticity, increasing numbers were choosing social media as a way 
to engage in romance, because in many cases it was still far better than 
their offline experiences. In an environment where persistent societal 
expectations mean that women are unfairly and disproportionately 
expected ‘to uphold the monogamous marriage, through sexual fidelity 
and marital service’,40 social media offers scope for romantic relation-
ships to develop in secrecy, without the need to publicly acknowledge 
their existence, and to circumvent the pressure and expectation that 
they will result in marriage.41
This section has illustrated the important and complicated role 
social media is occupying in mediating relationships between unmar-
ried people of opposite gender. These cases are all powerful in that the 
anonymity and distance afforded by social media has allowed many 
young people in Anshan Town to bypass the often acute embarrassment 
and awkwardness involved in interactions with the opposite gender. 
But while interactions with strangers become increasingly popular, 
concerns are also widespread: both males and females are cautious of 
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being cheated through encounters with strangers, with some women 
flatly refusing to communicate with strangers on social media. Concerns 
become even more important when social media’s presence is felt within 
conjugal relations.
Social media in marriage: the stranger as the ‘third one’
For you I’ll work like an ox, work like a horse, I’ll not cheat on you. 
All the new girls I meet, all the new telephone numbers I store, I will 
prepare them for you to inspect everyday
These lyrics feature in the song The Wife is the Biggest, which was a 
national hit during the period of field work.42 Such was its popularity 
that Anshan Town’s square dance troupe, mostly consisting of middle- 
aged women, often danced to this song in public on the town square in 
the evening.43 The ideal of devotion to conjugal relations and complete 
truthfulness towards one’s partner described in this song (and many 
of the social media postings related to love and devotion discussed 
in Chapter  3) emphasises the ultimate importance of monogamous 
marriage in society. This aligns with state discourses that portray 
monogamy as a socialist principle of marriage vital to the social order 
and fabric of society.44 Even though social media has become a com-
mon place for young people to engage in romantic relations that may 
ultimately lead to marriage, its continued use following marriage is 
often perceived as problematic, as university student Wang Gaoshan 
explained:
Before you get married you can chat [online] with many women. 
But after you get married, it has to be only you and her. If you 
don’t delete them all, then your woman will delete them for you. 
Including your QQ password, she has to know this. You have to put 
everything you own in her hands.
While other young married men expressed similar sentiments to Wang 
Gaoshan, not all ultimately deleted strangers from their friends lists 
upon marriage, with some, as previously mentioned, continuing to add 
more strangers over time. Indeed, as time went on, some men opened 
up to me with regards to their pursuit of romantic relations outside of 
marriage through social media. One example comes from Li Jian, who 
works in one of the local companies manufacturing large- scale pres-
surised heating systems. His job takes him all around China, and he has 
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frequent long business trips (sometimes for several weeks or months to 
other provinces in China. His wife and young daughter stay at home in 
Anshan Town while he goes off on these trips.
One day Li Jian revealed to me that he actually owned a second 
phone, from which he could organise to meet his mistress. Li Jian also 
said that he had recently deleted WeChat from his phone, because his 
wife almost found out about the existence of this ‘third one’ (disanzhe). 
He compared his situation to that of one of his male friends, comment-
ing that, ‘I am lucky, because [my friend’s] wife has already found out, 
she wants to divorce him. But of course, he will not allow the divorce [to 
happen], he has a wife and a son.’
A similar instance comes from Pan Bohua, a man in his thirties 
who manages a small construction company. He often travels around 
the district supervising the projects that he works on, and he also has 
to entertain clients by taking them to restaurants and karaoke parlours. 
Pan Bohua explained that he only uses WeChat during the day when he 
is away from home, because ‘if my wife knows I  use WeChat she will 
smash my phone’.
It would be easy to try to make sense of such male promiscuity 
as simply a means to assert their masculinity, or the remnants of feu-
dal marriage practices.45 It is instead more convincing to understand 
this behaviour within the context of an insistence on marital mono-
gamy that forms part of the moral framework of life in Anshan Town 
and state concepts of ‘socialist morality’.46 Zheng Tiantian attempts 
to understand male infidelity as a repudiation of artificial limitations 
imposed by a moralist Confucian- socialist system, arguing that men 
analogically compare turning their semen ( jing) into their wives to the 
act of a peasant handing in their grain to the state, which took place 
under the socialist system.47 She argues that men assert autonomy 
over their own bodies by ‘misappropriating’ their semen from their 
wives, just as peasants misappropriated grain from the state during 
the socialist era.48
Whatever the explanation, only a few married men actually spoke of 
arranging trysts through social media and it remains incredibly difficult 
to gauge how widespread cases such as these really are. Because these 
forms of relationships challenge the sacrosanct status of monogamous 
marriage, many do not to want to talk openly about it. Arguably rumour 
and gossip surrounding such behaviour had a greater social impact than 
the actual occurrence of such events. Hearsay among townsfolk is usu-
ally sufficient to encourage a widely held feeling that social media con-
stitutes a threat to the stability of marriage and, by implication, society. 
SOC IAL MED IA IN RUR AL CH INA112
In response, significant numbers of married persons spoke of drastically 
reducing or stopping social media use altogether following marriage, 
while others sought to hide such use from their partner.
Cutting back social media use for this reason tends to fall unfairly 
on women, reflecting the continuing importance attributed to ‘women’s 
responsibility as the protagonist of monogamy’ 49 in conjugal relations. 
There were no draconian rules restricting women’s use of social media, 
but there were subtle, unwritten norms of acceptable and appropriate 
use, many of which were expressed by women themselves. For example, 
several women said that following marriage they would remove many 
strangers from their contact list from previous ‘messy adding’ sprees 
during their teenage years. Others withdrew from particular platforms 
or stopped using social media altogether. Pregnant women also tended 
to reduce their use of social media, although this was partly because of 
beliefs that mobile telephones and computers emit harmful radiation. 
Many women ‘locked’ their Qzone albums, typically with questions such 
as ‘What is my name?’ so that only people who knew them offline could 
view the personal photos that would identify them.
Zhang Lili, the 30- year- old married mother who ran Anshan Town’s 
only beauty parlour, is especially cautious about using social media to 
interact with strangers following a bad encounter she had on the plat-
form. Zhang Lili spent a lot of time online chatting with strangers, to 
ease the boredom during long periods when she had no customers.
On one occasion one of these strangers, a male whom she had been 
amicably chatting with on QQ IM for some time, suddenly sent her a 
message, which read ‘I have changed a QQ number, add my new QQ 
number.’ Zhang Lili asked why he had a new QQ account number, and 
received the unexpected response ‘because his wife knows’. Reading 
this reply made Zhang Lili very angry; she felt she had not done any-
thing wrong and never even met the man. Zhang Lili replied: ‘I have no 
special connections with you, what does it matter if your wife knows?’ 
Eventually she decided to add his account to her ‘blacklist’ (hei ming-
dan), which prevented him from subsequently adding her account. 
However, Zhang Lili had not realised that this stranger was someone 
from Anshan Town, and she recalled that the matter almost became a 
‘big thing’, hinting that this secret online relationship between strangers 
very nearly spilled over into the public life of the town.
As a result of this incident, Zhang Lili is now more careful when 
speaking to strangers online. She has removed all the pictures of herself 
from QQ and WeChat, and all the albums on her Qzone are now locked 
with personal questions, so that only people she knows offline can access 
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them. She has also set her username to a pseudonym, and changed her 
WeChat avatar from a picture of herself to an image of an unnamed 
woman holding a gun, which she found on the internet. In addition, she 
set the gender of both her QQ and WeChat profiles to male to reduce the 
number of male strangers attempting to add her.
Zhang Lili’s case illustrates the pressure felt by women to embody 
the monogamous ideal. Even after they are married, people are expected 
to display publicly the normative morality of the town. Being too visible on 
social media, or visible in the wrong ways, can carry a risk of others misin-
terpreting one’s intention and questions being raised about one’s morality.
While Anshan Town women tended to be more selective and cau-
tious about the friends they kept online following marriage, for men mar-
riage seemed to have little effect on their social media use. Part of this 
may be due to a traditional expectation that men are supposed to earn 
money for the family, and therefore be outside. Townsfolk often explain 
this pattern through the saying ‘women live on the inside and men live on 
the outside’ (nü zhu nei, nan zhu wai). This encapsulates the widespread 
feeling that men should be active in establishing guanxi, and therefore 
need to visit people in order to cultivate social connections.
The plight of rural Chinese women has undoubtedly improved 
when compared to previous decades, when incredibly oppressive enact-
ment of patrilineal ideals severely limited their mobility and status.50 
The right to work, own land and increased freedom of marriage has – 
albeit partially and often not uniformly  – improved conditions. In 
Anshan Town itself, a changing material culture including mobile tele-
phones and social media make it easier for women to maintain social 
networks between family and close friends, while electric bikes make 
travelling between the villages within the township easy. Nonetheless, 
these forms of mobility are still impoverished and stigmatised in com-
parison to the hyper- connectivity and mobility that the town’s adult 
male population enjoys.
Conclusion: Making moral relations
This chapter has presented two specific strands of social media use that 
are fundamental to social relationships within China. The first strand 
focused on how use was dominated by non- kin relationships based in 
school, work and place, while noting that parent– child relationships 
were conspicuously absent. The second strand looked at how people use 
social media to connect with total strangers.
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The lack of parent– child relationships on social media was partly 
explained by the relatively short time the platforms have been in use 
within the town:  offspring use was rare among young parents, while 
conversely parental use was rare among middle and high school stu-
dents. One of the most important activities for offspring who used social 
media was sustaining the classmate group outside the school classroom, 
with young people using platforms to build strong circles of online 
friends which continued to be significant in everyday life.
The incredibly strong horizontal integration of QQ, plus the func-
tions allowing discreet one- to- one conversations with nearby strangers, 
made it a particularly ideal venue for conducting romantic relationships. 
Many middle and high school students found social media helped them 
to circumvent parental and school prohibitions over such relationships. 
Students attending university in nearby urban areas turned to WeChat’s 
‘People Nearby’, or Momo to speak to strangers outside of established nor-
mative relationships drawn from classmate groups, by potentially seeking 
partners from other colleges. While a small number of young married men 
in the town have made use of social media to find extra partners and to 
conduct affairs, this has had a considerable impact on the way that people 
view the platform. Upon marriage, individuals (and particularly women) 
feel they need to delete strangers from their social media profiles, driven by 
concerns to preserve reputation by upholding monogamous conjugal ties.
In very broad terms this chapter has shown how marked differences 
in attitudes towards and adoption of social media has both sustained 
divisions between generations within families and facilitated inter-
action between young people within their peer group circles. Although 
social media has enabled romantic relationships through online inter-
actions with strangers, almost as soon as these are legitimised through 
marriage the use of social media is discouraged as it is seen to be a threat 
to the very partnership that it created in the first place. As such young 
married couples often prefer to communicate with each other by either 
telephone call or text message.
The model presented above is a generalisation, and there were 
couples and individuals who deviated from it. Nonetheless the model is 
sound enough to shed light on what the transformations in relationships 
represent, how specific attitudes to social media are formed through 
them, and also how ideologies about what constitutes moral behaviour 
within Anshan Town are expressed.
The very nature of social media as something that creates dis-
tance between parents and children, allows romantic relationships 
and then almost immediately prohibits its further use is revealing of 
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the changing kind of sociality people desire. The fact that people’s 
attitudes towards the platforms change rapidly as they go through 
certain life stages indicates that social media should not be consid-
ered as a whole, but that it is the specific functions and services of the 
platforms that should be analysed. It is these functions that people 
make sense of with reference to their own complex and shifting net-
work of social relationships.
However, social media is doing more than just playing a role in 
changing particular social relationships and how they are formed and 
maintained in Anshan Town. This chapter has also demonstrated that 
people in Anshan Town view social media as emblematic of wider changes 
in social relationships and society. The sudden ubiquity of social media 
means that it is easy for townsfolk to attribute it as being the cause of 
particular social transformations and phenomena, regardless of whether 
or not that is the case. So, while the prevalence of romantic relationships 
at universities arguably owes much to the siting of self- contained univer-
sity campuses away from towns, people nonetheless come to view these 
relationships as a function of social media. Likewise, while the divorce 
rate in China has been rising for a number of decades, townsfolk find it 
easy to attribute domestic strife and infidelity to social media, despite the 
fact that easier transportation for men, and the popularity of new semi- 
private spaces of consumption, may equally be to blame.
The irony here is that social media is often understood as the 
place where things become visible to others, demonstrated in the 
previous chapter’s examination of the kinds of posting people most 
regularly shared with their friends on social media. This chapter 
has emphasised another aspect of social media communication, one 
which is far more concealed in nature. In addition to facilitating dif-
ferent social engagements and relationships, this limited visibility 
now seems to represent the less tangible shifts in social relationships. 
So whereas, as described in Chapter 3, social media provided a plat-
form for overt morality, this chapter has shown how people use social 
media to explore and rationalise various transformations in society. 
At this point in time urbanity is encroaching on Anshan Town and 
its people are having to find new ways to incorporate their tradi-
tional moral values into everyday life. On one hand, they can attri-
bute changes in society as being caused by these platforms, and blame 
them for what they see as good or bad. On the other hand, within 
this perceived transformation of society and the family social media 
becomes an enabling tool, allowing individuals to reposition them-
selves within dramatic change.
116
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Moral accumulation: Collecting  
credits on social media
To be honest, I don’t know much about social media. I only go on 
Qzone to check whether my friends have posted anything . . . and 
to steal vegetables.
—Chen Hao, 19 years old male, kitchen assistant.
Given that increasing numbers of people in Anshan Town are leaving 
farming to work in factories or elsewhere, I found it both ironic and per-
plexing that many played QQ Farm, a web browser- based game in Qzone 
(similar to FarmVille) where users grow virtual crops to exchange for 
fictional currency and points.1 The game allows players to view online 
farms kept by friends and ‘steal vegetables’ (toucai) from them should 
they happen to be harvestable at that moment. This earns the player 
extra currency and points, and speeds progression through the game’s 
levels (Fig. 5.1).
The desire to earn more points in QQ Farm – and on many other 
parts of Chinese social media – drives townsfolk to adopt what are some-
times quite unusual patterns of behaviour. For example, shopkeeper 
Zhang Li recollected the fascination with QQ Farm he experienced 
during its peak popularity, around the year 2000. Despite being in his 
mid- thirties at that time, and busy each day running his store and car-
ing for his family, he would nonetheless set his alarm to sound at 3 am. 
He would then go directly to his computer and browse his friend’s QQ 
Farms searching for ripe vegetables to steal, after which he would return 
to bed. Zhang Li explained that the very early hours of the morning were 
the most opportune time for stealing vegetables because many plants 
would come to harvest overnight, and few people would have risen in 
time to harvest their own plants.
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He explained that his friends often expressed a mixture of surprise 
and admiration when they logged in to their own QQ Farm to find that 
the crops they had expected to be ready for harvest had already been 
pilfered. Zhang Li was proud of the high level he had achieved on the 
QQ Farm game, largely due to the diligent care he afforded to his own 
virtual produce, but also helped by his illicit nocturnal raids. Zhang 
Li’s example is perhaps amusing, but it also pinpoints how an intensely 
experienced desire to accumulate levels can result in people engaging in 
quite extreme patterns of behaviour.
This enthusiasm around using social media as a way of moving up 
through levels forms the focus of the current chapter. I will argue that, far 
from being frivolous games, these activities are anthropologically impor-
tant because they actually demonstrate how desirable personal charac-
teristics  – most notably diligence and ingenuity  – become constituted 
among townsfolk through social media. This provides another example 
of how social media use is a force in both informing and constituting the 
moral framework of Anshan Town. This chapter shows that in addition 
to level accumulation forming a readily understood symbolic signifier 
that is shared with one’s circle of friends, these practices also carry an 
inwardly directed aspect of self- cultivation. Individuals derive feelings of 
accomplishment through the persistence, hard work and resourcefulness 
necessary to achieve progress in these level schemes. Users also associate 
these systems of accumulation with broader economic and social trans-
formations occurring in China’s rapidly developing market society.
Fig. 5.1 A QQ Farm with the user’s level displayed on the green 
toolbar 
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As well as this self- directed element, its social function should 
not be overlooked:  circles of friends, and particularly the classmate 
group, remain a constant and significant presence in these activities. 
It will be shown how levels create differentiation within classmate 
groups, but also encourage students to co- operate to assist each other 
in mutual progression. The desire to climb levels online will also be 
discussed in relation to other systems of levels and accumulation 
existing in social life. These findings are significant for the discussion 
in Chapter 6, which will turn to consider sets of broader relations that 
link Anshan Town and its constituent villages to the ‘higher levels’ 
of the county, city, province and the Chinese nation in political and 
economic terms.
The rest of this chapter is split into four sections. First, the growing 
literature on gamification and level systems will be examined; however, 
it will be argued that applying these theories to Anshan Town obscures 
local motivation for and understanding of the significance of these activ-
ities. The second section of the chapter describes the complex rules that 
govern level accumulation systems on Chinese social media platforms. 
The third section considers how people in Anshan Town respond to such 
systems with various tactics and strategies to speed their own rate of 
accumulation. The fourth section of the chapter accounts for the moral 
dimension of level collecting practices, observing a parallel with exist-
ing literature on the entrepreneurial nature of gambling in China, and 
arguing that the practices draw on valued personal characteristics of 
dedication and manipulation.
Gamification is not an explanation
The presence of conspicuous point- collecting and level- accumulation 
schemes on users’ social media profiles is a particularly distinctive fea-
ture of Chinese social media, elements which generally do not exist 
on non- Chinese social media platforms. It is tempting to ascribe this 
phenomenon to the recent trend of gamification, one feature of which 
is the permeation of gaming elements into non- gaming contexts.2 
However, Anshan Town people’s attitude towards social media level 
schemes, and the way they appear in the context of their everyday lives, 
differs from many of the existing explanations for the popularity and 
effectiveness of gamification. I  propose that the popularity of these 
games can be better understood by acknowledging how townsfolk 
re- appropriate level accumulation as a form of moral activity.
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The concept of gamification has gained prominence in recent years 
due to its promotion by consultancy and marketing industries as a novel 
concept and source of revenue. A range of publications have promoted 
the use of gamification, evangelising its role as an income stream for 
business3 and even as a tool with the potential to transform the world.4 
Critiques of gamification have followed, seizing on the commercial ori-
gin of the movement and arguing that the practice is not really about 
game design but is motivated by consumer exploitation.5 Those advocat-
ing the serious study of computer games as a cultural form express frus-
tration at the attention given to gamification, saying it ‘reduces playing 
to a stimulus– response experience’.6 It has been proposed that gamifi-
cation turns users into passive individuals, removing their choice and 
effectively objectifying their own agency.7
However, much of the literature, whether advocating for or critical 
of gamification, often excludes the users’ points of view, and the way 
in which users engage with gamified content is rarely contextualised 
in relation to their lives and social situations. There seems to be an idea 
that gamification owes its effectiveness to designers somehow achiev-
ing a specific awareness of the mechanics of human behaviour, but for 
those trying to make sense of gamification this excludes the possibility 
that cultural differences could have an impact on these practices. My 
chief point is that both the techno- utopian and techno- dystopian views 
on gamification are largely grounded in culturally specific Western con-
cerns around the appropriate location of game play activities in online 
life. Anshan Town’s social media users, by contrast, generally hold few 
qualms around the suitability of these gamified elements appearing on 
many social media platforms. This chapter will argue that the perceived 
virtue attributed to level-accumulation activities in fact reveals the deli-
cate and shifting moral ‘boundaries’ 8 governing social media in the town. 
Acknowledging such boundaries can pave the way for a broader discus-
sion surrounding whether or not some of the principles and ideals that 
are commonly attributed to social media – and the internet more broadly, 
such as equality and freedom – apply to the same degree in Anshan Town.
Bureaucratic measures: The rules governing level  
accumulation (or how to get 2.89 days out of 9.5 hours)
There are a large number of graded level systems that exist on Chinese 
social media platforms; however, this section will mainly concentrate 
on one system: the QQ ‘levels’ (QQ dengji),9 as QQ is the dominant social 
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media platform in Anshan Town (see Chapter 2). Describing the admin-
istration of this system will lead to an understanding of users’ own prac-
tices in response, which will be discussed later.
A user’s QQ level is prominently displayed using a combination of 
symbols including moons, stars and crowns, brightly coloured penguins 
with the word ‘VIP’ and numbers (Fig. 5.2).
QQ has a complex system for calculating how levels are conferred 
on users, the full explanation of which is tucked away on a series of 
pages within the QQ website.10 In brief, gaining QQ levels relies on users 
first accumulating a unit called ‘active online days’.
‘Online time’: putting in the hours
The most basic method of accumulating active online days is through 
‘online time’, which involves remaining logged in to QQ IM, either via 
a desktop computer or the mobile app (or for the maximum possible 
accrual rate, both). To incentivise use of the network, Tencent awards 
‘active online days’ based on a user’s time spent on the network. Prior 
to 2004, the proportion of the day that a user spent online directly 
corresponded to the proportion of an ‘active online day’ that the user 
User’s net alias
User’s ‘Super QQ’ level
QQ level
‘Super QQ’ privelige status
‘active online day’ multiplier
Fig. 5.2 User’s QQ level and ‘Super QQ’ privilege status displayed on 
their profile page 
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was awarded. At that time, staying logged into QQ on one’s computer for 
24 hours would result in the award of one active online day; while stay-
ing logged in only 6 hours would result in 0.25 active online days being 
awarded.
This like- for- like award system led to a large number of QQ users 
nationwide choosing not to switch off their PC or internet connection, 
thereby remaining logged in to QQ 24 hours per day  – referred to as 
‘hanging up one’s QQ’ (gua QQ). This maximised the accumulation 
of active online days and users would climb the levels at the fastest 
possible rate.
The practice became so common that China’s State Grid Corpor-
ation,11 which governs the country’s electricity supply, warned Tencent 
of their responsibility for the electricity being wasted by consumers. 
Tencent changed its method for awarding active online days as a result. 
Users were instead awarded a set amount of active online days when 
they achieved a specific threshold of online time in one day (Table 5.1). 
In theory this removed the incentive for people to remain continuously 
logged in, although some users still chose to do so (to be discussed later 
in this chapter).
Trading levels for invisibility
Ensuring that one’s online status is set to ‘visible’ constitutes another 
method of increasing active online days. QQ IM has a number of differ-
ent online status settings including ‘online’, ‘offline’, ‘away’, ‘busy’ and 
‘invisible’. A user spending two hours in one calendar day with a visible 
online status earned an additional 0.2 active online days. Setting one’s 
QQ status to invisible meant that users appeared as if they were offline 
to their QQ friends. Invisible users nonetheless remained able to send 
and receive messages to and from other users. Recall from Chapter  2 
that Anshan Town people generally desired a form of online visibility 
that made them visible only to their friends. However, at times even this 
Table 5.1 ‘Active online days’ through online time accrual rate
Online method Time spent online Increase in ‘active 
online days’
QQ Desktop Computer 
version
Over 2 hours 0.5 days
QQ Mobile version Continuously logged  
in for 6 hours
1 day
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was considered too onerous. The use of the invisible setting seemed to 
be allied to concerns regarding privacy and intentionally creating bar-
riers to communication at certain times, effectively making it the QQ 
equivalent of ‘call screening’.
One example of why concealing one’s presence on a social media 
platform could be useful comes from the case of Gao Li, the female nurse 
(mentioned in the previous chapter) who works in Anshan Town’s small 
hospital and sought to avoid receiving online messages from many other 
people in the town. Receiving ‘annoying’ ( fan) messages from men led 
her to set her own QQ IM status to invisible. Disguising the fact that she 
was online allowed her greater control over whom she spoke to. We can 
now see that Gao Li’s ‘selective sociality’ 12 would come at a cost, how-
ever, as setting her status to invisible slowed the rate at which her QQ 
levels accumulated. In Gao Li’s case she was happy to make this sacrifice, 
as QQ levels were no longer as important to her as they had been when 
she was a teenager.
Paying for privilege
A third way to increase one’s QQ level was through purchasing premium 
‘VIP’ membership services, such as ‘QQ membership’ (QQ huiyuan) or 
‘Super QQ’ (chaoji QQ huiyuan). These services allow users some extra 
instant features,13 and also act as multipliers of the active online days 
accumulated through online time and visible status (see Tables  5.2 
and 5.3). The standard QQ membership service costs 10 RMB ($1.61) 
a month, while Super QQ membership is priced at 20 RMB ($3.22) a 
Table 5.2 QQ membership yearly accrual status
Membership level (i.e. years of  
paid membership)
‘Active online day’ multiplier
QQ member Annual paying 
QQ member
VIP1 × 1.2 × 1.5
VIP2 × 1.4 × 1.7
VIP3 × 1.5 × 1.8
VIP4 × 1.6 × 1.9
VIP5 × 1.6 × 1.9
VIP6 × 1.7 × 2.0
VIP7 × 1.9 × 2.2
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month. Users who chose to pay annually (rather than monthly) enjoy 
higher rates of level accumulation.
In addition to speeding up the accumulation of active online days 
(and therefore QQ levels), these paid- for membership schemes have 
their own internal level systems. For instance, in the first year of paid 
Super QQ membership the user’s level will be SVIP1; for every year 
membership dues continue to be paid, the level will increase – to SVIP2, 
SVIP3 and so on, up to SVIP7 (Table 5.3). The attained level rankings 
are prominently displayed on users’ profiles (Fig. 5.2).
The final way in which ‘active online days’ can be earned is 
through the use of a range of ‘Tencent Services’, for example installing 
Tencent’s free ‘Computer Butler’ (tengxun diannao guanjia) anti- virus/ 
firewall application, or playing QQ’s mobile games (QQ shouji ban youxi 
zhongxin).
For each user the four criteria detailed above (online time, visible 
time, level speed increase and Tencent services) were monitored by the 
QQ system on a daily basis. They were then used to discern the total 
amount of active online days rewarded to that user each day, according 
to the following formula:
Active online days = online time + visible time × level speed increase 
+ Tencent services
This formula meant that it was possible for a user to, for example, spend 
only 9.5 hours logged in to QQ using a combination of the above services 
and accumulate 2.89 active online days in the process!14
Table 5.3 Super QQ membership yearly accrual status
Membership level (i.e. years  
of paid membership)
‘Active online day’ multiplier
Super- QQ  
member
Annual paying 
Super- QQ member
SVIP1 × 1.4 × 1.7
SVIP2 × 1.6 × 1.9
SVIP3 × 1.7 × 2.0
SVIP4 × 1.8 × 2.1
SVIP5 × 1.8 × 2.2
SVIP6 × 1.9 × 2.4
SVIP7 × 2.1 × 2.7
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At the end of each calendar day, the amount of ‘active online days’ 
earned during that 24- hour period is added to the user’s cumulative 
total of active online days accrued since first joining QQ. This is then 
converted to a corresponding QQ IM level, and shown on each user’s 
profile graphically through a combination of symbols (Table 5.4).
The symbols representative of the levels  – such as the moon, the 
sun and, at the very highest level, the ‘imperial golden crown’  – carry 
strong cosmological inferences. The corresponding amount of active 
online days also builds on the long- standing Chinese cultural passion for 
numbers.15 For example, the highest level, 64, is especially auspicious in 
China, the product of eight squared: an especially lucky number whose 
Chinese word (ba) rhymes with the word for ‘becoming rich’ ( fa). The 
average QQ level obtained among the middle school students surveyed in 
the town was 18.8 (with a maximum of 64, and minimum of 2), a further 
indication of the widespread participation in these level-accumulation 
systems.
In addition to the ‘cultural capital’ of the overt symbols of level 
accumulation, this complex bureaucratic system also leads to a range 
of awards being conferred upon users. Some of the rewards are also 
highly visual signifiers of one’s QQ IM level: the VIP badges mentioned 
earlier, speech bubble decorations and emojis for use in instant messag-
ing. Certain administrative privileges, such as the right to build more 
QQ groups and have higher numbers of friends, are also bestowed upon 
users on reaching particular levels.
Table 5.4  QQ IM’s graphical representation of levels
Level Level symbol Active online days required
1
4
8
12
16
32
48
64
5
32
96
192
320
1152
2496
4352
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The desire to accumulate QQ IM levels was demonstrated in all 
kinds of ways; for example, I  witnessed one elementary school child 
peering over a peer’s shoulder as he used the service, remarking, ‘Wow, 
your QQ level is so high!’ Other individuals took note of and were able to 
recall which of their friends had higher status. Equally some also asked 
me what my own level was when we spoke about QQ.
Levels on other social media platforms
The significance of this complex system of level accumulation is evi-
dent when two further considerations are taken into account. The first 
is that such levels rarely appear on non- Chinese social media platforms 
such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. However, QQ IM’s level- 
accumulation system is typical, rather than exceptional, in China. For 
example, Qzone features its own system of level accumulation (with 
yet another optional paid- for element) entirely separate from QQ IM. 
Instead of moons and stars, levels are calculated via flowers, leaves, 
tomatoes and ‘golden apples’ (Table  5.5). Among the rewards avail-
able to members is the ability to decorate their Qzone with customised 
backgrounds, or to set up animated introduction pages in order to wel-
come visitors to a user’s Qzone.
Sina Weibo also has a complex level system calculated through a 
combination of online time, messages posted and paid membership.16 
Momo has a star- based ranking system giving users extra functionality 
such as contacting more strangers and building groups on the platform.17 
Online shopping platform Taobao features level systems in which sellers 
and buyers accumulate points through successful transactions and by 
writing reviews for service and products. Systems of level accumulation 
are, however, notably absent from WeChat, and the significance of this 
will be discussed at the end of the chapter.
User agency: the manipulation of accumulation
Despite the elaborate and rigid regulations set out by Tencent governing 
the accumulation of levels on Chinese social media platforms, Anshan 
Town’s users adopted their own strategies to speed up the accumulation 
of levels. They took considerable delight in methods they employed to 
‘beat the system’. However, conversations about QQ IM’s level system 
quickly turned to general discussions about accumulating levels on a 
number of social media platforms or online games. While the previous 
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Table 5.5 Graphical representation of Qzone level system
Level symbolPoints
5
10
15
20
30
40
50
60
75
90
160
250
360
490
640
810
6250
16810
32490
146410
342250
615040
Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
32
48
64
128
192
255
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section concentrated on a description of the level-accumulation system 
on QQ IM, the following subsections look at how Anshan Town users 
increase their levels on multiple platforms.
Staying logged in
In spite of the reforms to QQ IM’s system for rewarding ‘active online 
days’, leaving one’s QQ permanently logged in remains a common tactic 
for moving up through QQ IM levels. Although leaving QQ logged in 
24 hours a day is no longer necessary, a significant number of people 
set up their computer so that QQ IM logs in automatically on start- up 
and remains running in the background. Many users also take advan-
tage of a feature in QQ IM that allows multiple accounts to be logged in 
simultaneously. It was common to see a single computer in households, 
shops or offices that had several QQ accounts logged in at the same time 
(Fig. 5.3).
This feature is particularly useful for the town’s young people, 
especially those from poorer families who have limited internet access 
(as outlined in Chapter  2). To ensure their levels kept increasing, 
some young people described leaving their QQ logged in at the house 
of a trusted school friend or relative where there was a terminal and 
Fig. 5.3 The toolbar of a Windows PC in a business in Anshan Town. 
The four penguins denote four separate social media accounts that are 
logged in at the same time 
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broadband connection. In addition to problems of access, simply having 
the time to spend online was another major constraining factor, espe-
cially for games (such as QQ Farm) which required constant monitoring 
in order to progress through the levels. Many middle school students 
commented that they would like to spend more time on the internet so 
that they could accumulate levels more quickly, but their middle school 
timetables occupied most of their weekdays (Table 5.6), and a propor-
tion of the weekends; many felt they simply lacked the necessary time to 
move up through the levels at a satisfactory rate.
Table 5.6 Typical daily schedule of a second- grade middle school student
Time Activity
06:00 Get up. Brush teeth, wash face. Depart for school
06:30 Teacher supervised ‘self- study’ lesson
07:20 Eat breakfast, clean classroom
08:00 Class group sings song together
08:10 Lesson 1
08:55 Short break
09:05 Lesson 2
09:50 Long break
10:20 Lesson 3
11:05 Short break
11:15 Lesson 4
12:00 Return home. Lunch*
12:50 Return to school. Prepare for lesson
13:20 Clean classroom
13:30 Class group sings song together
13:40 Lesson 5
14:25 Short break
14:35 Lesson 6
15:20 Long break
15:50 Lesson 7
16:35 Short break
16:45 Lesson 8
17:30 Return home. Dinner*
(Continued)
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This lack of time to invest in social media is clear in the case of 
Zhang Jie, an earnest, bespectacled middle school student living in 
Huangtian village with his parents who run a small car repair business 
from the courtyard of their tiny, two- room brick home. Despite hav-
ing a computer and internet connection at home, Zhang Jie had little 
time to make use of it. His parents were keen for him to improve his 
grades; during the holidays they paid for extra one- on- one tuition with 
a teacher from the town’s middle school. They have even purchased an 
electric bike for Zhang Jie to ride to school in order to reduce time spent 
commuting. Zhang Jie only has time for gaming at the weekend, when 
he mainly indulges in online games such as Seer (sai’er hao), Counter 
Strike and QQ Farm. Significantly, his choice of preferred games is 
largely driven by which games afford the maximum level progression 
with the minimum investment of time. Zhang Jie describes these as 
‘normal’ (putong) games, contrasting them with more ‘complex’ (  fuza) 
games played by his older peers attending high school or university 
such as League of Legends, which require a greater investment of time 
in order to succeed.
They [high school/ university students] play more different kinds 
of games than I do. They have the newest version of QQ, or games 
where you move up through the levels faster . . . I can’t play them, 
because I don’t have any time to look after them. I can’t log on to 
them that much.
This frustration at being unable to achieve timely level progression is 
more pronounced among students whose families lacked internet access 
Time Activity
18:00 Return to school. Prepare for self- study
18:30 Short break
18:40 Teacher supervised ‘self- study’ lesson
19:35 Short break
19:45 Teacher supervised ‘self- study’ lesson
20:40 School ends. Return home*
22:00 Sleep
Students from remote outlying villages (about half of the total) live in school dormitories during 
weekdays and have their meals in the school canteen. An asterisk denotes times when a non- 
boarding student is at home and is typically permitted to use a mobile phone, computer, etc. 
(if available).
Table 5.6 (Contd.)
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altogether. For instance, Wang Na, a first- grade middle school student, 
lives in one of the remote outlying villages with her older sister, their par-
ents and grandparents. In contrast to Zhang Jie, her home has no inter-
net access and her parents own only simple 2G feature phones. Wang 
Na’s main opportunity to access the internet is during the bi- weekly 
computer class at school (as discussed in Chapter  4). In conversation, 
Wang Na was clear as to how she makes use of her scarce online time:
Wang: I  only go on [Qzone] in order to try and get promoted 
a level.
Tom: Where do you do that?
Wang: School. In the computer class. Just once a week, and I don’t 
get promoted quickly. I’m not even sure what level I am on now.
Getting the help of friends
Many school students (especially those attending middle school) are not 
able adequately to ‘invest time’ (touru shijian) and ‘invest money’ (touru 
qian) in order to ‘care for’ (zhaogu) their social media profiles and QQ 
games and advance through levels. They will therefore often ask their 
friends to ‘look after’ (zhaougu or guan) their social media and game 
accounts on their behalf.
The people charged with such care often have greater amounts of 
free time or their circumstances mean it is easier for them to access the 
internet. The pharmacist Zhang Lin, mentioned in this chapter’s open-
ing sequence, eventually tired of stealing vegetables from his friends’ 
QQ Farms in the dead of night. He now enlists his wife’s help in plant-
ing, growing and harvesting the virtual crops (although she remains 
unwilling to get up in the middle of the night to steal other users’ virtual 
carrots).
Devolving the care of a QQ account constituted a significant test 
of trust for users, especially in the case of schoolchildren. Of the mid-
dle school students surveyed, 73 per cent shared their social media 
passwords with others. Passwords were most often shared with friends 
(50 per cent of survey group) and siblings (32 per cent). A  consider-
able number of students spoke of sharing their passwords with their 
‘male senior apprentice’ (shixiong), an antiquated term which today is 
used to describe an older male classmate; female middle school stu-
dents often shared their social media password with an [almost always 
female] ‘bosom buddy’ (guimi). For students sharing QQ passwords 
with peers typically occurred within the same gender. For married 
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couples who still kept social media accounts the opposite was the case, 
with passwords often being shared with spouses in order to mitigate 
the suspicions that could form around social media use, as detailed in 
Chapter 4. The sharing of passwords and co- operating to help each other 
accumulate levels thus represents an important way in which bonds of 
friendship within the familiar ‘circles’ of Qzone can be strengthened.
One consequence of these common practices of leaving QQ 
logged in on shared computers and sharing passwords is the relatively 
frequent occurrence of accounts being hacked or misused. National fig-
ures show that 25.9 per cent of Chinese internet users have had their 
account hacked or password stolen.18 The field work demonstrated 
that townsfolk hold a very specific attitude towards privacy and the 
safety of their data, making their laid- back attitude towards devolv-
ing passwords to other individuals. Ultimately users seek to overcome 
this contradiction by distinguishing among the persons they deem to 
be trustworthy, a judgement that can also be interpreted as a means to 
build trust.
Multiple accounts
A further way to accumulate was through the creation of second 
accounts. This was a relatively common practice, with 55 per cent19 of 
middle school students surveyed claiming to have more than one QQ 
account.20 People generally refer to their oldest, most established and 
frequently used account as their ‘main account’ (zhuhao), while other 
accounts are often referred to as ‘second accounts’ (erhao). Having mul-
tiple accounts is helpful in gaining higher levels in many of QQ’s online 
games. These games were designed to be played with one’s QQ friends; 
however, users often intentionally arranged competitions between their 
main and second accounts to increase the rate at which they earned 
points and accumulated levels. One high school student explained the 
logic behind such matches:
My biggest love is playing basketball. I’ve got some games on 
my Qzone, some are about basketball, . . . it’s called ‘NBA Dream 
Team’ . . . The game has everything in it . . . On the computer, in 
Dream Team, there are lots of stars and you can buy all of these 
players for yourself and make them your own players. Once you’ve 
done that you feel very cool! When you are playing the game you 
need a certain amount of luck, but I’ve also opened a second Qzone 
account and I use that account to buy players, which I then sell to 
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my main account. This helps my main account to move up to the 
next level and then I can set up matches between my main account 
and my second account. Of course my second account won’t be able 
to beat my main account, and in this way my main account will get 
more experience and move up through the levels.
This explanation demonstrates how such tactics help individuals beat 
the bureaucratic systems imposed by social media companies to restrict 
the speed at which people are able to accumulate levels. Far from being 
exploited by a system imposed from the ‘top down’, Anshan Town users’ 
creation of multiple accounts speaks to the degree of agency they were 
able to exert over their engagement with these platforms.
Paid membership
Surprisingly, rather than being considered an unnecessary extrava-
gance, paid- for QQ VIP memberships were actually relatively popular 
among the town’s social media users who considered these schemes to 
be largely benign. In a survey carried out solely among social media 
users in the town, 44 per cent of respondents claimed to have spent 
money on social media subscriptions, online games or both (Fig. 5.4).21
Given the limited wealth of most Anshan Town families, it seemed 
surprising that almost half of the people surveyed were willing to spend 
their scarce resources on virtual goods and memberships. Few young 
people in the town have the means to subscribe to annual VIP member-
ships, so spending tends to be limited to a single month’s membership 
or a particular item required for progression in a game. Some users 
56%
19%
7%
18%
Social media
Online games
None
Social media &
online games
Fig. 5.4 Areas of online spending by social media users 
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interpreted these paid- for virtual goods and services as a sign of distinc-
tion. For example, high school student Li Biao explained how a class-
mate’s use of QQ membership revealed the wealth of the classmate’s 
family, commenting ‘My classmate has QQ membership . . . his family 
are rich’.
Many students exercised considerable creativity in extracting 
money from their parents to purchase premium memberships. Far from 
seeing themselves as being manipulated by Tencent into parting with 
‘real’ cash for ‘virtual’ things such as obtaining QQ levels, many saw 
it as an opportunity to demonstrate their financial ability among their 
circle of friends. This willingness to take part in systems of overt strat-
ification based largely on spending power makes sense in the context 
of a wider turn towards conspicuous consumption as a regular way to 
express financial wellbeing. Such behaviour has been commonplace 
since government policies created the category of the small  private 
trader in the early 1980s and individuals in Chinese cities began to 
become wealthy.22
This description of the strategies for level accumulation has shown 
the ingenuity of users in the face of bureaucratic measures that impose 
multiple systems of level accumulation upon them, and despite their lim-
ited resources. It has demonstrated that a significant group of users seem 
enthralled with the levels offered by various social media platforms and 
the opportunity to move up through these levels, and are quite happy 
to devote considerable resources to doing so. However, this fixation 
with level accumulation ought to be viewed in relation to a user’s own 
agency, exerted by employing techniques such as remaining logged in, 
obtaining the help of friends, using a second QQ account and spending 
money on memberships and virtual levels, which enables users to feel 
that they have some control over these level systems. Therefore, while 
gaining levels holds major appeal, a large amount of this springs from 
the considerable craft, skill and technique required to speed one’s climb 
through the level system.
Accounting for accumulation: level accumulation  
and morality
The final section of this chapter will explain how practices of level accu-
mulation on social media and the dedication, ingenuity and skill they 
necessitate become understood by users as a morally worthwhile activ-
ity. This reveals an important entrepreneurial ethic that underlies all of 
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the activities, despite the fact that different generations of users often 
prefer to carry out the activities in different ways.
‘Growing up’ and level accumulation
While these level accumulation systems were widespread on many 
social media platforms and games, different systems appealed to dif-
ferent users. Preference for a particular system seemed to be shared 
among circles of friends – often the same peer group or gender. For pri-
mary and middle school students, and especially male middle school 
students, there seemed to be a particularly strong interest in systems of 
level accumulation on platforms such as QQ IM and Qzone. By contrast, 
young adults in their twenties who had previously purchased member-
ships would express scepticism towards such membership schemes. For 
example, 23- year- old Gao Li explained how her attitude toward paid- for 
membership had changed:
I used ‘yellow diamond’ [paid- for membership] in my Qzone. You 
can make the Qzone beautiful with it. . . . Now I don’t use it, I feel 
it’s a complete waste. Previously in high school, I felt I wanted to let 
other people see my Qzone looked beautiful. Music and decoration 
made it look good.
In a separate example Tang Lei, a college graduate in his twenties – who 
had accumulated the highest QQ level (68) of any research participant – 
explained how paying for membership several years ago had helped him 
to achieve a high QQ status.
Previously when I used to buy stock market shares I built a ‘super 
QQ group’; in order to do this, I purchased three years’ member-
ship. That is all the money that I’ve [ever] spent on it. . . . In the last 
few years, smartphones and wireless internet have now become so 
convenient and common. Previously people used to turn off their 
QQ when they left the computer, now I  don’t care if I  am at the 
computer or not, my QQ is never offline.
Young middle school students’ attitudes towards these levels contrasted 
to the limited interest felt among those in their twenties and above. 
These students, who faced severe restrictions on their access to smart-
phones, internet and social media, attributed great value to the time 
they were able to spend online. The value placed on access explains why, 
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to these students, the levels on Chinese social media and games seem 
to be of such great importance: they become an easy means to compare 
one’s connectedness and access to an otherwise scarce resource with 
one’s peers.
Contrast this with the case of those in their twenties or thirties. 
Several years earlier these people had responded to many of the lev-
els found on QQ and Qzone in a similar way to that currently observed 
among primary and middle schoolchildren in the town. However, for 
the twenty to thirty age group, access to the internet was much eas-
ier. Those who were at university and had access in their dormitories 
often played more ‘complex’ games (of the kind described by Zhang Jie, 
above) demanding more time and dedication. As internet access became 
an everyday commodity for them, the value attributed to QQ IM lev-
els was accordingly reduced. They now dismissed level systems on QQ 
as being childish (youzhi) and banal. This was a further reason for the 
growing popularity of WeChat among this group, a platform where level 
accumulation systems were noticeably absent.
Older individuals, aged in their forties and above, typically use social 
media far less frequently than younger people (see Chapter 2), so accumu-
lating levels on QQ IM and Qzone held less appeal for them. However, 
even among this older group it is still possible to find users taking part in 
such activities, often through online versions of familiar card games and 
mah- jong, which when played offline normally involves gambling. The 
popularity of this type of level accumulation is particularly important. 
Many existing explanations for the social significance of Chinese gamb-
ling practices emphasise the importance of players’ own ingenuity and 
tactics. Therefore these accounts can help to explain not only the popu-
larity of online card games and mah- jong played by older users, but also 
of all the systems of level accumulation on social media outlined above.
Understanding accumulation: the hard work of gambling
In all of the systems of level accumulation seen in this chapter, achiev-
ing a high ranking largely relies on one unavoidable factor:  sustained 
dedication. It does not matter whether this involves remaining logged 
in on QQ IM over many years, faithfully checking in to Qzone every day 
to gain points, earning credits through regular postings on Sina Weibo, 
or conscientiously tending to one’s crops in QQ Farm. Although the pre-
ferred platforms and media for carrying out these activities changed 
between age groups, possessing traits of commitment and perseverance 
remained key factors in accumulation.
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When attempting to account for the popularity of level accumu-
lation practices on social media, it is important to acknowledge that 
hierarchal social arrangements – and progression through them – have 
been a constant and major theme in anthropological representations of 
Chinese culture, informed by a long historical tradition of dividing all 
manner of relations, people and objects into clearly delineated levels.
For instance, the cosmological underpinnings of Imperial China 
rested in a hierarchy of different Chinese gods arranged into levels 23 
used as a ‘conceptual tool’ by the Imperial government in order to justify 
the various layers of bureaucracy that comprised the Imperial governing 
structure.24
Chinese patriliny constitutes a further hierarchy fuelled by the 
ideal of males being superior to females, and the old superior to the 
young.25 These two principles combine to create effective levels between 
generations within families, and also within the same generation based 
on age and gender. These rules informed the distribution and inheri-
tance of property,26 and had a profound influence on Chinese kinship 
studies.27 Recent studies emphasise the interaction of patriliny with 
other different cultural forms and understandings of relatedness.28
Hierarchies are further established by clearly delineated levels 
appearing in other aspects of Chinese society, including socio- spatial 
structures connecting places,29 business relations and official connec-
tions between individuals,30 moral hierarchies around the possession 
of specific character traits31 and within funeral rituals and mourning.32
While these historical hierarchies in Chinese society may provide 
beguiling explanations for the appeal of systems of level accumulation, 
they have undergone significant transformation in the past one hundred 
years, and it is unreasonable to simply assume that such historical fac-
tors are still of major influence today. The more influential factors are to 
be found by examining the platforms themselves and the practices of use 
outlined earlier in the chapter. These practices reveal users’ attempts to 
resituate their online activities within a moral framework by stressing 
the traits of persistence and manipulation required to be successful in 
the face of the platforms’ rigid administration.
The dedication required to successfully accumulate levels 
demands entrepreneurship and hard work, characteristics which are 
highly valued in Chinese culture. This ‘Chinese entrepreneurial ethic’ 
has been described as a cultural ideal that mandates investment of 
one’s resources ‘in a long- term quest to improve the material well- 
being and security of some group to which one belongs and with which 
one identifies closely’.33 The fact that all of the level accumulation 
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systems require a considerable input of time draws on this entrepre-
neurial ethic, turning QQ users’ activities into an industrious – even 
virtuous  – activity. This broadly defined Chinese entrepreneurial 
ethic resonates strongly with the townsfolk’s attitudes towards busi-
ness. Chapter 1 discussed the strong work ethic of townsfolk, which 
left them with little spare time for leisure activities in comparison 
with other regions of China.34
The fact that scarce resources are being dedicated to level accu-
mulation suggests that in addition to these practices being outward fac-
ing and performative, they also have an important self- directed aspect. 
Therefore, while level accumulation may partially be about cultivating 
one’s Qzone profile, the activities they involve also give users the sense 
that they are cultivating themselves through their continued engage-
ment in such practices.
How can these themes of hard work and persistence in accumu-
lating levels be reconciled against the strategies employed by users to 
circumvent the established system of level accumulation (for example, 
through spending money, having multiple accounts, staying logged in)? 
How can the accumulation of levels be moral, when those employing 
such tactics are placed at an unfair advantage over those who do not? 
The literature on the relationship between gambling and entrepreneur-
ship in China helps to explain this apparent contradiction. Gambling 
appears to attract comparable levels of interest to online level accumula-
tion, with many similarities and crossovers between the two. However, 
there are also important distinctions.
The popularity of gambling within Chinese culture, despite the 
fact that it appears to undermine the much- valued entrepreneurial 
ethic, has garnered significant attention.35 Accounts of gambling in 
China date back to the Xia dynasty (c. 2070 bc– c. 1600 bc).36 During the 
Han dynasty (206 bc– ad 220), writer Wang Fu criticised gambling as a 
vice of the idle wealthy of central China.37 Concern that gambling could 
bring financial destitution to entire households was a common theme 
during the Ming and Qing dynasties.38 These historical records all point 
not only to the enduring popularity, but also the often morally problem-
atic nature of gambling practices.
A separate anthropological account of mah- jong games that took 
place in a small market town in the Yunnan province in the 1940s high-
lights that gambling was as much a rural pastime as it was an urban one.39 
In this account the apparent contradiction between entrepreneurship 
and gambling was also speculated upon, although it was argued that 
Chinese gambling was largely a social event carried out between friends 
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and under set situations with clear rules and equipment, such as mah- 
jong or similar games.40
Research carried out in the early 1980s on gambling in a Chinese 
community of entrepreneurs in Calcutta proposed that although social 
prestige was an important aspect,41 other rationalities also informed 
these gambling practices.42 It was argued that gambling’s appeal lay in 
its ability to recreate the perils and dangers of everyday business rela-
tionships.43 A concept of fate was incorporated into gambling practices 
that allowed for player’s to retrospectively view the outcome of each 
gambling act as beyond one’s ultimate control. In this way, success in 
both life and gambling is seen to be a combination of hard work and 
good fortune.44 Gambling had added appeal because it allows players to 
see immediately the results of their investments.45
It has also been noted that the often morally problematic nature 
of gambling, which both challenges and supports the entrepreneurial 
ethic, is made possible because gambling ‘usually occurs in contexts 
that are ordered and bounded’.46 It has been argued that the bound-
aries which confine gambling practices in China are themselves con-
stantly shifting, and that the exuberance and ‘social heat’ of gambling 
situations can spiral out of control, which is when gambling is felt to 
become a problem.47 Gambling remains illegal on the Chinese main-
land, but is generally tacitly permitted (providing the wagers remain 
small).
In this sense, level accumulation systems largely lie outside 
these problematic boundaries. Although illegal online gambling 
does exist in China,48 the systems that appear on social media plat-
forms were not thought to be forms of gambling. While using money 
to increase one’s speed of accumulation was possible, this money 
would not gain value itself, nor could it be withdrawn at a later time. 
Participants understood that money paid in would generally never 
be returned.
from money to morals: the appeal of cash- less gambling on QQ
Some of the most popular systems of level accumulation within social 
media platforms were computerised versions of games that, when played 
in offline environments, frequently involve gambling. These include 
card games such as doudizhu, gouji and mah- jong. For some users, such 
as 23- year- old engineer Peng Lei, these online versions were attractive 
because they allowed him to avoid the unappealing betting element that 
often accompanied the games. However, Peng Lei remarked that in the 
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transition to online platforms, the games had lost some of the intense 
conviviality associated with face- to- face modes of play.
I like playing Chinese chess, doudizhu. I don’t like gambling. On 
QQ games there is ‘spicy doudizu’ (mala doudizhu); it’s roughly the 
same [as playing offline]. Of course, if people come [and play in 
person] it is better; the atmosphere will possibly be better.
Others, such as Li Ming, a local restaurant owner in his forties, high-
light the relationship between his business work and playing card games 
online. Rather than seeing any obvious analogy between the two spheres, 
Li Ming viewed one as being largely mutually exclusive of the other.
My main use of QQ is to play doudizhu . . . [but] now I am too busy, 
in the summer I have no time to play. When I am relaxing, when 
the business isn’t busy then I’ll play. When I am busy I have no time 
to play.
Li Ming’s quote suggests that play typically makes way for business, and 
that if possible, people would always prefer to be playing card games. He 
also touched on the added excitement and intensity that gambling money 
in such games would contribute, echoing the remarks of Peng Lei.
When you get a few friends together, and gamble a little bit of cash, 
then there’s a bit of stimulation (ciji), the play is exciting. But when 
you play online you can’t gamble money.
This kind of sentiment, where online card games devoid of gambling 
were felt to be bland and insipid in comparison to playing card games in 
person (with the added excitement of modest stakes) was commonplace 
among the town’s social media users. By contrast, others espoused the 
virtues of the online games precisely because they had been stripped 
of the potentially damaging influence of gambling. For instance, Tang 
Daiyu, a 38- year- old doctor who ran a small clinic in Huangtian village, 
maintained that playing the card game doudizhu on QQ was more fun 
than playing it offline precisely because it had not been sullied by the 
addition of money.
I don’t like gambling money. I  only play cards. The main attrac-
tion is entertainment. If you add money to entertainment, then the 
‘pure fun’ is gone.
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However, Tang Daiyu’s account suggests that the excitement that had 
been lost through removing the gambling element was more than com-
pensated for by the potential thrill of being able to accumulate levels.
When I go up a level I feel incredibly happy. As my points increase 
more and more, and I gradually move to the top of this level, I will 
be very happy. . . . but there are no [direct] benefits, only your 
skill has improved, it doesn’t really mean anything, it’s just an 
entertainment.
For Tang Daiyu accumulating levels through playing QQ online was seen 
to be far less morally problematic than accumulating money through 
gambling on similar games offline. Concerns were directed not just at 
the individual, but also the impact of such activities on her offspring.
I don’t like to learn mah- jong. When other people teach me I don’t 
like it, because it is too easy to get addicted. As the female house-
hold head, raising two children, if you want to play, your chil-
dren will also follow you in playing. If you want to manage your 
children well, first you must manage yourself. Although playing 
cards is just fun, there is not that much addiction. The motiva-
tion is for the children, managing the children well is the main 
objective.
Tang Daiyu’s claim suggests that level-accumulation practices lie on the 
‘correct side’ of the boundaries of acceptability. A comparable situation 
is found in Steinmüller’s study of gambling practices in rural Central 
China, where he notes the distinction between social gambling (wan) 
and problem gambling (dubo).49 So, while gambling is an activity that is 
enjoyable precisely because it is analogous to the risk taking and uncer-
tainty seen in business practices, the opposite seems to be the case for 
level accumulation on social media, where its entrepreneurial ethic is 
precisely the thing that makes it attractive.
In this context, the strategies to speed accumulation are often 
not felt to be cheating at all. In fact, the town’s social media users 
recounted the various techniques they used to speed accumulation 
with measured pride. They viewed their own activities not as deceiv-
ing either the system or other users, but merely using one’s own clever-
ness. In a separate study into the popularity of underground lotteries 
in rural China, it was noted that many played these lotteries despite 
the belief that they were rigged, largely because a combination of 
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skill and fate still meant lottery players felt that they had some con-
trol over the system.50 A similar such logic appears to be in place in 
Anshan Town.
Conclusion: entrepreneurship, social media  
and social transformation
By examining the popularity of level accumulation practices as they 
appear on Chinese social media, it is possible to reject common dis-
courses around gamification that tend to see such platforms as exploit-
ative of docile users. Instead, the interpretation of systems of level 
accumulation by Anshan Town people within their local moral frame-
work has revealed how these users transform the practices into ethical 
activities by asserting their entrepreneurial nature.
While many of the methods for climbing levels involved either ded-
ication or ingenious ways to circumvent the bureaucracy, the fastest way 
to raise one’s level remained spending money. Whether buying the VIP 
membership schemes introduced above, or directly purchasing accounts 
or items that already have a high status, financial power offers a route to 
bypass the established moral values and creative approaches described 
in this chapter. The presence of such financial shortcuts in social media 
can be seen as reflecting a wider transformation in society, where the 
material signs and signifiers that come to represent one’s achievement 
end up being based less on hard work but increasingly reflect one’s abil-
ity to buy advancement. Although the introduction of money into level- 
accumulation systems is largely aligned with rather than opposed to 
entrepreneurial activity, it does not mean that using money to directly 
purchase such status is destined to continue to be viewed positively. 
Indeed, in the long term shortcuts may increasingly act to erode the 
importance of the levels themselves, as users see them less as a sign of 
self- cultivation, and more as a symbol of economic ability.
The ability simply to purchase status indicates that Chinese users 
possess a radically different set of ideals in comparison to users outside 
China around the principles that should underlie social media use. Some 
users outside China have advocated for concepts such as ‘net neutral-
ity’, reflecting attitudes that all internet data (and users) should receive 
equal treatment. Rather than ranking and grading systems being incon-
gruous with supposedly egalitarian peer sociality, on Chinese social 
media these two aspects appear together with little concern from 
users. This also speaks to a broader social change: the transition in the 
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reform and opening era from a controlled socialist structure  – albeit 
still informed by strong ideals of meritocracy  – to an appreciation of 
spending power within the vastly expanding domain of consumer cul-
ture. This may partially account for why people start to lose interest 
in level systems in their twenties and above; they increasingly realise 
that exchanging money for purely online goods has less appeal than 
exchanging it for material goods.
Users’ accounts of changing opinions of social media levels 
over the years also intersect with significant change in terms of the 
‘circles’ of known friends that form the key social group dominating 
their social media interactions. On the one hand, users are happy to 
call on the help of members of their circles to move up through the lev-
els, and, on the other hand, the systems of levels add new forms of dis-
tinction into what were otherwise fairly egalitarian circles of friends. 
The move towards material consumption partially reflects a desire to 
use material goods to effectively break out from these circles, and to 
become involved in larger global transitions and levels of wealth and 
power that exist elsewhere in Chinese society, all of which will come 
into play in the next chapter.
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6
Broader relations: The family,  
the state and social media
From the loving example of one family a whole state may become 
loving, and from its courtesies, courteous; while from the ambition 
and perverseness of the one man the whole state may be thrown 
into rebellious disorder.
—Confucius1
This persistent notion of the family being central to the Chinese state2 
appears not only in Confucius’ Analects, but is also present in contem-
porary discourses. The previous chapters of this book have focused on 
exploring the moral implications of social media use for different rela-
tionships such as family, familiar- non- kin or, increasingly, strangers. 
By concentrating on relationships between individuals, the role of the 
state has largely been omitted from the discussion so far. However, this 
chapter will show how, in response to moral concerns over social media 
transforming families and society, the state is seeking to influence social 
media in a number of ways. Equally, individuals and families may also 
expect the state to intervene in response to their own moral concerns 
over social media.
The chapter draws together a number of the themes raised in 
previous chapters (for example, ‘traditional’ family values, why and 
how people communicate with strangers, the moral accumulation of 
wealth) and attempts to illustrate how townsfolk make sense of them 
with reference to the political environment around them. In examin-
ing connections between the family and the state, this chapter broadens 
the focus by connecting events in Anshan Town to larger political and 
economic structures that operate at national and regional levels, and 
the specific cultural conditions in the town where social media is found 
and operates. A key argument of this chapter is that while the state has 
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responded to families’ moral concerns over social media with increased 
regulation and control, there remain untapped possibilities for individ-
uals to engage in profit- making activities via social media. These oppor-
tunities may prove effective in assuaging many of the concerns around 
social media technology because such entrepreneurship is well regarded 
in Chinese culture.
Social structures in China had, of course, already undergone 
monumental change prior to the advent of social media, perhaps most 
notably the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Cultural 
Revolution and the subsequent large- scale abandonment of socialist 
ideals in favour of the market- based economy of the reform era.3 These 
structural changes were often accompanied by significantly different 
sets of values and ideologies that guided each system. This chapter will 
examine some of these broader relations, while attempting to remain 
rooted in the everyday lives of townsfolk by illustrating the key links 
between Anshan Town families and the nation state as they are enacted 
through social media use.
The chapter has three distinct sections. First, it will examine the 
control that various institutions place on Chinese social media plat-
forms, along with the townsfolk’s interpretation of these measures. 
Notions of state responsibility towards families allow parts of the state 
(and also industry) to assert the need for a ‘moral internet’,4 supposedly 
legitimising measures enacted over social media. The second part of the 
chapter documents how, rather than controlling access to social media, 
an equally important aspect is state efforts to create an environment 
where these platforms are populated with forms of propaganda and 
other ‘appropriate’ content. Appropriate content includes domestic news 
coverage and also patriotic postings by users. This section argues for an 
acknowledgement of users’ role as active creators, rather than passive 
receivers of nationalistic content. The third section of this chapter con-
siders the increasing interest among townsfolk to undertake business 
and commerce via social media. It is suggested that the potential eco-
nomic benefits of social media for individual users may align with cul-
tural attitudes toward the accumulation of profit through hard work and 
co- operation (as outlined in the previous chapter) thereby potentially 
satisfying both state and family concerns regarding new technologies.
This chapter will also provide further context and illustration of 
how relationships with strangers seem to be becoming more accepta-
ble and possible. The discussion will suggest that through controls, 
propaganda, nationalistic postings and increasing economic activity on 
Chinese social media platforms, an online space is being shaped that 
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promotes and sustains the imagined community of the nation state. 
This grants a certain licence for interactions with strangers to take place 
within the online domain of this imagined community, the inhabitants 
of which are tacitly assumed to be fellow citizens.5
Cause for control: Protecting nation and family
Restrictions that have been imposed on social media platforms have 
ranged from controls enacted by the state to the entirety of the internet 
in China to controls enacted on a far more local basis within Anshan 
Town itself. Some of the latter may even have originated with individ-
uals or families who were concerned about the potential danger of the 
internet.
State- level controls: The Golden Shield
The Golden Shield Project ( jindun gongcheng), colloquially referred to 
as the ‘Great Firewall of China’ (  fanghuo changcheng), is arguably the 
best- known mechanism of Chinese state control over the internet. The 
Golden Shield Project is a large, central government project adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Public Security and enacted by the country’s 
ISPs. It is predominantly aimed at preventing local users from visiting 
particular websites and searching for a range of key terms. Many stud-
ies, particularly by scholars based outside China, have revealed various 
aspects of the Golden Shield Project, such as how controls and blocks are 
applied in reaction to sensitive political events,6 the role of industry in 
developing the necessary technology,7 the increasing sophistication and 
reach of the network over time8 and countermeasures enacted by users 
in response to the restrictions.9 An altogether less frequently discussed 
(but equally pertinent) reason for the existence of controls limiting 
access to foreign social media platforms is to protect the high revenues 
of indigenous social media firms.10 Western social media platforms such 
as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram were included among the inaccessi-
ble platforms (at the time of writing).
The opaque nature of the system and its management by the 
Ministry of Public Security makes it difficult to fully discern the pro-
cess that ultimately results in a decision to ban a particular overseas 
social media network. It has been suggested that a key motivation 
behind the Golden Shield is to limit the contact that domestic social 
media users have with foreign users and the information posted on 
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social media networks. It is significant that blocks on social media 
platforms have often been enacted at specific moments related to 
political crises in China. For example, during the 2014 Hong Kong 
Protests the Golden Shield was extended to prevent users in main-
land Chinese accessing the photo- sharing platform Instagram. Hong 
Kong’s Central district was filled with protestors, and large numbers 
of photographs of altercations between police and protestors were cir-
culating on Instagram.11
When events such as this happen, how does the Golden Shield 
actually affect the lives of ordinary people in a place like Anshan Town? 
The answer may be not very much – at least not in a way directly dis-
cernible to townsfolk themselves. Although tech- savvy, cosmopolitan 
and globally aware residents in China’s urban cities may have experi-
enced the sudden blocking of Instagram (and, prior to that, other social 
networks), the case was different in Anshan Town where use – and even 
awareness of – non- Chinese social media platforms is extremely limited. 
The questionnaire conducted in Anshan Town showed only one individ-
ual who possessed a Facebook account (a 25- year- old male Post Office 
clerk, who was from Bai Town), and no users of Twitter or Instagram. 
I was often asked what social media platforms were used outside China, 
and whether people outside China used QQ.
Despite the barriers to using non- Chinese social media platforms, 
most university students and people in their twenties had at least heard 
of Facebook. Many knew of Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder, 
either through the film The Social Network (a dramatisation of the 
events surrounding the conception of the platform) or via the national 
news reports of his visits to China during which, some townsfolk noted, 
Zuckerberg had spoken in broken Chinese. During the entire period of 
field work only one participant – a hairdresser in the town – took the 
time to install a Virtual Private Network (VPN) program that allowed 
him to circumvent the Golden Shield. He subsequently joined Facebook 
and added me as a friend. A few days later he commented that Facebook 
was not as good as QQ and WeChat, because it ‘didn’t really have any-
thing on it’ (understandable given the fact that I was his only friend on 
the network).
In general, the high level of interest the Golden Shield Project 
receives in non- Chinese reports and academic coverage of the Chinese 
internet12 is not reflected locally, where most people are unaware of its 
existence and those who are aware are largely unconcerned about it. 
This reflects the fact that the Chinese government occupies a ‘default 
position’ of authority over the internet, in contrast to Euro- American 
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governments which have to legislate in order to give themselves the 
right to exercise control over the internet.13
We should not assume that all users of social media in Anshan 
Town would be Facebook/ Twitter users by default if the constraints 
described above did not exist. This is clear when viewed from the other 
direction. There is absolutely nothing to stop European or American 
social media users from setting up a QQ or WeChat account (both plat-
forms have English- language versions), yet in practice very few people 
have such accounts. Other factors are clearly at play, such as whether 
the platform is judged to be useful to the people who use it or whether 
their friends, family or other associates that they communicate with also 
happen to be members of the same social network.
Deleted posts and frozen accounts
The next level of control occurs within Chinese social media platforms 
themselves, where certain types of postings are actively monitored and 
deleted. As with the Golden Shield Project, the process of moderating 
posts lacks transparency. It has been suggested that social media com-
panies work to monitor potentially objectionable content in response to 
demands by the Ministry of Public Security.14 Postings that are subject to 
moderation are not limited to those that are critical of the government, 
but include other content deemed inappropriate:  pornography, fraud 
schemes and instances of account abuse, etc. Only two people I spoke 
to recalled having their account frozen. Jiao Yongqi, a 20- year- old shop 
worker, reported having his accounts frozen for a short period of time; 
however he was unwilling to go into details of what he had posted that 
brought this about. Jiao Yongqi regarded this block as an inconvenience, 
rather than seeing it as especially oppressive. In a separate instance Liu 
Wei, a 28- year- old travelling salesman, had his account frozen for cheat-
ing while playing card games on QQ:
I have been reported [by another user]. What thing ended up with 
me being reported? My friend and I  were playing doudizhu [the 
card game]. The two of us were working together to cheat that 
[third] person out of their ‘Happiness beans’ . . . The two of us knew 
each other’s cards. That person reported us, we were unable to play 
for a month. They shut down our accounts.
Although these threats of deletion or bans do deter users from certain 
behaviour, by far the most effective deterrent is self- censorship; most 
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users understand that there are expectations about the kind of content 
that is appropriate for posting on these platforms. Chapter  3 showed 
that the vast majority of users’ postings on QQ were related to either 
offspring or romance and marriage, rather than political postings. For 
example Zhang Lin, a shopkeeper in the town, spoke about the need for 
caution when making such posts.
I do [post about news], but I still have a few scruples. I have a class-
mate who doesn’t have a single bit of common sense. He used to 
be a teacher, and then he became a businessman. He is more rad-
ical than me. He will be filled with righteous indignation at some 
unfair things in society. He will share these things [online], I’ll also 
comment. But eight out of ten times it’s not possible to publish. 
Sometimes you can’t even publish a curse.
However, there was no evidence that Anshan Town people shy away 
from making overtly political postings because they are afraid of puni-
tive measures by the government or social media companies. Instead, 
users seem to regard QQ and WeChat as outlets that are appropriate 
only for more positive kinds of posts. When it comes to posting mes-
sages online, people are far more concerned with whether the posts will 
provoke the disapproval of friends and family, rather than the state, 
law enforcement bodies or the social media companies. As such, social 
media was generally felt to be an inappropriate locale for posts regard-
ing news, politics and current affairs.
The above examples of Jiao Yongqi, Liu Wei and Zhang Lin are 
interesting in that they reveal the way in which controls over accept-
able content often become codified into cultural norms. This may 
explain why users’ responses frequently shift between expressing 
feelings of constraint over what it is possible to post to claims that 
they do not want to make political postings on social media anyway. 
I believe that such reactions can be understood as ways that towns-
folk form a strategy for coping with inflexible controls that they are 
otherwise unable to influence. It should be noted that this aversion 
towards political postings does not mean that townsfolk are entirely 
opposed to intense political discussions. I  witnessed numerous ani-
mated debates over tea drinking sessions, at dinner tables or in homes, 
regarding all manner of issues from China’s foreign policy to local 
land allocation and issues of corruption. The key point is that both 
families and the state were active in conspiring to keep such postings 
outside of social media.
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Limiting youth access
The social media use of young people in Anshan Town was an area of 
particular concern for townsfolk, who were often worried about the 
potential corrupting influence of such technologies. This is a partic-
ularly significant area, as efforts by both the state and local families 
often overlap in seeking to limit young people’s access to social media. 
For example, social media companies imposed limits on the amount of 
time that users were permitted continuously to play games. Users were 
required to confirm their age by registering with a valid national iden-
tity card number. For users under the age of 18 years, playing in excess 
of three hours per day would halve their ‘profit’ in the game (i.e. virtual 
points, experience or currency); playing in excess of five hours would 
reduce it to zero.15 Young people in Anshan Town found a way to circum-
vent this by entering someone else’s identity card number (their parents’ 
ID card numbers – either with or without their knowledge – were usually 
felt to be a good choice). Some users registered a second QQ account that 
they could continue to use once their first account had reached the time 
limit. Once again, these controls were targeted at young people, in part 
due to criticism of social media companies concerning young people’s 
‘addiction’ to gaming. The state needed to be seen to respond seriously 
to such widely held family concerns.
In addition to nationwide controls implemented by the government 
or social media companies, there were a number of measures that were, 
to varying degrees, enacted locally. For example, there is nationwide 
prohibition on under- 18s using internet cafés, which is half- heartedly 
implemented in the town’s only such café. Throughout China a national 
identity card is required to use any internet café. The front desk of every 
internet café is fitted with a card reader and users must swipe their cards 
on arriving and when leaving. In addition to logging time spent online, 
and ensuring the customer is billed correctly, this measure is designed 
to make café owners ensure the users are of the legal age. Regular, 
unannounced inspections by the county- level Cultural Bureau and other 
government departments are supposed to check that café owners are 
fulfilling this requirement to prevent underage use.16
However, in Anshan Town’s internet café the manager kept a 
supply of spare ID cards (borrowed from friends and extended fam-
ily) in a locked drawer at the front desk. When under- 18s without ID 
cards came to the café, the manager would swipe one of these tempo-
rary cards in lieu of the youngster’s. The underage users were usually 
accommodated in two ‘secret’ rooms at the back of the café, away from 
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the street and out of view of family members and inspectors. Despite 
only 2 per cent of the surveyed middle schoolchildren identifying the 
internet café as their main place of internet use,17 these schoolchil-
dren seemed to be the most common customers in the café. By pro-
viding access to schoolchildren, the internet café owner was aware 
of the resulting low social standing he had in the town.18 In compar-
ison urban areas, where internet cafés were open 24 hours a day,19 in 
Anshan Town the café limited its opening hours to between 07.00 am 
and 10.00 pm daily.
Rural internet cafés are more community- based than their urban 
counterparts, which further raises their status as a ‘commons’ for their 
users. In this respect, they fulfil a wider function than urban internet 
cafés which can be seen more as entertainment centres and therefore 
more likely to be subject to government clampdowns.20
Restrictions on mobile phone use for young people in the town 
were a further example of the kinds of controls that affected social 
media use. Parents believed that mobile phones had an adverse affect 
on their child’s educational achievement, so many would refuse their 
offspring’s requests for phones until they went to university or college. 
Schools were also complicit in enforcing a ban on mobile phones within 
classrooms.21
The cases discussed in this chapter show that the regimes creat-
ing and enforcing these control systems are organised at the state and 
local levels and by internet service providers, social media companies 
and even local businesses and schools. The controls which receive 
the greatest attention outside China – the Great Firewall and deletion 
of social media posts – are the ones that typically concern local peo-
ple the least. However, other systems of control  – such as checking 
users’ ages and restricting access for young people – that act at a local 
level are immediately visible and very important to townsfolk. Some 
of these measures come from people’s own convictions about the 
appropriate use of social media, rather than just from state- imposed 
restrictions.
By looking at the various measures of control enacted over social 
media use at different levels, this section has emphasised the degree 
of collaboration that exists between the Chinese state and families in 
shaping appropriate use of social media. Many of the interventions dis-
cussed, whether implemented by the state or by individuals, are guided 
by moral concerns regarding the potential dangers of social media use 
for families or the state, or sometimes both.
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Appropriate content: propaganda and patriotism
Limiting users’ access to social media platforms, and certain types of 
content appearing within them, was only one aspect of state efforts 
to promote a social media aligned to both state and family interests. 
Another method was by populating these platforms with content  –  
‘propaganda’ and ‘patriotism’ – felt to be commensurate with these aims. 
On occasions this too became a joint activity by both the state and social 
media users, which had the effect of creating a uniquely Chinese social 
media environment in which a series of national values and priorities 
were discussed, shared and instilled.
Tencent news: national news delivery via social media
Examining the way news appears on social media provides a particularly 
good way of understanding propaganda. It should be noted that in China, 
while propaganda frequently ends up forming the basis of news, not all 
news comes from, or is, propaganda. In Chinese, the term ‘propaganda’ 
(xuanchuan) carries less negative connotations than in English, where 
it is commonly associated with intentional misinformation. In contem-
porary China the term ‘propaganda’ is increasingly being used in prac-
tices that are normally associated with ‘public relations’.22 The Anshan 
Town government has its own ‘Propaganda Office’ (xuanchuan bu), 
as do all government departments of a similar level and above. It is 
also very common to see propaganda departments within state-owned 
enterprises and commercial businesses of a similar size. Even placing 
commercial advertising or organising a promotional campaign is often 
referred to as ‘doing propaganda’ (zuo xuanchuan).
QQ and WeChat differ from the most popular non- Chinese social 
media platforms as they are set up, by default, to deliver national news 
items to their users’ mobile devices. These items appear between the 
other conversations in the application (Fig. 6.1). The desktop PC version 
of QQ IM also delivers news headlines to users’ computers in the form of 
an onscreen pop- up that opens when users log in.23
The news headlines and stories that appear in each of these in- app 
news services is not created by external news agencies, but by Tencent 
themselves, through an in- house  ‘Tencent news’ centre. Both platforms 
deliver three news reports daily, with each report normally containing 
four news stories. Occasionally news stories of major national impor-
tance were afforded their own individual posts.
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That these applications are configured to deliver news stories by 
default and interspersed with everyday conversations does not seem to 
pose any major concerns for Anshan Town’s social media users. Nobody 
ever spoke about choosing to deactivate the news reports or associated 
notifications (in contrast to notifications from QQ groups, mentioned 
in Chapter 4). This ambivalence seems to originate in part from a lon-
ger history of the delivery of news to citizens through trusted state- 
approved networks.
Unlike larger Chinese towns and cities, Anshan Town does not 
have any newsstands. Instead, the only way to get a newspaper is 
through a subscription from the town’s Post Office. Large bundles of 
newly printed newspapers are trucked into the town on a daily basis 
and the town’s postmen deliver them to subscribers’ homes by motor-
cycle. Overall, newspaper subscriptions were dwindling for a township 
with a population of 31,000 persons (Table  6.1). The town’s postmen 
vigorously promoted the subscriptions (as they received commission 
on newspapers delivered), and some townsfolk explained that they felt 
obliged to purchase subscriptions in order to stay on good terms with the 
postal workers. Many companies bought several copies to keep in their 
offices. A public noticeboard had also been placed outside the govern-
ment’s Industrial and Commercial Management building on the busy 
Tencent news headlineNormal WeChat contacts
Fig. 6.1 News appearing among recent conversations in WeChat 
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commercial street, inside which pages from the day’s newspapers would 
be pinned for people to read, although few did so.24
Anshan Town citizens are therefore used to news being delivered 
directly to them, and so the appearance of news stories interspersed with 
conversations within a social media app was not viewed as a distraction. 
In fact, many users maintained it was highly ‘convenient’ ( fangbian). Li 
Yan, a 21- year- old university student from Anshan Town, explained:
I won’t go and look at the news on my own accord. WeChat sends 
me news. Everyday it sends me Tencent news. I will just open it and 
look for a while, that’s all.
One feature which distinguished Tencent news on social media from 
newspaper news was the speed with which it was delivered, although 
the content that appeared on these different platforms was by- and- large 
similar. Shop assistant Jiao Yongqi explained:
[Tencent news] is very convenient, if you want to read the newspa-
per, you have to find the paper, to watch the TV [news] you need to 
turn on the TV. You just take your phone, turn it on and you can see 
it. The content is all about the same. It’s just the content is faster 
[via social media]. You have to wait until the afternoon for today’s 
paper to be delivered, whereas with news on the phone you can 
search it anytime.
However, the actual content of news that appeared on Tencent news 
showed that it does occupy a unique position within China’s news eco-
system. Tencent news on QQ mobile and WeChat is noticeably free of 
formal news regarding new government laws and diplomatic meetings 
and official government announcements. Repeated verbatim, this con-
tent tends to dominate the main government- controlled national news 
sources such as China Central Television’s (the state television broad-
caster) National Network TV news (Xinwen Lianbo) and the People’s 
Table 6.1 Newspaper circulation estimates for Anshan Town
Newspaper Daily circulation (copies)
Jinan Daily (Jinan Ribao) 400
Shandong Evening Paper (Qilu Wanbao) 340
Jinan Times (Jinan Shibao) 200
Dazhong Daily (Dazhong Ribao) 160
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Daily newspaper (Renmin Ribao). Likewise Tencent’s coverage differs 
markedly from the newspapers, the majority of which are either local 
papers – which beyond the front pages mainly focus on issues relating 
to the city or province – or the local state party newspaper, Jinan Daily 
(Jinan Ribao), delivered to all government units and state owned enter-
prises in the region, which dryly announces the party line on a number 
of issues.
News that appears in the stories featuring on Tencent News has a 
distinctly mainstream, tabloid flavour. I performed a simple analysis on 
the themes of 50 articles that appeared on WeChat in September 2013, 
which revealed that the majority of the articles featured themes relating 
to criminal and government corruption court cases, sex and scientific/ 
natural discoveries (Fig. 6.2).
Most of the news articles are about crime, and many of them 
appear to emphasise the effectiveness of the justice system, frequently 
showing accused or convicted criminals in court hearings (Fig. 6.3).
Anshan Town people had their own interpretations of the types of 
news that they encountered on social media. Liu Wei, a travelling sales-
man, explained.
I read Tencent news by going on to QQ . . . but in reality it is not 
that good. A  lot of Chinese news is all controlled by the govern-
ment. Real things, the inside story definitely won’t be reported; 
only superficial details will be reported. For example, if there is 
an earthquake there is no number of dead, no clear number of 
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Fig. 6.2 Analysis of themes appearing in Tencent news articles 
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injured, or more people have died. The numbers on Chinese news, 
you can just listen a little to. But if they say one person died, then it 
is possible [that actually] over ten people died.
Wang Gaoshan was also similarly sceptical with regards to these national 
news services, and said that he preferred to use a different online news 
service to obtain news.
China’s news, do you know what it’s called? ‘Political factors’ 
(zhengzhi yinsu). 80 to 90 per cent of it is fake news. National 
Network TV News only says praise (ketao de hua, literally ‘bow-
ing down language’), you don’t know anything. I  like to look at 
‘Little mushroom’ [an alternative online news service]. . . . National 
Network TV News just tells you [the news], swaps between scenes, 
then it’s over. I don’t like that kind of news; I  just like to look at 
interesting [news]. I know that it’s important national news, but in 
reality it has got nothing to do with me.
Other townsfolk suggested that the internet provided a broader range 
of news providers, and some of these were seen to offer different view-
points. People who were particularly interested in politics or who were 
intellectuals often cited the Hong Kong news platform Phoenix news 
(which had a special site for mainland China), as an alternative. As 43- 
year- old male shopkeeper Zhang Lin explained:
There are two main ways I get my news. One is Tencent news, and 
one is Phoenix news. Most is from Phoenix news . . . what’s on it is 
Fig. 6.3 Tencent news articles concerning court proceedings 
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more subjective. I have never used Xinhua news and People’s news 
[both state- run news agencies] websites, including China Central 
Television [China’s state run broadcaster]; they are all the same 
style. All the news Phoenix news publishes in Mainland China has 
been filtered or examined.
Tang Xiaoguang, a 44- year- old male teacher from the local middle 
school, had similar comments.
Speaking from the heart, Phoenix news is a little ‘freer’. It has some 
comments that really are [interesting] . . . Phoenix news’ website 
also has a richer design, it has everything on it.
With cases such as Little mushroom and Phoenix news, social media 
was felt to offer a greater variety of perspectives in comparison to 
those found on traditional media. Individuals like Zhang Lin and Tang 
Xiaoguang, who chose to seek out such news sources tended to be ‘intel-
lectuals’ with relatively humble incomes. However, most people who 
obtained news from social media relied on Tencent News as their pri-
mary source, which was often viewed as being closer to the conservative 
position seen from state news agencies, albeit written in a more interest-
ing and digestible style, and interspersed with celebrity and other news. 
Even though people may have had reservations regarding its authentic-
ity, the fact that every social media user in Anshan Town received this 
news, and the majority read it, meant that it was extremely effective in 
instilling a sense of belonging to the broader Chinese nation.
Local news: The cherry- picking festival
While Tencent news consists of a top- down approach to news deliv-
ery that often acts in support of central government, by contrast local 
government has a very different approach to social media and how to 
manage interactions with individuals and families in Anshan Town. As 
noted in Chapter 2, the Anshan Town government are not very active on 
social media at all. Governmental bodies in the town do not have their 
own official social media accounts, and did not tend to promote their 
activities online via social media. This actually reflects the other ways in 
which the town’s government employees were concerned with limiting 
their contact with townsfolk – such as their reluctance to live in Anshan 
Town itself. While many government workers in the town had their own 
personal social media accounts, here too they seemed cautious about 
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sharing anything work- related on their profile pages. However, despite 
the Anshan Town government making little use of social media, there 
are certain events in which higher bodies – such as county , city or pro-
vincial level government departments – used social media to promote 
and report on events that took place within Anshan Town. One such 
example was the town’s cherry- picking festival. May is cherry- picking 
season in Anshan Town. It is a short harvest, lasting only a month. The 
end of the cherry season is followed by similarly brief but plentiful har-
vests of apricots, peaches and plums (in that order). Most of the cherries 
are picked locally and sold in the fruit markets within Jinan. However, 
some city- dwellers drive to Anshan Town to visit the orchards and expe-
rience picking the ripened cherries themselves. During this period, sev-
eral locals also set up makeshift stalls on the side of the main road into 
town to sell fruit to passing drivers.
Anshan Town’s cherries are one of the area’s ‘local specialities’ 
(difang techang), the others being free- range eggs and sesame oil. It is 
common practice when travelling in China to buy gifts of local speciali-
ties from one’s origin or destination to give to one’s relatives and friends. 
The practice is such that passengers weighed down with numerous large 
presentation boxes of specialities are a common sight at train and bus 
stations. Anshan Town’s cherries have managed to become a moderately 
renowned ‘local speciality’ for the area.
Cherries were not grown in Anshan Town until recently. Around 
2002 the Jinan city  level government spent around 500,000 RMB 
($80,600) in an effort to bring cherry cultivation from Zhaodong 
(another county in Shandong where they had been grown for decades) 
to Anshan Town, as testing had shown that the soil conditions in parts of 
the town were suitable for the cultivation of cherry trees.
A few households in the outlying villages had enjoyed particular 
success in their cherry growing ventures. Some farmers, with around a 
hundred cherry trees, could be expected to generate a turnover in excess 
of 100,000 RMB ($16,120) per year from cherry growing. The local 
government want to encourage more farmers to follow suit, and they 
continue the practice of distributing free cherry seeds to local farmers. 
However, many are unwilling to grow cherries as larger profits can be 
made from cultivating other fruits. In 2014, the Anshan Town govern-
ment, keen to capitalise on the minor fame of the town’s cherries and to 
encourage visitors to the township, inaugurated the town’s first cherry- 
picking festival.
The event was particularly notable because, in contrast to the 
usual absence of Anshan Town government activities on social media, 
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in this case a significant number of postings promoting the government- 
backed cherry- picking festival had been made on the public social plat-
form channel Sina Weibo. A  large number of cherry- picking festival 
posts, featuring splendid images of abundant ripe cherries (Figs 6.4 and 
6.5), originated from, or were shared, by the district  level or city  level 
tourist departments. For example:
Sina Weibo share by @Poly Jinan:  Found out from Bai Town 
county [government] the Bai Town seventh cherry picking festi-
val will be opened in ten days. The main cherry production areas 
of Long’an Town, Shuangde Town and Anshan Town will all hold 
cherry-picking activities. It is understood that the fourth tomato 
festival will be opened at the same time, the two will go to the end 
of May 19. via @Jinan Municipal Bureau of Tourism.
Looking at public Weibo posts, one can see the combination of posts 
made by county  town and city  level government departments (although 
not Anshan Town government itself), and comments and re- posts from 
interested individuals.
Fig. 6.4 Sina Weibo posting shared by Jinan Weibo information. 
Caption reads: ‘The season for eating cherries has once again arrived, 
do you know where to pick them?’ 
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However, it should be remembered that few people within Anshan 
Town actually used the Sina Weibo micro- blogging platforms in compar-
ison to QQ and WeChat (see Chapter 2). Despite the unusual level of pro-
motion this local event received, it is unlikely that Anshan Town people 
actually saw the postings on these channels. The promotion of the event 
to people via Weibo would by and large have reached audiences in urban 
areas such as Bai Town and Jinan, rather than in Anshan Town itself.
The targeting of urban users via social media did not correspond 
with those who attended the grand opening of the cherry- picking festi-
val, which consisted of a ceremony that took place in one of the town-
ship’s outlying mountainous villages a few kilometres from Anshan 
Town itself. The event was held on a flat agricultural plain dotted with 
a few trees and surrounded by gentle hills. In the middle of the field the 
organisers erected a large, red carpeted stage towered over by a red, 
inflatable, semi- circular gate bearing the message ‘Warmly congratulat-
ing Jinan City’s “Bai Town –  Clear Water” inaugural Anshan Town Great 
Leisure Tourism Cherry Picking Festival Grand Opening’. Similar words 
were repeated on the backdrop behind the stage, including billing the 
event as a ‘Cherry Tourism Road Opening Ceremony’ (Fig. 6.6).
Fig. 6.5 Sina Weibo posting promoting Anshan Town cherry- picking 
festival 
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There had been a temple festival the previous day, and the most 
notable thing about the first cherry- picking festival was that – despite 
the extensive coverage on Weibo – it was obvious there were no tourists 
from outside Anshan Town in attendance. Instead there was a smatter-
ing of local businessmen, village leaders, government leaders (including 
those from higher levels of government, such as Bai Town and Jinan) 
and journalists from local TV and radio stations. The audience predom-
inantly consisted of bemused local farmers from nearby villages, who 
had come to witness the unusual spectacle unfolding on their fields.
Xu Meiqin, an employee of the Anshan Town government who was 
working on the event, tried to explain the reason behind promoting the 
event on Weibo. She explained that in cases such as this, the district and 
city  level government departments would ‘give us guidance’ (gei women 
yixie zhidao) on how to publicise. She claimed that the ‘level(s) above’ 
(shangji) could provide support and help them to spread the message 
further. Her comments imply that in addition to expertise, higher lev-
els of government often had greater capabilities and resources that the 
lower levels could make use of.
The example of promotion for the cherry- picking festival suggests 
that the Anshan Town government’s lack of enthusiasm for adopting 
social media emerges in response to a combination of factors. Firstly, 
Fig. 6.6 Anshan Town cherry-picking festival opening ceremony 
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the low proportion of social media uptake among townsfolk (especially 
of social media platforms that allow announcements such as Weibo 
and WeChat’s ‘Subscriptions’ function); secondly, the availability of 
more established media channels (both traditional and new) operated 
by higher levels of government; and thirdly a reluctance to be overtly 
public- facing and engaging.
Although few tourists attended the cherry- picking event despite 
the significant social media activity, there are grounds for suggesting 
these efforts were not a complete failure. The role of the event had been 
for the benefit of higher levels of government, as much as it was for the 
tourists. The festival and associated social media coverage confirmed 
that the local government not only possessed, but were also enacting, 
an ambitious plan for the future that would transform Anshan Town into 
a prosperous, modern, developed and ecological industrial town with 
a booming tourist industry. The event acted as proof that this plan was 
not a far- flung dream, but was coming into being. Social media such as 
Weibo, in addition to traditional media channels, allowed the govern-
ment to share news of this event, which both confirmed these aspira-
tions and the progress towards them, to a perceived ‘wider public’.
Even though the Anshan Town government was averse to setting 
up and using its own official government social media accounts as a way 
to communicate to the public, they were nonetheless happy to involve 
themselves in the higher levels of the state on occasions when their activ-
ities were felt to align particularly well with the national goals of mod-
ernisation and development. In this way both the cherry- picking festival 
itself and the use of social media for its promotion can be understood as 
actions that transgress individual administrative levels of authority, and 
in so doing cultivate the imagined community of the nation state.
Patriotic postings
Another way in which social media posts expressed a sense of belonging 
to a larger national community was through nationalistic and patriotic 
postings. While there were few posts critiquing the party or govern-
ment bodies, most critical posts tend to be focused on the activities of 
corrupt government officials or over- zealous police or city administra-
tion (chengshi guanli) officers. There were very few posts that directly 
criticised the central government, or policies and attitudes of the state. 
There is an argument that even these critical posts should be understood 
as strengthening the sense of belonging in the imagined community of 
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the Chinese nation, in that they target those whose activities are deemed 
to be against the interests of the state overall.
In fact, of the 1,214 posts analysed as described in Chapter 3, only 
six posts were identified as having themes directly centred on politi-
cal figures. All of these were shared memes, rather than original post-
ings, and generally spoke of China’s incumbent and former leaders in 
approving terms (unless they were suspected of corruption). These 
postings included a post featuring archive photos of Chairman Mao at 
different stages of his life, a post with imagery from Chairman Mao’s 
state funeral, a post in support of the prosecution of Bo Xilai for corrup-
tion, a post comparing Xi Jinping (in positive terms) with Bo Xilai (in 
negative terms), and a speculative post regarding the possibility of Xi 
Jinping announcing the end of the legal category ‘small private traders’ 
(getihu).
A good example of such a posting can be seen in Fig. 6.7, which 
was shared by Zhang Meixiang, a 15- year- old middle- school student. 
Fig. 6.7 Meme showing former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao eating in 
a communal canteen 
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It shows a meme containing a photograph of Wen Jiabao, the former 
Chinese Premier. Wen Jiabao attracted public praise within China fol-
lowing the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, when he immediately flew out 
to the area to meet victims and oversee relief work. The text accompa-
nying the meme reads:
If you are a Chinese person. It doesn’t matter how busy you are 
right now. Please stop and take a minute to read this. He [Wen 
Jaibao] possesses a high position and much power, subordinate to 
a single person [implying Hu Jintao, China’s then Chairman and 
leader of the CCP] and superior to many thousands of people. But 
he eats the same dishes as the canteen employees. He is genial and 
diligent with government affairs, loving the people. At the scene of 
every accident in China you can see this old man’s shadow. I do not 
know how many people this photo will move? But at the very least, 
it moved me. This old grandfather will soon retire; he has contrib-
uted to China day after day, night after night. It doesn’t need me to 
say, I believe that everyone has the same view? In a few days it is 
Grandfather Wen’s birthday. Everybody, forward this post of this 
white- haired grandfather and add a message of blessing (zhufu). 
Share a message of health, share! (after you share, your net name 
will change to the rarely seen purple- red colour).25
The plea for the message to be forwarded takes the form of a ‘blessing’ or 
‘well wishes’ (zhufu, literally ‘wish wealth’). The word also has a range 
of religious connotations, being the kind of statement one might hear 
uttered during the burning of incense at a temple festival, or text mes-
sages shared with friends and family during Chinese New Year celebra-
tions. A significant use of such blessings occurs during times of national 
emergency or disasters. Posting blessings and messages of support on 
social media is another way to reinforce the notion of belonging in the 
nation.26 As another person comments, people forward posts for the vic-
tims of disasters (the conversation centred on the Ya’an earthquake in 
this case) because:
It’s probably because it represents a kind of support. The support of 
‘kindly intentions’ is a kind of support. But I’m afraid [this form of 
support] is very small.
Xu Meiqin recounted that she created her own blessing in response to 
the Ya’an earthquake, with the hope of it resonating and being shared.
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I didn’t share [other posts]. On that day I watched the television, 
when I knew the news, I was really sad, I took a phone, and took a 
picture of the television [programme], and said [in the post] ‘Ya’an 
has had an earthquake, lets bless Ya’an’. After some friends for-
warded it. If, let’s say, you want me to forward it, it’s definitely that 
the news, in my opinion, has a different meaning. Or it’s just this 
news is barbaric, horrific. Or if I feel deep hatred and resentment, 
that kind of news. Simply it has to physically resonate with me.
And a further statement from Li Biao, the high school student mentioned 
previously, confirmed this.
The things I share are all interesting occurrences. When it was the 
Ya’an earthquake, one of the classmates in our class set a [Qzone] 
status of ‘Wish blessings to Ya’an’. We all shared it. Afterwards 
classmates from other classes also shared it.
Not everybody agreed on the efficacy of sharing these blessings. For 
example, shop attendant Jiao Yongqi was far more sceptical in this 
regard, commenting that.
I didn’t post anything; it won’t help anything. . . . I’ll just look. I do 
not express any judgements [online]. Also, expressing has no use, 
after you express no- one else will look.
Despite sceptics such as Jiao Yongqi, widespread sharing of this type of 
blessing in response to natural disasters constitutes highly nationalistic 
acts. These posts allow townsfolk to express solidarity with their fellow 
citizens and (many) feel they were able to do something – no matter how 
small – to influence events.
Sometimes nationalistic feeling took the form of antagonism 
towards foreigners. This was particularly so in the case of postings 
featuring anti- Japanese sentiment that appeared on some Qzone and 
WeChat profiles. Anti- Japanese sentiment was common in the town and 
often emerged from a combination of historical distrust towards the 
Japanese government and more recently perceived antagonism regard-
ing the Diaoyu/ Senaku island conflict. These feelings were further 
fuelled by local accounts of Japanese conduct during the anti- Japanese 
war of resistance (1937– 1945) and tales of abuses witnessed first- hand 
by some of the elderly townsfolk. Stories of the town under Japanese 
control told how guards were stationed on the corner of each street, and 
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about horrific executions for acts of resistance. Zhang Baoqi, a travelling 
salesman from the town, once warned, ‘If you are in China and you men-
tion Japan, you will arouse public indignation’.
However emotional, this disdain for Japan was also tempered 
by a grudging respect for various aspects of Japanese culture. These 
conflicting attitudes are encapsulated well by Fig. 6.8, which shows 
a recipe meme shared by a 20- year- old female on her Qzone page. 
The post provides instructions on how to cook Gyudon Beef Bowl, a 
Japanese dish.
Fig. 6.8 Anti- Japanese meme shared on Qzone 
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Make your own Gyudon Beef Bowl!!! Force the little Japanese to go 
to hell!!! There is no need to keep spending so much money going 
to Yoshinoya [the Japanese chain restaurant]!!! Do it yourself at 
home. 5– 6 RMB ($0.81– $0.97) per serving (and twice as much 
meat as Yoshinoya)!!!
While displaying admiration for Japanese cuisine, the post attempts to 
instruct individuals on how to make their own, so that they can avoid 
eating at Yoshinoya, a popular Japanese chain restaurant, and in so 
doing contribute to resisting Japan.
The fact that this type of highly political posting is permitted while 
others are not reflects how nationalism is tacitly allowed, even encour-
aged, within China’s digital spaces. Separate research has shown that 
the Chinese authorities apply a mass- media model to popular websites 
with content concerning national history and identity, which effectively 
‘reproduces the very logic of “imagined communities” that makes rec-
onciliation of historical disputes in East Asia so protracted’.27 Other 
research has noted that online nationalism in China has grown beyond 
its origins as bulletin board services operated by universities and that 
while government and commercial bodies play a role in steering these 
nationalistic discourses, loosely- organised ‘ground up’ nationalistic 
websites are also emerging.28 The case of Anshan Town demonstrates 
how such postings appear on mainstream social media, albeit in a less 
orchestrated fashion that reflects the personal sentiment of individuals. 
People’s desire to re- interpret and reproduce these posts speaks to the 
effectiveness of nationalistic postings on social media and elsewhere 
online (in addition to other offline media) in normalising such expres-
sive behaviour on the internet.
In summary, patriotic and nationalistic posts made or shared by 
users in Anshan Town are seen to operate on three different levels: firstly, 
as in the example regarding Premier Wen (Fig. 6.7), expressing admira-
tion for central party leaders (past and present); secondly, expressing 
national pride and solidarity, particularly towards fellow citizens at 
times of natural disaster; thirdly, against common enemies, especially 
the Japanese. Social media has become an appropriate place for towns-
people to express their membership of this ‘imagined community’ 29 of a 
wider Chinese nation. Far from being passive receivers of propaganda 
and nationalist discourse, many social media users in the town used 
the platforms to play an active part and contribute to it. In this case the 
intense social feelings that are attached to history are not only read, but 
also ‘resonated’ by individual users back into social media, amplifying 
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them and making their individual acts of sharing also a social act, ones 
that speak to the higher social collective of the nation.30
This sense of collectivity shapes interactions with strangers 
through social media, ensuring a degree of commonality between those 
who meet online. Because Chinese social media platforms are almost 
entirely dominated by Chinese users, most of these interactions are 
likely to be with people who share a familiar cultural background and 
at least some common values. The strangers that one meets online will 
never be too strange.
The opposition in this chapter to an emphasis of understanding 
social media through overtly political postings may be complemented 
by a return to what the evidence suggests social media is doing. At all 
levels – from the state to the individual – we see a consistent concern to 
express the importance of morality, and the creation of a ‘moral internet’ 
related to moral persons, moral citizens and moral families. We also see 
social media being used by individuals to identify with a broader notion 
of the familial nation state, not so surprising in a region influenced by 
Confucius where there has been continuity in the idiom of patriarchy 
from the family through to the state.
Under these circumstances, that the Chinese government may be 
seeking to use the internet to exert its influence upon individuals and 
families may be seen as largely unsurprising. The state has sought to 
exert control over families in multiple ways, including through limit-
ing mobility,31 family planning,32 education,33 propaganda, labour and 
architecture.34 This means that when social media suddenly appears in 
a place like Anshan Town, it is easy for individuals to seize on specific 
aspects (such as the platform’s effect on educational achievement, or on 
marriage) and use these to castigate the platform as a whole. This effect 
is exacerbated by the fact that younger people are enthusiastic adopt-
ers, while the older generations are likely to feel some concern and keep 
their distance from social media.
In these circumstances, the government (at various different 
levels) is faced with the difficult task of managing the introduction of 
social computer networks into society – a move which is understood 
to be vital for the country’s continued development. From the per-
spective of young people in China, improved networks and greater 
access cannot come soon enough, while parents, conversely, hope to 
see the networks contained, controlled and managed. However, such 
is the popularity (and utility) of social media platforms in China that 
attempting to limit their growth is akin to trying to pushing water up 
a hill.
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The real problem therefore becomes how to make social media 
platforms palatable to conservative parents and grandparents. Controls 
on access and the deliberate production of appropriate content are partly 
aimed at satisfying the older generations’ desire for the government 
to intervene to make the internet a more ‘civilised’ and moral place. 
It hardly matters that many of the controls are ineffectual and young 
social media users often find ways to circumvent them.
Efforts to restrict the internet are thus only ever piecemeal, which 
may explain why on occasion a decision to implement controls only par-
tially (for instance by lending identity cards to underage users in the 
town’s internet café) is a deliberate one, aimed at ameliorating the some-
times diverging expectations between government and individual users. 
At the moment, the state has mainly choosen a reactionary approach, 
focusing on control and constraint of social media. This could be seen 
as the most cautious path that the state could take in incorporating this 
new form of communication technology into the nation. However, in 
considering the remit, scope and target of restrictions placed on Chinese 
social media, the majority of such controls detailed in this section are 
aimed at preventing or limiting access to certain kinds of content. I sug-
gest these restrictions should be considered alongside the limits that are 
placed on economic aspects of social media use, which carry a different 
set of moral concerns, but could be central to transforming the perceived 
influence of social media on the family and state.
Monetised media: business and friendship  
on social media
In China it may be said that what is generally regarded as the political 
domain is actually often subservient to a much larger concern – the eco-
nomic domain. In the vast transformations of the past century, whether 
first to communism or later toward modernity and reform, the effective 
mode has been via economic transformation. China’s economic reforms, 
implemented by Deng Xiaoping following the death of Chairman 
Mao, have brought unprecedented change to the country. While these 
reforms represent the adoption of a number of the elements of capitalist 
market economy, they were always billed as being ‘socialism with spe-
cial Chinese characteristics’ (zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi). The phrasing 
allowed the implementation of sweeping economic and social reform 
without having to directly acknowledge the large- scale abandonment of 
many of the socialist ideals of the past.
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This remarkable economic transition extends right down to 
Anshan Town itself, where being industrious, doing business and 
earning money are major parts of people’s lives and are seen as being 
extremely desirable personal qualities. This attitude was reflected in 
the previous chapter in the discussion of how the entrepreneurial ethic 
came to be expressed online on social media. A large number of farmers 
are actively engaged in the market economy. Many sell high- priced fruit 
and surplus crops that they have grown. Many farmers (mostly male) 
preferred to work as manual labour in the town’s factories in order to 
earn more than they might do working in agriculture, leaving their 
wives responsible for tending vegetables for most of the year (in addition 
to the considerable burdens of housework). Through this employment, 
the factories made a significant contribution to the local economy. The 
town itself was full of retail outlets, selling everything from groceries 
to clothes to motorcycles. Anshan Town residents were, in many ways, 
acutely aware of their participation in the regional, national and global 
economies. A proportion of internet users also sought to extend their 
entrepreneurial ethic to their use of social media. The previous chapter 
looked at users for whom this took the form of level accumulation; for 
others it involved trying to extend their business activities into online 
spaces.
Social media for promotion
There were already instances of small businesses in Anshan Town, such 
as restaurants and shops, using social media within their everyday oper-
ations, although using social media as a channel to promote their activ-
ities was altogether less common. Neither Qzone nor WeChat have the 
ability to easily create business pages35 in the same way that Facebook 
offers. One user, Li Ming, who runs a restaurant in the town, set his per-
sonal profile name to that of his restaurant. For a period, his WeChat 
profile picture was a photograph of his restaurant storefront. Li Ming 
hoped that by doing this, people who were visiting the town might see 
his WeChat profile online via the ‘People Nearby’ function, and if they 
happened to be looking for somewhere to eat, they might contact him 
and then come for a meal. He explained that since he had set up the 
profile, one or two people had, indeed, become aware of his restaurant 
this way and had come to eat at his restaurant. However, he expressed 
disappointment that his online presence had not elicited more custom. 
Li Ming eventually gave up on this approach, instead using an image of 
himself as his profile picture.
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Another example was Gao Jianguo, who ran a photocopy/ print-
ing shop within the town. Like Li Ming, Gao Jianguo also set his QQ 
alias as his company’s name and used an image of his shop front as his 
profile image.36 In the case of Gao, social media was more immediately 
relevant to his business. Although most people came directly to the 
store in order to print things off, usually armed with a USB key con-
taining the relevant files customers also sometimes sent him the files 
for printing via QQ. QQ was thus used as a business page in order to 
aide communication and to increase visibility to potential customers.
There were also instances of people using social media platforms 
themselves to sell specific products. One example is a woman whose 
father was a retired carpenter. Her home featured a beautiful bed that 
her father had made by hand. She placed an advert on her Qzone con-
taining a photo of the bed, saying ‘if anyone is interested in buying one 
call me on this number . . . ’. One small company in the town that spe-
cialised in selling steel to the town’s factories for use in the manufac-
turing process attempted to promote their business through WeChat 
group messages. The company used the group message function to 
regularly send the wholesale prices of metal (i.e. per tonne) to buyers 
in each of the factories to keep them updated on changing prices.
All three of these examples show the willingness of townsfolk to 
utilise social media platforms for their own business purposes. For these 
small local businesses, social media was the preferred way to both pro-
mote one’s business and to communicate with customers. However, per-
sonal accounts and business accounts were often indistinguishable from 
one another, again reflecting the fact that personal relations were seen 
to form an integral part of business relations.
Taobao
As already noted, there are very strong links between the development 
of social media sites more generally and that of Taobao, a popular online 
shopping website that operates in a similar way to Amazon Marketplace. 
For a 1,000 RMB ($161) returnable deposit, it allows people to set up 
their own store where they are able to sell products. In some ways the 
overlap with more conventional social media is more apparent than it is 
with Amazon Marketplace because Taobao has a strong social element to 
it. It features a chat client called ‘Prosperous Ali’ (a’li wangwang), which 
allows potential customers to chat directly with store owners. Rather 
than customer –  storeowner dialogue on Prosperous Ali being confined 
to issues of post- sale customer support, a significant amount of dialogue 
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is conducted prior to the sale. Many sellers receive messages from cus-
tomers prior to purchase checking whether they have a particular item 
in stock, and customers will often attempt to negotiate a discount on the 
listed price.
During the field work I  only met one woman in Anshan Town, 
Wang Miao, who operated her own Taobao store. Wang Miao was a 
Chinese medicine doctor in the town’s hospital; however, she also ran 
a small clothes shop in Anshan Town, selling children’s clothes in part-
nership with her sister. Her online Taobao store also sold clothes, how-
ever in contrast with the actual store she operated in Anshan Town, 
none of the clothes on her online store were actually owned by her. 
Instead, she acted as an agent, selling on clothing for another person 
who was located in another city in China. Each time Wang Miao made 
a sale on her online store, she messaged the person, who fulfilled the 
order and electronically transferred a small portion of the profits to 
Wang Miao’s account. The person who fulfilled the order had their own 
online store on Taobao; however by having multiple stores offering 
their products, the main seller increased the potential range of people 
who could receive such offers. Nonetheless, Wang Miao reported that 
sales through this channel were minimal, and towards the end of my 
field work she closed her online store, as she felt it required too much 
time to maintain.
In contrast to selling online, buying from Taobao is common 
among Anshan Town people. Over the period of field work shopping 
via Taobao became an increasingly popular activity. One of the major 
transitions was the opening of a ‘Taobao assisted buying shop’ on the 
town’s Commercial Street during the field work. The shop, run by a local 
family, served to reduce two barriers that discouraged townsfolk from 
buying online:  the expense of getting items delivered, and the lack of 
trust involved in conducting online transactions with strangers.
The opening of the ‘Taobao assisted buying shop’ broke the 
monopoly on delivery services held by the town’s Post Office. Prior to 
the store opening, the Post Office (operated by China Post, the state 
Post Office) was the only officially recognised parcel delivery service. 
In contrast, large cities offered greater choice, with several private 
couriers offering delivery that is both cheaper and faster than China 
Post. These courier companies are able to offer superior service by lim-
iting their coverage to cities and large urban towns, such as Bai Town. 
By not offering delivery to smaller, poorer places such as Anshan Town 
(where there are fewer customers posting items, and fuel and delivery 
costs are high), the couriers keep their overheads to a minimum. The 
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‘Taobao assisted buying shop’ services the final stage of the delivery 
process  – between Bai Town and Anshan Town  – which the couriers 
had deemed to be unprofitable. Each day the shop owners drive to Bai 
Town, visiting the delivery offices of each courier company and pick 
up all packages destined for Anshan Town. On return to Anshan Town, 
recipients are called and told to pick up their goods from the shop on 
the town’s Commercial Street. The courier companies pay the shop 1 
RMB ($0.16) for each item they deliver. For the residents of Anshan 
Town, being able to pick up their items from the store in Anshan Town 
is far preferable to travelling to Bai Town to pick up the package in 
person.
The ‘Taobao assisted buying shop’ offers a further convenience for 
users, helping them to make the purchases in the first place by providing 
a way for users to overcome issues of trust. Customers can use one of two 
computers located in the store to browse through the Taobao site them-
selves, and to select goods for purchase. The store owner helps to intro-
duce users to the site and provides guidance on how to talk to the seller 
using a’li wangwang to negotiate a discount. Furthermore, instead of 
paying using their own credit cards or online bank accounts, customers 
were able to pay the Taobao store in cash (for a percentage fee of the total 
cost of the product). The store owner then used their own bank account 
to pay for the items. Many of the people who made use of the store’s 
assisted purchasing service tended to be young people, mostly middle 
school students and young mothers. Visitor numbers swell during the 
school’s break and lunchtimes, when students from the school opposite 
visit to make purchases. These people often do not have bank accounts, 
or do not trust online purchasing, so have not yet activated this feature 
of their bank account.
The storeowner keeps a record whenever they buy items on behalf 
of customers, so that when the package arrives they know who to pass 
it on to. Examining this record revealed the low value of many items 
purchased. Of a random selection of 44 different items purchased by 15 
different customers, the average item cost was 33 RMB ($5), with the 
most and least expensive individual items costing 6 RMB ($0.96) and 
178 RMB ($29) respectively. The majority of items purchased through 
the store were clothes, shoes and accessories.
In this case, it was the familiarity of the local owner of the Taobao 
store that helped to allay users’ fears around conducting online trans-
actions with strangers. The store owner was as a member of a known 
family from the town, and therefore users were happy to conduct trans-
actions through this individual, even if the end user was not known.
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In this economic arena the particular character of Chinese social 
media seems to find its niche. In China there is always a duality between 
the social and the economic and a preference for a more socialised form 
of exchange, which may explain why people seem to be increasingly 
willing to spend their money on these platforms. There is also increas-
ing willingness to try to make money out of online platforms, as evi-
denced by Wang Miao’s online clothes store and both Li Ming and Gao 
Jianguo’s use of social media profiles to promote their businesses within 
the town itself. It is worth noting how this is the opposite of the impact of 
the internet on commerce in the West, where sites such as Amazon rep-
resent a further de- socialising of commerce when compared to offline 
shopping.37
Conclusion: Making social media  
moral – from content to commerce
This chapter has examined the relationship between the family and 
the state in the context of various controls that are placed on social 
media in an attempt to produce a morally acceptable online space, 
which is perceived to be in the best interests of both of parties. The 
chapter has examined how Anshan Town people themselves experi-
ence attempts to control both access to and content on social media, 
through measures such as the Golden Shield project, deletion of posts 
deemed inappropriate and self- censorship. The production of con-
tent  – both propaganda in the form of news and patriotic postings 
made by users – were also found to be an activity directed towards 
creating an ‘imagined community’ of online users of social media. 
This in turn provided the conditions for interactions among strangers 
online. In all of these cases specific forms of content and usage are 
being encouraged with the aim of promoting shared national values 
and ideals. However, rather than this being a ‘top down’ activity, users 
also play an active role in the production of appropriate content. In 
this way, the state and the family collaborate to produce a social media 
containing information that is understood to support and strengthen 
the values and ideals of both parties.
Considering social media’s role in the economic sphere provides 
an important counterpoint to these concerns around content. Chinese 
social media platforms have been incredibly successful at monetising 
their services. Chapter  5 noted the presence of paid- for membership 
schemes and add- ons on social media, and the high proportion of young 
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people who had subscribed to these premium services at one time or 
another. The fact that the platforms are capable of generating such reve-
nue can be seen as a further motivation for the Golden Shield: it ensures 
that Chinese internet users’ money remains in the domestic economy – 
largely spent on gaming and services offered by local internet compa-
nies – rather than going to foreign firms.
Chinese social media users are accustomed to the fact that they 
may have to pay for part of their social media use. However, this chapter 
has also revealed an interest in and willingness among significant num-
bers of social media users in Anshan Town to explore the possibilities of 
these platforms for business purposes. The desire to exploit social media 
to make money is not necessarily individualistic; it actually reflects the 
fact that entrepreneurship and the earning of money is perceived to be 
aligned with the ideal of the corporate family.38 However, to date, the 
flow of money for social media users in Anshan Town has largely been 
an outward one,  with money from the users being spent on internet 
access, virtual goods and subscriptions. Currently these highly mone-
tised social media platforms are seen to encourage the flow of money 
away from users towards the social media companies themselves. Young 
people’s spending on such items – in terms of money and time – has also 
caused a certain amount of conflict within families: it is seen as wasteful 
and undesirable. Investment in an education is widely held to produce 
moral persons capable of contributing to the nation and of returning 
financial gains to the family and parents in their old age. If there were 
more opportunities for young people to use social media to earn ‘real’ 
money, rather than to spend it on what parents view as being idle ‘enter-
tainment’, then the potential utility of social media may become appar-
ent to those parents.
It seems that the challenge at the present time is to design plat-
forms that allow people to engage in commerce and conduct transac-
tions. WeChat has gone some way to doing this with the development 
of the WeChat wallet, which allows users to move money between peo-
ple. Taobao also has a similar escrow service named Alipay (zhifubao) 
that is also popular. What users in Anshan Town seem to desire is an 
adjustment to the platforms so that users have greater opportunities 
to earn money through these channels. If those who command power 
over China’s internet and social media infrastructures were to consider 
this as a potential alternative to more tried- and- tested controls over 
access to information, they may find the internet to be an altogether less 
problematic beast.
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Conclusion: Circles and strangers, 
media moralities and ‘the Chinese 
internet’
This book has examined the impact of social media in contemporary rural 
China by giving an ethnographic account of its use and consequences in 
Anshan Town, exploring its wide- reaching influence on friendship, mar-
riage, family life, education, consumption, politics and economics. The 
volume began with the case of Li Kang, a young man who had deleted his 
WeChat account in order to prevent his wife discovering he chatted with 
other women via the platform – behaviour that contrasted sharply with 
the family- oriented and moralistic postings he shared with his friends 
via his QQ feed. Returning to this example in light of the material pre-
sented here, we can now better understand these apparently contradic-
tory behaviours. The appeal of these platforms to people such as Li Kang 
can be seen to lie in the opportunity they offer individuals to explore 
such inconsistencies within their own lives.
The book has described the characteristics of China’s social media 
platforms and their users, and illustrated this with valuable contextu-
alised accounts gathered during an extended period of ethnographic 
engagement. These accounts detail how and why participants’ social 
media contacts are predominantly drawn from classmates and people 
from established offline social networks, and why, with these people in 
mind, postings are of a highly moralistic nature. There is a ready avail-
ability of stranger- finding features on popular social media platforms, 
and yet the book has been able to show how all of these features relate 
to a strong moral framework in Anshan Town, where the ‘traditional’ 
values of family and integrity are felt by townsfolk to distinguish them 
from other Chinese people.
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In this chapter I  will draw together three key themes of inquiry 
that were introduced in Chapter 1 – circles and strangers, morality and 
‘the Chinese internet’ – and discuss the main implications of these find-
ings. I will first summarise the importance of the circles of contacts and 
strangers and discuss its consequences for the understanding of social 
relationships in China, by arguing that Anshan Town people’s desire for 
these relationships reflects a growing individualism. Secondly, I  will 
consider the interaction between social media and the strong and per-
vasive moral frameworks that exist in the town. Finally, I will examine 
how the case of Anshan Town can help to create a more accurate picture 
of ‘the Chinese internet’ and particularly its social media, highlighting 
the key challenges to current understandings that are raised by the 
ethnographic data.
Circles and strangers: individualistic relations
Relationships based on circles of friends or of strangers, mediated by 
social media, have featured prominently throughout this volume. Up to 
now, they have largely been treated as being in opposition to each other. 
Indeed this is how they have been viewed in important anthropological 
accounts to date (as discussed in Chapter 4), and also sometimes how 
people in the town speak about strangers in comparison to ‘normal’ rela-
tionships with their friends and families. However, taking these two sets 
of relations and considering what they mean as a whole, I argue, reveals 
that social relations in contemporary rural China are becoming more 
individualistic in nature as people seek to construct their own personal 
and selective spheres of relationships. In the following section I  will 
show how relations with both circles of friends and strangers are forms 
of these more individualistic relations.
This finding partially corresponds with the work of Yan Yunxiang, 
who has argued that increasing individualisation in China combines 
with  cultural democracy and the lack of a welfare state to create a 
diminished notion of individualism that is far more utilitarian and self-
ish in nature than that seen in other modernising societies.1 This, he 
argues, accounts for the absence of trust and the competitive nature of 
Chinese society. While I  think specific online relationships in Anshan 
Town are indicative of the increasing importance of individualism as 
people are able to personally structure their online relationships, I am 
less convinced that this can be attributed to individualism understood 
as extreme selfishness, resulting in ‘egotistic’ and ‘uncivil’ individuals. 
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The evidence suggests not only a willingness to trust both friends and 
strangers, but also strong ideals surrounding the morality of social 
media use.2 As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is not that individuals have 
necessarily ‘lost’ their morals, it is simply that these morals have under-
gone a change.3 In part this was shown by the way individuals attempted 
to balance the relationships between circles of friends and strangers 
within the same online space. I argue that although both sets of relation-
ships are insular to varying degrees, it is through juxtaposing them that 
Anshan Town’s social media users can explore and navigate the mean-
ing of moral change.
In the case of relations within circles of friends, many of the con-
nections already possessed an inward- facing quality, as these non- kin 
friendships are based on familiarity. Chapter 2 outlined the importance 
of specific regimes of visibility afforded by social media platforms, 
which provide favourable conditions for sociality among circles of 
friends, rather than the wider internet. Chapter 3 examined the highly 
family- oriented and moralistic postings that indicate moral worth to 
one’s peers, confirming the significance of social media as a platform for 
interaction with a known circle of acquaintances. The clearest example 
came from Chapter 4, which demonstrated that friendship relations sus-
tained on social media are based on the principle of commonality (tong) 
which has traditionally formed the basis for non- kin guanxi relations 
drawn from common class, home- town or work acquaintances.4 Taken 
as a whole, social media has allowed for a continuity of these relation-
ships, which already represented somewhat closed and intimate groups.
However, in many ways social media has strengthened these 
groups and relations and led them to become more insular than before. 
Examples can be seen in the classmate groups on QQ, which enabled 
groups to continue beyond the school walls, facilitating reunions after 
graduation (Chapter 4). Although the frequent use of avatars and aliases 
appeared to add a layer of invisibility, it actually increased intimacy 
by presuming familiarity among people already known to each other. 
Chapter  5 showed how the practice of level accumulation on social 
media introduced elements of competition and hierarchy into these cir-
cles of friends. The evidence presented suggests that relationships are in 
fact becoming intensified, but are also more individualistic as a result of 
social media.
On initial inspection, relations with strangers through social media 
seem to be the opposite of these familiar relationships, allowing people 
to connect with individuals located completely outside the bounds of 
traditional familiar relations. Chapter  4 showed how elementary and 
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middle schoolchildren found it relatively easy to connect to and interact 
with strangers through the process of ‘messily adding’. Older university 
students from the town took this a stage further, using location- aware 
features on social media for the purposes of dating. On the one hand, 
these behaviours seem to be the antithesis of ‘traditional’ relations, for 
example by threatening the supposedly inviolable nature of monoga-
mous marriage. Stranger relations thus represented a challenge to pop-
ular discourse about the types of relationships felt to be permissible in 
social life, but also to foundational theories of social relations in China 
that have understood strangers as being the antithesis to relations based 
on kinship or familiarity.5
However, although relations with strangers may seem to be a rad-
ical alternative form of sociality, which sees individuals break through 
the boundaries of traditional familiar relationships, they can be viewed 
as a move towards a more individualistic- oriented network, as individ-
uals seek to exert greater control over their own social worlds. Many of 
the interactions that individuals pursue with strangers appeal precisely 
because they are free of mutual connections, providing relief from the 
constraints of familiar relationships that are governed by moral obli-
gation and concern for reputation. Chapter 4 also described how indi-
viduals may use encounters with strangers for anything from seeking 
romantic relations to talking about one’s problems, or sometimes simply 
relieving boredom. Therefore, although the numerous encounters with 
strangers that individuals undertake online are a form of exploration 
and a source of novelty, they are voluntary, reflecting an individual’s 
choice of who to befriend. In comparison, networks of obligation are 
determined by circumstance  – epitomised by kinship or familiar non- 
kin relations.
As people turn inwards in their relationships, family relations 
in particular have been shown to sit uneasily within the environment 
of social media. Family connections are not completely absent from 
social media, but they certainly do not occupy a central position in 
the sociality on these platforms in the same way as familiar non- kin 
relations, such as classmates or work colleagues. Indeed, there are far 
fewer interactions between generations, and within marriage such use 
is discouraged. Instead, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, idealistic notions 
of family are strongly expressed in the form of baby photos, romantic 
memes focused on marriage and messages of adoration towards one’s 
parents – all of which are unlikely to actually be viewed by family mem-
bers. Concern around social media use and its effect on the family is not 
entirely without basis. The turn towards sets of relationships dictated 
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by individuals’ personal desires can represent a departure from, or even 
a threat to, relationships within the family, which assume each person 
occupies a fixed and indisputable position in a social hierarchy by vir-
tue of their birth and gender.
Anshan Town users can juxtapose relations with friends against 
relations with strangers and this may be where the appeal of social 
media lies. I  have demonstrated how both sets of relationships point 
towards an inward turn among Chinese social users, in which individ-
uals are seeking to focus upon that set of social relations which increas-
ingly derive from personal choice. However, this inward turn does not 
necessarily mean that individuals are becoming ‘less social’ or are losing 
the ability to communicate, as espoused by some scholars critical of the 
influence of social media.6 Instead it must be acknowledged that social 
media users are intentionally crafting an online environment where 
they seek intense forms of sociality, which also involves being able to 
contrast and move between the different experiences found in different 
forms of relations. Anshan Town’s social media users are intentionally 
using the shielded world of social media as a space where they can crea-
tively bring these oppositions together, explore their contradictions and 
create their own intimate sphere of relations. In relation to individual-
ism, this supports the idea of a more individual focus as they are choos-
ing their own relationships and not just accepting the dictates of kinship, 
but, on the other hand, it is not making people more individualistic in 
the sense that they are becoming less social.
This inward turn in relations has important implications for how 
we understand the experience of everyday life in rural China. People 
are willing to think of themselves as part of an ‘imagined community’, 
as shown by the patriotic posts, and they use this as a basis of familiarity 
upon which they build relations with strangers. One of the key questions 
of this inward turn in relations is how it affects the way in which indi-
viduals understand and come to moral decisions about the world they 
live in.
Media moralities
The old Taoist temple, perched high in the mountain on the town’s east-
ern boundary, was one of my favourite spots in Anshan Town, offering a 
spectacular vantage point from which to view the town below. On visit-
ing the temple I would often call in on Priest Wang, who occupied one of 
the temple buildings. Priest Wang always dresses in white Daoist robes 
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and speaks in a calm, balanced and reflective manner, having clearly 
benefited from spending the best part of his life ensconced on the hill-
side, reflecting on the nature of existence.
Despite his traditional appearance, Priest Wang does not shy away 
from new technologies. Whenever he sits down at a table he pulls out 
a large, glistening Samsung smartphone from the deep pocket of his 
priestly gown and gently places it in front of his person. Although the 
distinct sounds of QQ and WeChat message notifications sporadically 
emerge from his phone, he nevertheless resists the temptation to impul-
sively read such messages, instead concentrating intently on whoever he 
is conversing with at the time. On asking Priest Wang what he thought of 
social media, he gave a typically measured answer, doubtless informed 
by his Daoist worldview: ‘All things have their good side, and they have 
their bad side. . . . What is important is how you use them.’ Priest Wang’s 
advice is worth bearing in mind when it comes to making conclusions 
regarding the impact of social media on the lives of Anshan Town inhab-
itants, and the broader consequences of this technology for China and 
humankind more generally.
Chapter 1 noted that scholarly discussion on the impact of social 
media (and the internet more generally) tends to be dominated by 
approaches which assume a technology is inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This 
volume has sought to shy away from such simple judgements, instead 
calling upon ethnographic engagement to illustrate the varied use and 
multiple and contradictory effects of social media on the lives of the 
townsfolk. In other words, I  have tried to understand the morality of 
media by looking beyond the media itself, and to consider the wider eth-
ical underpinnings of the context in which it is found.
The presence of Priest Wang overlooking the town also helps us 
recognise the special context for this study. Most people in China are 
Chinese by default, but they do not necessarily bear a great personal 
responsibility for embodying or representing China, or Chinese values. 
The people of Anshan Town are different from many others, because 
they acutely recognise this responsibility: not to represent China or the 
Chinese as a whole, but rather a version of it that is embodied by their 
own understandings of what constitutes Confucianism, Daoism and 
socialism.
So the dilemma considered in this book is how does a population 
that is defined by its embodiment of classical values and moralities 
respond to a technology most closely associated with radical change? 
In addition, social media is often seen as destructive of tradition. In 
this book we do not find a single or simple answer. Instead we see a 
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number of different ways in which the population creatively develop 
an appropriation of social media that suits their situation. These varied 
responses reflect the fact that rather than the Confucian, Daoist and 
socialist pasts being experienced as fixed and stable, or even as hege-
monic conservative norms, they appear as points of reference within 
the moral frameworks which townsfolk construct in response to their 
social situations and the modernity of everyday life. In so doing, the 
character of these traditions themselves is also open to reinterpretation 
and change.
The first, and perhaps most straightforward, response is simply to 
find ways in which social media can come to express and facilitate tradi-
tional values and moralities: the threat is turned into a supportive tool. 
In Chapter  3’s analysis of visual postings demonstrated how the two 
main genres  – baby photos and idealised romantic relationships  – are 
inherently about conservative values, which could be linked to parent– 
child reciprocity7 and the perceived inviolability of marriage.8 In the 
same chapter, postings in which children express devotion to their par-
ents, despite the parents being unable to see these messages, is further 
evidence of using social media postings as a means to establish one’s 
own moral value among one’s peers.
Chapter 4 showed how the different types of social relationships 
fostered by social media use in China are also felt to reflect the morality 
of the user that engages in them. Circles of friends mainly consisting 
of familiar non- kin relations – classmates, work colleagues and people 
from one’s hometown – are felt to be relatively unproblematic. However, 
far more ambiguous online relations with strangers has led to social 
media often being  stigmatised within married couples as inherently 
immoral and damaging to the stability of families.
Chapter  5 looked at level accumulation, describing how social 
media users turned the practice of collecting virtual currency and levels 
online into a moral activity by emphasising its entrepreneurial nature, 
even if this involved using money to purchase levels or manipulating 
the system in other ways. The emphasis on moving up levels seems to 
fall between an obsession with progress through meritocracy  – that 
was foundational to education and bureaucratic governance – and the 
new status aspirations of consumer materialism. The intense interest 
of (often young) people in these activities was felt by older generations 
to be especially problematic, adding to their general distrust of social 
media as a whole.
Chapter  6 described how the broader moral stigmatisation of 
social media raised in Chapters  4 and 5 brings together the state and 
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the local population, allowing both to form moral judgements about 
modern social media and assert the need to control it. Social media is 
part of a long- term project in which the current Chinese government has 
sought to draw upon and reinforce an idiom of patriarchy. This extends 
from the proper moral family through to the proper moral state, so that 
the concept of duty can be consistently applied at all levels, with social 
media forming part of a moral internet. In Anshan Town there was evi-
dence that this drive was coming from below as well as from above. 
Attempts to control social media content were contrasted in Chapter 6 
with a less confrontational mode of activity: the growing interest among 
some media users to appropriate these platforms for their own economic 
purposes, recollecting the theme of entrepreneurship as a moral activity 
highlighted in Chapter 5.
In this volume the evidence that social media can be turned into 
an instrument of moral tradition and conservatism is tempered by an 
equally important role for social media as the instrument of transforma-
tion and change. Social media itself represents change but it has arrived 
in China at a time of radical change, when many areas of life and socie-
tal values are being reconfigured. Social media has been shown to have 
a dual role in social transformation, allowing individuals both to imag-
ine alternative moral and social possibilities, and also to experiment in 
engaging with such potential.
This research largely agrees with Priest Wang that social media is 
neither inherently good nor bad. Morality is implicated in social media 
in far more complex ways than the innate qualities of the technologies 
themselves. For example it can be seen in such as usage behaviour, 
the types of relationships formed, the consequences for education and 
work, and the messages and ideals that are disseminated through the 
platform. Anshan Town’s distinctive cultural heritage also informs 
these moral discourses, but these actions simply cannot be separated 
from the tremendous social and cultural changes occurring in the town 
at the present time: improving urban linkages, migration, engagement 
in industrial labour, increasing prevalence of consumer goods. The fact 
that townsfolk use social media as a means to understand and think 
through morality is thus significant in that it supports a range of recent 
ethnographic studies emphasising the importance of the ethical in ordi-
nary Chinese life.9 Examining social media arguably acts as an ideal per-
spective on social change because the multi- faceted functionality and 
widespread and differentiated use of information and communication 
technologies evoke a range of moral issues that define contemporary 
social experience in China today.
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Understanding ‘the Chinese internet’  
and its social media
Both the specific social relations (with circles of friends and with strang-
ers) and the moral dilemmas raised by social media, which have been 
the major themes of this study, are relevant when it comes to drawing 
broader conclusions about the nature of ‘the Chinese internet’ and its 
social media platforms. Examining media use in relation to these aspects 
of social life allows for a more intimate perspective on the concerns and 
motivations of the users, which can in turn help to challenge conven-
tional understandings of such media.
One of the key findings of this volume has been the high degree 
of difference and autonomy that Chinese social media has compared to 
the other countries in the larger research project of which this study is a 
part.10 This distinctiveness may be expected given the Chinese govern-
ment’s authoritarian control over the internet; it has sought to mould 
what it considers an appropriate online space, in which non- Chinese 
social media platforms have gradually been ostracised while domestic 
platforms have been allowed to flourish. However, the idiosyncratic 
nature of Chinese social media cannot be solely attributed to the plat-
forms themselves. The reasons for these differences are in fact more 
complex. This study has shown that any understanding of the conse-
quences of a new communication technology for a particular society 
must include a consideration of how individuals from that society cre-
atively put these technologies to use in their everyday lives.11
Chapter 2 included a description of some of the key features of the 
social media platforms used by people in Anshan Town which started 
to build a detailed understanding of the social behaviours, relation-
ships and moral issues emerging from their use.12 The limited visibility 
afforded by the most popular platforms helped to make clear the primary 
audience of known friends for sharing posts online, while also enabling 
relations with strangers to be concealed from one’s other acquaintances. 
Location- aware stranger finding services built into the same platform 
indicated users’ willingness to juxtapose these two sets of relations. The 
overt nature of level-accumulation systems on QQ, Qzone and other 
platforms (Chapter 4) raised questions about the ethics of social differ-
entiation and monetisation within social relationships. However, it was 
only through observing and discussing with participants how they made 
use of these features that it become possible to draw firm conclusions as 
to their relevance.
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Thinking through both the platforms themselves and their use – 
and thereby including both the material and the social  – provides a 
more detailed picture of the impact of social media on society. Such an 
approach allows us not only to realise how social media is appropriated 
differently in different places, but also to use this difference to challenge 
the process by which themes of internet use come to be deemed wor-
thy of study. Here again we return to the distinction between techno- 
utopian and techno-deterministic approaches, which have largely 
informed discussions regarding the social impact of new technologies. 
These two opposing viewpoints have ended up guiding many of the 
chief areas of concern around the impact of social media such as privacy, 
democracy, inequality and education.13 However, this study has shown 
that rural Chinese users define social media as important in ways that 
do not always correspond to these ethnocentric ideals about what ought 
to give it meaning.
For example, Chapter 1 noted that in relation to the topic of per-
sonal freedom in online spaces in China, some commentaries empha-
sise the potential for social media to be a tool of liberation, while others 
stress the impact of state controls on the same social media.14 By contrast, 
Chapter 2 showed how people of Anshan Town feel little need to ‘have a 
voice’ on the internet; in fact they largely avoid using social media plat-
forms which allow them to share their thoughts with the entire internet. 
Chapter  6 described how few people in the town were even aware of 
the existence of the national ‘Golden Shield Project’ (often known as the 
‘Great Firewall of China’) which blocks certain websites, including non- 
Chinese social media platforms. Those who are aware of it seem largely 
unconcerned about it. Similarly, very few people reported having any 
social media posts censored or deleted, which in part reflects the fact 
that, for most people, social media is not seen as an appropriate place to 
share overt political opinions or postings.
This does not mean that Anshan Town people were acquiescent in 
their own suppression or lacked critical perspectives on the wider struc-
tures of power around them. Chapter 6 also showed how many spoke 
disparagingly about the content of news reports on social media (and 
traditional media), believing it usually to reproduce the Party view. It is 
rather that social media is constructed by what such populations desire 
to make of it, and in this instance it is issues such as pleasure, romance, 
family and personal aspiration that come first.
The topic of privacy provides a further example of the need to 
understand local interpretations of themes of inquiry before using them 
to assess the impact of social media. Anshan Town’s social media users 
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were not overly concerned about the state or social media companies 
monitoring their use; it was personal privacy that was a prime concern. 
The use of avatars and user aliases was commonplace, and helped to 
facilitate interactions with strangers by allowing users to conceal 
their own identity. Equally, sharing social media passwords was com-
mon behaviour, especially among young peers for whom it signified 
the existence of a high level of trust. Some users operated multiple or 
secret accounts to hide their online activities from their partners. These 
activities all point to a far greater concern about how one’s peers and 
family, rather than the administrative powers, may react to one’s online 
behaviour.
A final example that perhaps most forcefully illustrates the impor-
tance of taking the local into account when attempting to understand 
social media’s impact comes from the topic of inequality, where opin-
ions are divided between whether social media will reduce or exacer-
bate social inequality. Debates on this theme have to consider a range 
of social variables such as socio- economic status, literacy, age, gender, 
location and race. This project has demonstrated that ethnographic 
engagement can make clear how technology and the distribution of 
wealth and opportunities in society operate in a complex and reciprocal 
relation, rather than a linear and causative one.
The first contrast to draw on the subject of inequality is between 
the rural and the urban, especially in light of the unique setting of this 
study. Surprising findings have been obtained simply by giving due 
attention to rural use. For example, Chapter 1 noted how many urban 
Chinese believed internet and social media use in the countryside to be 
rare or non- existent. The range of platforms and internet access meth-
ods described in Chapter  2 showed Anshan Town to have a thriving 
(albeit unevenly dispersed) communications ecology.
Age and migration were shown to be two key and interrelated 
factors governing the use of social media. Users who had migrated to 
urban areas such as Bai Town or Jinan for extended periods of study or 
work often used a broader variety of platforms. By contrast, people who 
had not left the town  – especially elementary and middle schoolchil-
dren – tended predominantly to use QQ. However, even here there were 
notable exceptions; for example, a minority of individuals in their late 
thirties and above working in shops or administrative offices were also 
frequent users of QQ, a phenomenon that is often attributable to their 
working conditions – they are required to be in their workplace where 
they have both long periods of idleness and readily available internet 
access. As such, we see that determining someone’s level of social media 
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use may be as much about their immediate context as it is about any 
single social variable.
Gender has also been a key theme in this book. It is not simply 
that men and women use social media differently by virtue of their 
gender. It was demonstrated that the differing levels of mobility 
afforded to men and women (by virtue of their access to different 
modes of transport) combine with social media to afford both gen-
ders with markedly different opportunities for social interaction. So 
with gender, as with age and migration before it, we see a complex 
and at times contradictory picture. Instead of simple causal relations, 
patterns of social media use emerge in response to normative ideals 
informed by moral frameworks that dictate access to and appropriate 
use of a vast array of material technology in the town. Equally, these 
ideals are open to interpretation and challenge, including through 
social media use itself, and as such exceptions are also commonplace. 
This means that while structures of inequality exist in Anshan Town, 
as with any society, it is important to avoid seeing them as rigid and 
absolute.
While themes such as control, privacy and inequality are common 
areas of inquiry when studying the internet and social media in both 
China and beyond, this very specific case of a rural Chinese town has 
shown that each of these themes can mean greatly different things for 
local individuals. So the critique of their prevalence lies not in the impor-
tance of these themes for understanding the impact of social media and 
the internet in China  – topics which rightly require thorough research 
and documenting. The issue is the imbalance of the existing articles, 
which can easily lead readers to believe that such topics are the defining 
features of the Chinese internet for those that use them. This study has 
brought to the fore the specific kinds of social relations people create and 
maintain through their social media use, and how these become impli-
cated in important and pressing moral frameworks, revealing another 
aspect of the internet and social media. As such, social media’s impact 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by either utopian or deterministic 
principles, but rather we must see society and technology in a recipro-
cal relationship with each other in order to reveal what appear to be the 
townsfolks’ ambivalent positions in a society undergoing constant trans-
formation. In this complex and shifting context, it is only by trying to 
understand the significance that users of social media themselves attrib-
ute to such technologies (which requires us to first put our own assump-
tions on hold) that we might expand our own comprehension of social 
media from being a tool of communication to one of understanding.
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Appendix – Methodology
Questionnaires
This volume has made reference to statistical data throughout. The 
majority of this data was obtained through three questionnaire sur-
veys, which were conducted during different stages of the field work. 
Completion of these questionnaires posed a considerable challenge, 
and was sometimes hampered by participants’ suspicion regarding the 
purpose of the questionnaires, misunderstandings over the meaning of 
certain questions, illiteracy and boredom. Certain questions included 
in the original questionnaire proved so problematic, ill-defined and 
irrelevant to the local situation that they ended up being disregarded 
altogether.
The above factors also contributed to difficulty in finding individu-
als willing to respond to the questionnaires. The sample sizes are there-
fore relatively small. This means that the figures given in this book should 
be taken as being representative only of those who responded, rather than 
of Anshan Town as a whole. Nonetheless, certain findings drawn from 
the surveys have been presented in this volume as their inclusion com-
plements the breadth of data gathered over 15 months of ethnography in 
Anshan Town, for example by corroborating the author’s own intuitions 
regarding the existence of specific patterns of attitudes toward, or use of 
social media in the town, based on behaviours that were observed many 
times or points of view that were frequently expressed. On plenty of occa-
sions, however, statistics gave unclear answers.
Some will argue such use of statistics to be selective and problem-
atic. However the other alternative, large- scale, macro- level surveys 
and ‘big data’ analysis tend to miss out the kind of fine detail and anal-
ysis that participant- observation research can deliver.1 One of the ben-
efits of long- term interaction with participants was that it allowed the 
design of later questionnaires to take into account and address observa-
tions raised in the field. All questionnaires were anonymised and coded.
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Questionnaire A
Questionnaire A  was performed between June and August 2013 (the 
third to fifth months of field work). It consisted of a six- page question-
naire covering aspects such as socio- economic background information, 
use of different social media platforms, range of activities on social 
media, types of people communicated with on different platforms. The 
questionnaire also considered the presence of a range of different ICTs 
in the home, and their use by different family members. Ownership of 
transport and other household items was also measured. This ques-
tionnaire was designed with the intention of facilitating comparison 
between the nine field sites in the study, and therefore roughly the same 
version of the questionnaire was conducted in each of the field sites in 
this study.
The complexity of Questionnaire A meant that respondents gen-
erally had to be helped to complete the questionnaire by the author or 
a research assistant, who was able to guide participants through the 
questions, often recording responses on their behalf. In total 111 people 
completed the questionnaire (52 females, 59 males), with the youngest 
respondent being 16 years of age, and the oldest 65 years (the mean age 
was 32  years). This questionnaire included both users and non- users2 
of social media. The participants who formed the focus of the remain-
der of the field work were almost entirely recruited by means of this 
questionnaire.
Questionnaire b
Questionnaire B was conducted in the final three months of field work, 
between June and August 2014. It consisted of a two- page questionnaire 
containing only multiple choice or number responses. Questions included 
the quantity of contacts, the prevalence of friending family members on 
social media, face- to- face interactions, sharing of passwords, spending 
money online, and responses to advertising and online dating. This 
questionnaire was far simpler to complete than Questionnaire A, and 
was distributed in local businesses and to the homes of people already 
known to me, with the majority of respondents filling in the form by 
themselves. A  significant minority of these questionnaires were also 
entrusted to a local summer tuition school, where students were asked 
to complete them in bulk during class time. Once again, this question-
naire was designed to be comparative, so that it could be completed in 
the nine different field sites of the study.
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In total 175 responses were collected (81 females, 86 males, 8 
gender not provided). This questionnaire was targeted at users of social 
media, and responses were skewed towards younger people. (56 per 
cent were aged 13– 19 years; 21 per cent, 20– 29 years; 15 per cent, 30– 
39 years; 6 per cent, 40– 49 years; 1 per cent, 50– 59 years; one respon-
dent did not give age information.)
Questionnaire C
Questionnaire C was conducted in January 2014, and was aimed solely 
at middle school students. The questions in this survey focused on 
aspects of mobile phone, internet and social media use (including types 
of accounts used, presence of multiple accounts, QQ level obtained, 
password sharing, preferred activities).
In total 312 students completed this questionnaire; 146 respon-
dents were female and 145 respondents were male. In terms of their 
school age, 38 students were in grade 7 (12– 13 years of age), one stu-
dent was from grade 8 (13– 14 years) and 273 students were from grade 
9 (14– 15 years). The survey was completed with the generous assistance 
of teachers responsible for each of the class groups who distributed the 
questionnaires to students for completion in classrooms; they were 
immediately returned to the teachers who passed them on to the author 
for processing.
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Glossary of selected Chinese terms
Pinyin Chinese English
a’li wangwang 阿里旺旺 Prosperous Ali (chat client)
bai 百 one hundred
bai 白 white
baijiu 白酒 sorghum wine
baishi 白事 ‘white event’, mourning
baobao 宝宝 treasure, baby
baobei 宝贝 treasure, baby
baoxi, bu baoyou 报喜不报忧 share happiness, not sadness
bu zhengchang 
jiaowang
不正常交往 abnormal relations
bubugao 步步高 BBK (phone brand)
chuanyue huoxian 穿越火线 Crossfire
ciji 刺激 stimulating, exciting
dandiao 单调 monotony
dingyue 订阅 subscriptions
disanzhe 第三者 illegitimate lover
doudizhu 斗地主 ‘Tease the landlord’  
(a card game)
dubo 赌博 gambling
erhao 二号 second account
fa 发 to become rich
fan 烦 troublesome, annoying
fangbian 方便 convenient
fanghuo changcheng 防火长城 Great Firewall of China
fujin de ren 附近的人 People Nearby
fuza 复杂 complex
getihu 个体户 small private trader
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Pinyin Chinese English
gua QQ 挂QQ remain logged in to QQ
guanxi 关系 connections, relationships
guimi 闺蜜 bosom buddy, close friend 
(between female peers)
haoke 好客 friendly, good hosts
hei mingdan 黑名单 blacklist
hexie wenti 和谐问题 harmony problem
hongshi 红事 ‘red event’, celebration
jindun gongcheng 金盾工程 Golden Shield Project
jing 精 semen
liuyan ban 留言板 message board
luan 乱 messy
luanjia 乱加 messy adding
meng sanguo 梦三国 Dream of Three Kingdoms
nü zhu nei, nan zhu  
wai
女主内男主外 women live on the inside 
and men live on the outside 
(proverb)
pengyou quan 朋友圈 Moments
piaoliuping 漂流瓶 Drift Bottle
pingbi 屏蔽 to silence notifications  
(on a device)
pusu 朴素 sincere and honest
putong 普通 normal
qingming jie 清明节 tomb sweeping festival
qiushou 秋收 autumn harvest
qiuzan 求赞 requesting ‘likes’
qiuzhuan 求转 requesting ‘shares’
QQ dengji QQ等级 QQ levels
QQ huiyuan QQ会员 QQ membership
QQ kongjian QQ空间 Qzone
QQ qun QQ群 QQ group
qun guanliyuan 群管理员 group administrator
qun zhuren 群主人 group owner
Renmin Ribao 人民日报 People’s Daily
riji 日记 diary
shang wang 上网 to go online
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Pinyin Chinese English
shangdi 上帝 God
shangji 上级 higher levels
shengren 生人 stranger
shixiong 师兄 older classmate (of the same 
teacher)
shuoshuo 说说 speak speak
shuren 熟人 close friend
sixiang pinde 思想品德 ethics and morals
ta de dongtai 他/她的动态 his/her happenings
tan lian’ai 谈恋爱 courting
tili huo 体力活 heavy work
tong 同 same, common
tongxiang 同乡 person from same village/
town/province
tongxue 同学 classmate
tongshi 同事 work colleague
toucai 偷菜 stealing vegetables
touru jinqian 投入金钱 invest money
touru shijian 投入时间 invest time
tuanyuan fan 团圆饭 reunion dinner
wan 玩 fun
weibo 微博 Weibo
weiji ke 微机课 computer class
xiangce 相册 gallery
xingfu 幸福 blessed
Xinwen Lianbo 新闻联播 National Network TV News
xiu kongjian 修空间 decorate Qzone profile
xuanchuan 宣传 propaganda
yaoyiyao 摇一摇 shake
yi ye qing 一夜情 one night stands
youzhi 幼稚 childish
zhaogu 照顾 to care for
zhidao 指导 guidance
zhifubao 支付宝 Alipay
zhongguo dianxin 中国电信 China Telecom
zhongguo liantong 中国联通 China Unicom
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Pinyin Chinese English
zhongguo tese shehui 
zhuyi
中国特色社会主义 socialism with special 
Chinese characteristics 
(political policy)
zhongguo yidong 中国移动 China Mobile
zhuanfa 转发 share
zhufu 祝福 blessing
zhuhao 主号 main account
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creativity and innovation of China’s technology industry.
13 For a discussion of this see boyd, d. (2014). It’s Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked 
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Appendix
1 Oreglia, E., et al. Studying the Sent- Down Internet.
2 Here ‘non- users’ refers to those with no social media account of their own, and does not 
necessarily mean they do not use these technologies incidentally or with the assistance of 
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China’s distinctive social media platforms have gained 
notable popularity among the nation’s vast number of 
internet users, but has China’s countryside been ‘left 
behind’ in this communication revolution?
Tom Mcdonald spent 15 months living in a small rural 
Chinese community researching how the residents use 
social media in their daily lives. His ethnographic findings 
suggest that, far from being left behind, many rural 
Chinese people have already integrated social media into 
their everyday experience.
Throughout his ground-breaking study, Mcdonald 
argues that social media allows rural people to extend 
and transform their social relationships by deepening 
already existing connections with friends known through 
their school, work or village, while also experimenting 
with completely new forms of relationships through 
online interactions with strangers. By juxtaposing these 
seemingly opposed relations, rural social media users are 
able to use these technologies to understand, capitalise 
on and challenge the notions of morality that underlie 
rural life.
ToM MCdonald  is Assistant Professor in the 
department of sociology, The University of Hong Kong. He 
received his Phd in Anthropology from UCL in 2013 and 
has published numerous academic articles on internet use 
and consumption practices in China.
